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Letter from the Editor
João Rosa

The existence of venues of critical intellectual engagement oﬀers above
all common spaces where social dissonance is engaged, challenged and
where solutions are fostered and nurtured. The Journal of Cape Verdean
Studies aims to be a space where such critical intellectual engagement
can be embraced with the understanding that in the context of the
development of humanity, rigorous debate has historically been one of
the fundamental pillars of progress.
With the current edition, The Journal of Cape Verdean Studies deepens
its trajectory as it contributes to a better understanding of the role of Cape
Verdeans in the Ivory Coast, the patterns of historic and socio-educational
development of Cape Verdeans in Italy, economic transnationalism and
homeland development, socio-historic eﬀects of the U.S. deportation of
Cape Verdeans on second generation youth as well as the historical
processes of the ending of slavery in Cape Verde between 1856-1876. With
such vast diasporic reach and temporal profundity, these contributions
bring greater clarity to the multidimensionality of Cape Verdean experiences and identities. Only through the suturing of the cloth of identities
and experiences can the strength of the thread be examined and the
richness of the fabric exposed.
The Journal of Cape Verdean Studies invites you to be a part of the
ongoing dialogue in a journey of discovery.
Joao J. Rosa, Ph.D.
Executive Director
Pedro Pires Institute for Cape Verdean Studies
Bridgewater State University

CONFERENCE

HISTOIRE DE L’IMMIGRATION CAPVERDIENNE
EN CÔTE D’IVOIRE*
Jean-Baptiste Tavares

Introduction
Le thème de cette conférence célèbre le 39ème anniversaire de Cabo
Verde. Ce choix thématique, qui est celui du Bureau de l’association «Sodade de Côte d’Ivoire» et de sa présidente, s’inscrit dans un triple champ
de la connaissance. Le premier, dans celui de la psychologie, puisqu’il s’agit
ici de mobiliser la mémoire pour reconstituer des faits. Le deuxième, dans
celui de l’historiographie, car comment et avec quels repères chronologiques
et types de matériaux présenter le tableau de cette immigration qui diﬀère
complètement de toutes celles que la Côte d’Ivoire a connues? Le troisième,
est celui de la géographie, dans la mesure où il concerne un mouvement
migratoire de population, phénomène qui définit l’immigration.
Cet article reprend les grandes lignes d’un vieux projet d’écriture que
le Dr. Pierre Franklin Tavares et moi-même avions en préparation sur
l’immigration, au travers d’une analyse comparative des communautés
capverdiennes de Côte d’Ivoire, de France et du Sénégal.
Pour entrer dans le vif de notre sujet, sacrifions à un devoir de gratitude.
En eﬀet, ici et maintenant, et cela pour toujours, en souvenir des Pionniers
de cette histoire, nous voudrions réaﬃrmer le témoignage initial d’une antique hospitalité, en déclarant haut et fort que «a Costa de Marfim é uma
*. Conférence: Semaine de Cabo Verde du 30 juin au 05 juillet 2014 à Abidjan (39ème anniversaire de l’Indépendance de Cabo Verde)
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terra de boa gente» [la Côte d’Ivoire est une terre de bonnes gens]. Et les
Anciens aujourd’hui disparus, et qui ont vu prospérer la Côte d’Ivoire, aimaient
à dire qu’elle est eﬀectivement le «pays de l’hospitalité», une «patrie de la
vraie fraternité»1.

II. Histoire des relations entre la Côte d’Ivoire et Cabo
Verde (Cap-Vert)
Au plan historiographique, il se dégage trois grandes séquences historiques bornées par trois repères chronologiques qui permettent de fixer le
cadre des trois principales phases de la relation entre la Côte d’Ivoire et le
Cabo Verde. Le premier repère temporel s’étend du milieu du 16ème au milieu
du 18ème siècle. Il est d’ordre religieux et administratif. À cet égard,rappelons
que Cabo Verde a été le siège du premier Évêché ouest-africain. En eﬀet,
c’est en 1533 que le diocèse de Cabo Verde sera créé et,douze ans plus tard,
en 1545, le premier évêque résidant, Mgr Jean de Parvi, y sera nommé.
Or, la juridiction de cet Évêché s’étendait du fleuve Gambie au fleuve Sassandra, qui une région de la Côte d’Ivoire actuelle.Au demeurant, au plan
linguistique, certains noms de villes ivoiriennes attestent de cette influence
ancienne: Sassandra (déformation de Santo André), Fresco (ou fraîcheur ou
François) et San Pedro (Saint Pierre), par exemple. Mais il est aussi le nom
de famille de Mgr Bernard Yago, premier Évêque de Côte d’Ivoire, dont le
patronyme «Yago» est dérivé de Thiago ou Tiago et qui signifie Jacques en
langue portugaise, comme l’ont signalé Charles Akibodé2, dans un texte
instructif, et Pierre Franklin Tavaresqui s’appuie sur le célèbre texte de l’abbé
Grégoire, De la littérature des Nègres, où le prélat français évoque comme
modèle l’influence de l’église capverdienne sur le continent et jusqu’en Asie
(Goa, etc.) par l’envoi de missionnaires caboverdiens noirs. Dans cet ouvrage
anti-esclavagiste publié sous Napoléon Bonaparte (qui venait de rétablir
l’esclavage et soutenait le Club Massiac), l’abbé Grégoire rappelle le lien étymologique entre Tiago et Jacques.
Ainsi, Cabo Verde, capitale ouest-africaine du catholicisme et rampe de
lancement de l’évangélisation comme enjeu de l’expansion portugaise en
Afrique, a-t-il établi son premier lien historique avec la Côte d’Ivoire. Sans
doute les archives du Vatican conservent-elles maintes informations sur
cette relation entre les deux pays. Il faudrait pouvoir les consulter.
1. Ces deux expressions sont des paroles de l’Hymne national de la République de Côte d’Ivoire.
2. Cidade Velha, Centre historique de Ribeira Grande, Cap-Vert : Proposition d’inscription sur la
Liste du patrimoine mondiale, janvier 2008.

3. En 1460, les explorateurs Diogo Gomes et Antonio da Noli découvrent officiellement
le Cap-Vert notamment les îles de Santiago, Maio, Boa Vista, Fogo et Brava. Entre 1461
et 1462: Diogo Afonso découvre les îles de São Vicente, Santo Antão, São Nicolau et Sal.
Cependant, des chercheurs portugais, qui mènent une étude approfondie sur l’archipel,
restent convaincus que la version la plus crédible est celle confirmant la présence de
pêcheurs africains, puis des arabes et grecs.
4. La forte demande de pagnes de coton, qui servaient également de monnaie d’échange pour
l’achat des esclaves, avait contraint la couronne portugaise, accablée par la concurrence, à
interdire dès 1687 leurs ventes aux étrangers, ces dernières étant considérées comme un
crime passible de peine de mort.
5. Au 16ème siècle, des navigateurs capverdiens, dont les plus connus sont André Donelha et
André Alvares d’Almada, explorèrent pour le compte de la Couronne portugaise les Rios de
Guinée jusqu’aux fins fonds de la partie continentale de l’Africain de l’ouest encore inexploré.
6. Christophe Wondji, La côte ouest-africaine : du Sénégal à la Côte d’Ivoire, géographie, société,
histoire (1500-1800), L’Harmattan, Paris, 2000.
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Le second repère temporel couvre la période de la découverte de Cabo
Verdeentre 1460 et 1462, par des navigateurs au service de la Couronne portugaise3, jusqu’à l’abolition de l’esclavage à la fin du 19ème siècle. Son fondement est d’ordre économique: le commerce triangulaire. En eﬀet, en 1466,
par charte royale, la colonie de Cabo Verde est autorisée à faire le commerce
des esclaves avec la côte africaine, pour la mise en valeur des terres agricoles.
Mais, cette charte est détournée de son objet initial pour transformer
très rapidement l’archipel en une plaque tournante du commerce triangulaire entre le Portugal, l’Afrique et l’Amérique Latine, notamment pour le
trafic des esclaves et activités connexes (ravitaillement maritime, industrie
du pagne en coton4, etc.). Le Cap Vert devient alors le plus grand centre de
la traite des esclaves: un recensement dénombre 13.700 esclaves en 1532.
Cette activité économique très lucrative explique deux faits: d’une part,
l’établissement de comptoirs commerciaux portugais sur le littoral ivoirien,
à Bassam, San Pedro, Fresco, Sassandra, etc., et, d’autre part, la présence de
«Lançados». Qui étaient-ils ?
Au cours de la première période de prospérité économique (16ème et
17èmesiècles), la ville de Ribeira-Grande était également un centre de recouvrement des droits et taxes sur les cargaisons de l’autoroute de la traite
négrière, pour le compte de la Couronne portugaise. Dans sa tentative
d’accaparement des revenus du commerce lucratif de la traite négrière, la
Couronne portugaise édicta des lois fiscales de nature prohibitive et qui
eurent pour eﬀet l’expatriation, dès le 16ème siècle, des premiers commerçants capverdiens vers les «Rios da Guiné»,cettevaste étendue de la Sénégambie (sud de l’actuel Sénégal) à la Sierra-Leone5. Ces commerçants, sont
appelés «Lançados» ou commerçants sans permis royal, et à propos desquels le premier ivoirien agrégé d’Histoire, le professeur Christophe Wondji,
a écrit un magnifique ouvrage6. Ces «Lançados» exerçaient leurs activités en
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dehors de toute consigne légale, bravant ainsi les lois de la métropole7. Ils
ont été les propagateurs du créole qui faisait fonction de «lingua franca» en
Afrique de l’ouest.
De l’ensemble des développements précédents, nous retiendrons deux
faits majeurs. Tout d’abord, le fait que les juridictions paroissiales de Ribeira-Grande, siège de l’Évêché portugais d’Afrique, comprenait la Côte d’Ivoire.
Ensuite, dans le cadre du commerce triangulaire, l’existence de comptoirs
commerciaux portugaisen Côte d’Ivoire.
En tous les cas, les deux faits majeurs mis au jour autorisent l’aﬃrmation
d’une réalité historique: la possible présence de capverdiens en terre ivoirienne, entre le XVIème siècle et le XVIIème siècle, soit comme personnel de
soutien dans les dits comptoirs, soit comme religieux chargés de la propagation de la foi chrétienne. Sur ce point, les archives maritimes portugaises, les
correspondances privées, les sources du Vatican et les registres des églises
capverdiennes devraient fournir de précieuses informations. Pour lors, si l’on
atteste d’une possible présence capverdienne en Côte d’Ivoire dès le 16ème
siècle, si l’on peut également définir leurs profils socioprofessionnels, il est
impossible de déterminer leur nombre.
Il en va tout autrement avec la troisième séquence historique qui, prenant forme avec la fin progressive du trafic négrier8, plonge Cabo Verde dans
une profonde crise économique, et que viendra aggraver un long cycle de
sécheresse et de famine, entre le premier quart du XVIIIème siècle et le milieu
du XXème siècle, excepté la courte période de prospérité du port de Mindelo
comme base de ravitaillement en charbon de la navigation transatlantique
sur la route des Indes orientales9. Cabo Verde traverse, bouleversé, la période
7. En 1518, les commerçants capverdiens furent interdits de toute activité sur le continent
par la Couronne portugaise qui les soupçonnait de vouloir créer une zone franche dans la
sous-région.
8. Entre 1480 et 1494, les Traité de Tolède (partage de l’Atlantique) et Traité de Tordesillas (partage des terres) divisent le monde à découvrir entre l’Espagne et le Portugal. Ce
dernier détient ainsi le monopole du commerce atlantique des esclaves capturés en
Afrique de l’ouest. De la fin du XVIème au XVIIIème siècle, ce monopole est remis en cause
par la concurrence française, britannique et hollandaise. Ces derniers s’emparent d’une
grande partie de l’Afrique de l’ouest et détournent le trafic des esclaves vers d’autres
ports (Gorée, Ouidah, El Mina, etc.).De ce fait, les mouvements de navires deviennent
de plus en plus rares et le port négrier de Ribeira-Grande (Cidade Velha) l’ombre de son
passé glorieux. Les raids des corsaires anglais Francis Drake et Hawkins (1577-1585) et le
sac du français Jacques Cassard (1712) sur Santiago, notamment Praia et Ribeira-Grande
parachèvent ce triste tableau économique (la piraterie fut naguère l’un des plus graves
fléaux pour le Cap-Vert). En 1876, l’abolition oﬃcielle de l’esclavage n’est qu’un acte juridique consacrant une réalité déjà accomplie dans les faits.
9. À partir de 1830, champions du « libre échange » et seigneurs des mers, les anglais installent des dépôts de charbon dans l’île de S. Vicente pour assurer le ravitaillement de la
navigation transatlantique ainsi que la télégraphie par câble reliant l’Europe à l’Amérique
du Sud. Au cours de cette période, de nombreux capverdiens se font embaucher sur les

III. La communauté capverdienne de Côte d’Ivoire:
origine et formation
Pour le détail de notre propos, nous distinguerons les notions de
«présence» et de «communauté». Par «présence», s’entend ici l’existence,
dans une contrée ou une région donnée, de personnesmais sans que cellesci ne s’organisent en groupe avec d’autresindividus de même origine ou de
même nationalité (compatriotes), de culte ou culture, soit parce que ces
personnes sont isolées et mènent une existence solitaire parce que peu
nombreux, soit qu’avec leurs compatriotes ils ne se sont pas rassemblés. La
«présence» renvoie donc à un état d’individualité hors communauté.
Quant au terme de «communauté», il désigne un groupe social homogène, résidant sur un territoire donné, composé d’hommes et/ou de
femmes partageant des caractéristiques identiques, un même mode de vie,
pratiquant la même culture et la même langue, et défendant des intérêts
spécifiques. Ces personnes sont alors liées par un sentiment d’appartenance
à une entité qui les dépasse. À titre d’exemple, citons les communautés
chinoises qui s’organisent sous la forme de «china towns» dans les grandes
villes d’Amérique du nord. En Côte d’Ivoire, maintes communautéssont
établies sur ces bases.

navires, notamment les baleiniers américains, en quête d’une vie meilleure Les États-Unis apparurent ainsi comme la première et la plus importante communauté de la diaspora capverdienne.
10. Cesária Évora, Sodade, in Miss Perfumado, 1992.
11. Bana, Caminho de Sao Tomé, in Ao vivo no Coliseu, 2000.
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la plus tragique de son histoire. En eﬀet, un tiers des capverdiens meurt
de famine. Un deuxième tiers s’expatrie vers les États-Unis d’Amérique,
l’Europe occidentale, l’Afrique de l’ouest et vers les grandes exploitations de
cacao et de café de l’île de Sao Tomé-et-Prince, itinéraire dramatique que
traduisent deux émouvantes chansons populaires du répertoire capverdien,
la célèbre Sodade10 et le poignant Caminho de San-Tomé11. Tous, hommes et
femmes, allaient dans cette île comme « contratado », cetteforme de salariat proche du travail forcé, abandonnant ainsi, par la douleur, le pays natal.
Cette dure réalité modifiera de manière profonde la relation entre le
Cabo Verde et la Côte d’Ivoire, qui devient une terre d’accueil juste après la
seconde guerre mondiale, pour des capverdiens qui seront à la base de la
formation de leur communauté en Côte d’Ivoire. On les appellera ici et avec
grande aﬀection les Pionniers.

Jean-Baptiste Tavares
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Précisons toutefois que la «présence» d’individus est antérieure à la
formation d’une «communauté». Bref, nous avons vu que la «présence»
d’individus capverdiens en Côte d’Ivoire devait remonter à une date entre
la fin du 16ème siècle et le début du 17ème siècle. Et que cette «présence»
s’est poursuivie jusqu’au milieu du 19ème siècle, avant de se transformer en
«communauté», mais sans que les deux phénomènes soient dans un lien
mécanique ou d’emboîtement sociologique. En eﬀet, la formation de la
«communauté» capverdienne en Côte d’Ivoire marque une rupture avec la
«présence» capverdienne.
Dans les récits, la mémoire des Pionniers fait elle-même de manière
spontanée le distinguo entre la «présence» de ressortissants capverdiens en
Côte d’Ivoire qu’elle date à partir de la fin de la 1ère guerre mondiale avec
«Nha Preta», épouse d’un béninois aﬀecté en Côte d’Ivoire comme cadre
de l’administration coloniale. Cette mémoire signale également la présence
ultérieure, plus exactement à partir de 1945, de «Nha Maria», la mère de
Pama, et de Georges Monteiro alias Djiby Loti, militaire démobilisé des
forces françaises libres. Ce ne sont que des «présences» qui ne constituent
pas encore une «communauté», car leur résidence est liée à des faits contingents (contraction d’un mariage ou démobilisation militaire). Les individus cités ne sont pas organisés en communauté (mode de vie, valeurs communes, langue, etc.). Ils ne se fréquentent pas.
En vérité, si l’on est généralement bien informé sur les causes des migrations capverdiennes successives, remarquons avec intérêt que l’on est
beaucoup moins bien renseigné sur leurs conditions d’accueil, leurs modes
d’insertion et de vie dans les pays où elles se sont installées. La faiblesse
actuelle de la base documentaire et le fait que les récits oraux n’aient pas
été recueillis ne constituent qu’un obstacle provisoire dans la reconstitution de l’histoire de l’immigration capverdienne en Côte d’Ivoire. Nous ne
devons pas désespérer de retrouver des archives de toutes sortes, des
témoignages, des dates et des faits permettant une reconstitution assez
fidèle. À cet égard, «Exposition photos» est une initiative opportune, pertinente et surtout novatrice. La recherche qui s’amorce ici doit se poursuivre
et approfondir son eﬀort.
Pour lors, il suﬃra à notre patience de débuter par la remémoration de
l’anecdotequi, orientant le cours des événements, sera à la source de la naissance de notre «communauté» en Côte d’Ivoire. Pour autant, il infléchira et
déterminera le cours général de notre immigration.
Nous sommes en septembre 1948, à Dakar, au Service d’hygiène. Deux
jeunes capverdiens s’y rencontrent, et ce tout à fait par hasard. Une pure
coïncidence donc. Ils doivent se faire vacciner et se faire remettre leurs

Géographique de la population et données sociodémographiques
Entre 1950 et 1965, période de naissance et de consolidation de l’État
ivoirien, la communauté capverdienne de Côte d’Ivoire est marquée par une
forte croissance démographique sous le triple mode suivant :
– l’arrivée de nouveaux immigrants, transitant par Dakar. Elle se fera essentiellement sous la forme d’extension des familles installées au cours
du premier quinquennat des années 195013. Cette forme de croissance est
pratiquée notamment par les populations de Boavista et de Fogo et dans
une moindre mesure par celles de San Vicente. Concernant les populations de Santiago, l’arrivée des nouveaux immigrants s’est faite sur la

12. Pierre Franklin Tavares, Considérations éparses sur la crise ivoirienne, Editions NEI, Abidjan 2005
13. M. Colombo De Barros facilita l’arrivée de son frère, M. Emmanuel De Barros (Nho
Néné), de son beau-frère, Gil Fernandes et de ses deux belle-sœurs, Mmes Winie Gomes
et Aida Teixeira Lopes. M. Maxime Brito fit de même avec les familles Da Silva (NhoTifulinho), Orlando Brito, Evora (NhoEanse) de la ville de Cabeça di Tarafa à Boa Vista et
M. Hemitério Pinto avec son frère Casimirio et sa sœur, Mme. Firmina Andrade.
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carnets de vaccination, en vue de leur voyage. L’un s’appelle Cristovão Colombo De BARROS, natif de l’île de Fogo, qui doit partir s’installer à Bamako.
L’autre est Gonçalo Amarante TAVARES, natif de l’île de Santiago, qui est
attendu à Abidjan par son cousin, Georges Monteiro alias Djiby Loti, militaire démobilisé des forces françaises libres.
Le second convainc le premier qu’Abidjan est une meilleure destination.
Ils s’y rendent ensemble. «La jeunesse de leur regard découvre une Côte
d’Ivoire qui n’est alors qu’un pays, c’est-à-dire une géographie et un paysage
[…] Tout était à bâtir ! Une large promesse du temps»12. Peu de temps après
leur insertion à Abidjan, ils procèdent chacun à un «regroupement familial»,
faisant venir femmes, enfants et bagages (1949-1950). Ils parviennent également à persuader certains de leurs proches parents à les rejoindre.
Ainsi créent-ilsla première filière d’immigration en Côte d’Ivoire, sur une
base patrilinéaire, parce que c’est la décision de deux hommes qui sont des
chefs de famille. La période charnière est donc 1948-1950: une anecdote.
Une rencontre fortuite. Deux jeunes hommes, en quête d’avenir. Une occasion. Deux familles. Une décision fondatrice. Ce sont eux les premiers immigrés capverdiens et les pères fondateurs de notre «communauté» en Côte
d’Ivoire. Par leur décision, ils suscitent un nouveau chemin d’immigration.
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base du «compadrage14» ou compérage. À partir de 1965, ce flux migratoire disparaitra de façon progressive au profit de pays européens,au
travers d’une combinaison de facteurs d’attraction (forte demande de
main-d’œuvre qualifiée dans le secteur des BTP, salaires plus élevés,
meilleure oﬀre de services sociaux, etc.), notamment en Allemagne, en
Belgique, au Luxembourg, en France et en Hollande, et de facteurs de
répulsion tels que la mauvaise gouvernance politique (première ère des
coups d’Etat). Ces éléments expliquent la structure démographique de
la communauté capverdienne de Côte d’Ivoire tout au long de la décennie de 1950: (i) une faible représentation des populations provenant des
îles de San Antão, de San Nicolau, de Sal et de Maio (moins de 10%); et
(ii) une structure pyramidale déséquilibrée avec près des 2/3 des populations âgées de plus 30 ans et comptant plus d’hommes que de femmes ;
et (iii) une forte concentration de la population (plus de 95%) dans la ville
d’Abidjan. Au niveau professionnel, les hommes sont actifs dans les différents corps de métiers des secteurs de la construction et du bâtiment
(maçonnerie, peinture, carrelage, menuiserie, ferronnerie, etc.), du textile et du cuir (fabrication et réparation de chaussures, couture, etc.) et
du maritime (chantier naval, activités portuaires, loisirs nautiques, etc.).
Les femmes pour la plupart sont couturières dans les chics boutiques du
Plateau, quartier des aﬀaires de la ville d’Abidjan, ou gouvernantes dans
les familles européennes expatriées et africaines aisées ;
– un fort croît naturel avec les premières naissances de bébés capverdiens de 1951-1953 et les baby booms de 1955-1957 et de 1959-1962. Par
la suite, ce mode de croît connaîtra un net fléchissement avec la nature
monogamique des familles et l’option du nombre restreint d’enfants par
famille ; et
– les femmes de la communauté capverdienne du Sénégal mariées à des
cadres ivoiriens de retour dans leur pays natal entre 1958 (loi cadre) et
1960 (indépendance nationale). Ce groupe (mères et enfants binationaux) vivraen marge de la communauté, constituant ainsi un paradoxedans
la mesure où (i) les maris, notamment Messieurs ADDÉ et BLÉGNOUA,
participaient activement aux diﬀérentes manifestations de la communauté; et (ii) les mères et leurs enfants étaient porteurs de capverdianité
avec une bonne maîtrise du créole et des pratiques culturelles spécifiques

14. Dans le système de parenté, le compadrage ou compérage était une institution sociale
faisant des parrains et marraines de véritables parents, avec une forte obligation de responsabilité vis-à-vis de leurs filleul(e)s, considérés comme leurs «fils» et «filles» spirituels.
Dans les relations sociales capverdiennes marquées par le catholicisme, le compadrage
ou le compérage fixait un lien et une alliance solides.

Ainsi sous ce triple mode de croissance démographique, la communauté
passe d’une dizaine de familles en 1950 à plus de 50 familles, correspondant
à près de 400 individus, en 1965. Sa taille, la plus petite minorité d’étrangers
vivant en Côte d’Ivoire, constituera l’une de ses principales faiblesses
l’empêchant ainsi de profiter pleinement de la forte expansion économique
de la Côte d’Ivoire, à l’instardes autres communautés étrangères du Bénin,
du Burkina Faso, du Mali, de la Mauritanie, du Nigéria et du Niger.
Pour la période considérée, la structure sociale est dominée à 90% par
les entrepreneurs individuels (aristocratie ouvrière) et des tâcherons (maçons, peintres, etc.). C’est donc une petite bourgeoise qui a fait preuve d’un
fort dynamisme dans le monde économique avec la création d’une des plus
grandes imprimeries modernes par la famille Alfredo MORENO (Imprimerie
Commerciale), d’entreprises en bâtiments avec les familles Victorino LOPES,
d’avitaillement maritime avec la famille PINTO et d’une fabrique semi-industrielle de bottes et chaussures avec la famille Gonçalo TAVARES, pour
ne citer que celles-là. C’est une période de grande prospérité économique
pour la communauté et, au lendemain de l’indépendance de la Côte d’Ivoire,
quelques-uns de ses membres étaient déjà propriétaires de leurs résidences
principales et d’habitations modernes mises en location (accumulation de
patrimoines).
La communauté capverdienne comportait de véritables lieux de sociabilité et tout était prétexte pour magnifier les caractéristiques personnelles
de la «Morabeza» et de la «Convivença»: fiançailles, mariages, baptêmes,
communions, anniversaires, etc. Et si cela ne suﬃsait pas, on improvisait
sur le champ des mariages et des baptêmes de poupéesou de régimes de
bananes. Ces manifestations faites de fraternité, à savoir de prévenance et
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aux capverdiens et plus particulièrement aux «badius».Ce paradoxe n’est
qu’apparent, si l’on tient compte du fait que ledit groupe est un produit direct de l’histoire de la communauté capverdienne du Sénégal et
représente la 3ème voire la 4ème génération de descendants de Capverdiens avec une forte volonté d’intégration à la société sénégalaise. Le
Ministre Jean-Paul DIAZ en est la figure achevée. Des problèmes d’ordre
identitaire pourraient également expliquer cette marginalité: (i) l’image
négative du Portugal dans les guerres napoléoniennes enseignées dans
l’Histoire de France et du Cap-Vert ravagé par un long cycle de famine; (ii)
le complexe de supériorité des dakarois du fait de la centralité de la ville
de Dakar dans le cadre de l’Afrique occidentale française; (iii) l’ignorance
de l’histoire générale de Cabo Verde en liaison avec l’inexistence de relations entre les espaces francophone et lusophone, etc.
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de gentillesse à l’endroit des uns et des autres, avaient lieu aux domiciles de
Nho FRANK à Dabou, de Nho LIXE au Plateau, de Nho PAZÉ et Nha NAZIA,
située à l’Institut fondamental d’Afrique noire (IFAN) à Adjamé et, surtout,de
Georges MONTEIRO puis Manuel TAVARES à l’Habitat Arras en face de
l’AITACI.
Comme mentionné plus haut, l’extinction de la filière d’immigration
annonce le déclin de la communauté capverdienne de Côte d’ivoire. Cette
dégradation de la courbe démographique s’accentuera avec le départ de
nombreuses familles résidentes. Ainsi, la totalité de la composante «bravense» de notre communauté reprendra les chemins de l’exil pour s’installer
aux États-Unis d’Amérique, leur seconde patrie, à la fin des années 1960. Il
en ira de même avec celle de Fogo, dont les fils choisissent la France comme
point de chute à compter des années 1970. Avec l’indépendance en 1975,
une dernière vague, constituée de quelques familles et surtout de jeunes
cadres, regagnera Cabo Verde. C’est la dispersion de la communauté, par
l’aﬀaiblissement de son socle initial.
Faisons ici une courte digression. Cette communauté a su fort habilement compenser son faible poids démographique, par un rôle décisif, au
double plan de la diplomatie africaine et de l’eﬀort de guerre dans la lutte armée pour l’indépendance. En eﬀet, mettant à profit l’indéniable importance
politique, diplomatique et géostratégique de la Côte d’Ivoire et l’influence
mondiale de Son Excellence Félix Houphouët-Boigny, quelques capverdiens
de Côte d’Ivoire ont su habilement l’amener à prendre fait et cause, de façon
précoce, pour l’Indépendance de la Guinée-Bissau et du Cap Vert. Ainsi, sur
le conseil de ces membres de la communauté, Amilcar Cabral fera de l’État
ivoirien un de ses principaux alliés et points d’appui, en nouant avec Abidjan
des relations fructueuses. Sans cette précision, nul ne peut comprendre que
le MPLA qui partageait la même idéologie que le PAIGC n’obtint pas les
faveurs du président Félix Houphouët-Boigny. Jamais ce dernier ne fera un
quelconque obstacle auPAIGC. Bien au contraire. Il apportera un constant
soutien financier.
Pour revenir à l’aﬀaiblissement de la communauté capverdienne de Côte
d’Ivoire, signalons que lasaignée démographique, dont nous parlions plus
haut, eut un impact négatifsur sa situation économique: la classe entrepreneuriale, fierté de la communauté, a pratiquement disparu. Pas ou peu de
relève. Car la nouvelle génération ne parvient pas à reprendre les aﬀaires
familiales ou, lorsqu’elle y parvient,avec beaucoup de peine à les faire fructifier. En tous les cas, les eﬀets cumulés et conjugués des diﬀérenciations
économiques et des divergences politiques naissantes,à la faveurdela lutte
pour l’indépendance et l’alternance démocratique,ont accentué le processus

IV. Perspectives du développement du partenariat
entre Cabo Verde et sa diaspora
Sur la base de l’expérience accumulée en la matière au cours de ces quarante
(40) dernières années,des pistes d’amélioration peuvent être dégagées sur la
problématique et les enjeux du phénomène de l’immigration. Ce sont:
– la résorption de l’énorme déficit de connaissance sur les diﬀérentes communautés de la diaspora capverdienne. Ceci doit constituer une tâche historique et politique décisive. En eﬀet, sans données sociales, comment l’État
peut-il sérieusement envisager une politique d’ensemble de l’immigration?
Toute stratégie nationale de mobilisation de la diaspora nécessite donc
de disposer de données et statistiques exactes et complètes16 sur les flux
15. Pierre Franklin TAVARES, La recherche sociale comme prise de position politique, 11 mai
1991.
16. Certaines stratégies pour mobiliser les ressources financières de la diaspora ne font pas
l’objet de recherches approfondies ou d’informations exhaustives. Parfois, elles sont
basées sur des données non vérifiées sur les migrants. A titre d’exemple, le Programme
national d’investissement (PNI) de la Sierra Leone avait fait des prévisions sur la base de
transferts de fonds de 500 000 migrants sierra-léonais contre un taux d’émigration du
pays de 2%, soit 114 000 migrants (statistique des Nations Unies).Ceci a compromis les
attentes du pays qui comptait sur les importantes ressources financières de sa diaspora
pour booster sa croissance et son plan de développement.
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de fragilisation et aﬀaibli la cohésion sociale de la communauté. Les grandes
familles constitutives de la communauté s’entredéchirèrent et cette «guerre
des clans», sous la forme d’une dictature parentalequi ira jusqu’à se traduire
par la disparition des mariages intra-communautaires et renforcer de facto
le poids démographique des binationaux et le retour à leurs racines par une
participation de plus en plus croissante à la vie de la communauté (base sociologique des dernières élections associatives et de la structuration de la
direction de SODADE-CI).
En résumé, «une communauté immigrée qui ne sait pas comment elle
compose socialement n’est porteuse d’aucun avenir. Elle reste une minorité,
à savoir un groupe d’hommes et de femmes qui ne prend pas part à la vie de
l’État et de la Nation qui l’accueille»15.
Tels sont les premiers éléments de l’Histoire de l’immigration capverdienne en Côte d’Ivoire. Aujourd’hui, une quatrième séquence de la vielle relation entre la Côte d’Ivoire et le Cabo Verde a pris forme, à travers un renforcement qualitatif de la coopération entre les deux États et le probable
renouveau de la communauté capverdienne de Côte d’ivoire.
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migratoires (importance et causes), les communautés immigrées (nature,
compositions sociales, modes d’insertion économique; vie politique et
culturelle des communautés; etc.).À cet égard, la création et la mise en
place de l’Observatoire des migrations est une avancée notable. Cependant, sa mission semble se limiter à la connaissance de l’importance des
flux migratoires. La création de centres de recherches appropriés pour
adresser l’ensemble des réalités sociales de l’immigration demeure donc
une question ouverte et non résolue, en dépit de son caractère urgent;
– la revue de l’histoire de l’émigration capverdienne en remontant ses
origines au phénomène des «lançados». Ceci nécessitera une étroite
collaboration entre historiens, sociologues et démographes capverdiens de l’intérieur et de la diaspora pour compléter les registres de
l’historiographie de l’immigration. Les «lançados» présentent un profil
diﬀérent (opérateurs économiques, exportation de capitaux,transfert de
savoir-faire et de compétences entrepreneuriales, etc.) de celui des immigrés des XIXèmeet XXèmesiècles (main-d’œuvre plus ou moins qualifiée dans les BTP). Et toute politique de l’immigration devrait s’inspirer
des «lançados» en faisant des diﬀérentes communautés de la diaspora
une formidable matrice de distribution commerciale de produits made
in Cabo Verde ou/et marchandises réexportés, notamment celles en
provenance du Brésil17;
– la constitution de l’immigration en un corps de citoyens actifs pour
devenir des acteurs significatifs du jeu démocratique en Cabo Verdepar
l’élargissement de sa représentativité législative, limité actuellement
à 5 représentants à l’Assemblée nationale, ou la création d’un conseil
économique et social avec un tiers de ses membres issus de l’immigration.
En eﬀet, le processus de construction de la nation et de transformation
économique du pays exige un dialogue politique et social permanent au
service du développement ; et
– la mise en place d’un environnement favorable combinée à une
vision nationale partagée entre le Gouvernement et la diaspora18.
Comme segment de la société capverdienne contribuant significativement au financement de l’économie nationale19, la diaspora doit être
17. Voir la politique d’appui de l’Etat mauritanien aux différents réseaux de boutiquiers
mauritaniens en Afrique de l’ouest.
18. La Chine, la Corée, et l’Inde figurent parmi les pays qui ont montré comment les apports
de la diaspora peuvent contribuer de manière significative à transformer les économies
nationales. Les approches adoptées par ces nations asiatiques se déclinent comme des
initiatives pilotées par les pays et fondées sur des objectifs partagés entre le gouvernement et la diaspora autour de piliers de croissance critiques.
19. Selon le Rapport sur le développement de 2009 du PNUD, les transferts de fonds per
capita des migrants capverdiens sont estimés à 262 dollars US en 2007, soit 85% du

V. Conclusions
Pour conclure, il faut signaler que le «grand Mensonge» (mot d’Amilcar
Cabral) au lendemain de l’indépendance est devenu Vérité, car Cabo Verde a
su surmonter ses principaux défis historiques:
– en un peu plus de trente ans (30) d’indépendance, le Cabo Verde est
sorti du groupe de Pays les moins avancés (PMA) pour accéder au groupe
de Pays à revenu intermédiaire (PRI); et
– en quinze d’indépendance, le Cabo Verde est devenu un des modèles
de démocratie dans le monde, avec une remarquable stabilité de son
régime parlementaire.
Ainsi, le «Petit pays», comme Césaria Évora aimait à appeler Cabo Verde,
montre comment il est possible de faire la synthèse entre développement
économique et démocratie. Et c’est fort de ces succès que, partout dans le
monde, toutes les composantes de la diaspora capverdienne sont habitées
d’une grande fierté.
Je vous remercie pour votre attention.

Abidjan, le 4 juillet 2014.

niveau d’aide publique au développement reçue par habitant.
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considérée comme un partenaire du développement,à travers des initiatives fondées sur des objectifs partagés entre le Gouvernement et la
diaspora. À cet eﬀet, la création d’un environnement favorable est une
condition sine qua non pour réussir la mobilisationdes ressources de la
diaspora (expertise, investissements, esprit d’entreprise et réseaux professionnels) autour de piliers de croissance. Parmi les composantes de
cet environnement, on peut citer, entre autres: (i) la mise en place des
structures de promotion de la transparence et de la responsabilisation
qui est un acquis sur lequel Cabo Verde doit continuer de capitaliser sur
ses gains en la matière; (ii) la revue des politiques et des mécanismes incitatifs pour promouvoir les investissements, notamment l’amélioration
du climat des aﬀaires et de la compétitivité (lourdeurs administratives
et rigidités du marché du travail, coût élevé des facteurs, notamment du
transport et de l’électricité, etc.);
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Abstract
Cape Verdean migration to Italy started in the early sixties of the nineteenth century as an exclusively female one, mostly caused by the demand for domestic
workers by bourgeois families. In the late eighties, the Cape Verdean community migrated to Italy was still composed of more than 90% of women. In 1990,
the introduction of a legislation setting forth the right to family reunification
allowed many women to reunite with their husbands and children remained in
their homeland. In Italy, the gradual social inclusion process and the creation of
a network of Cape Verdean migrants’ association, allowed to overcome all those
problems that troubled the first migrants arrived in Italy. Even though the integration process sets a context generally positive, there are still many problems,
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specially linked to job insecurity – also caused by the low social and professional
mobility – and children’s education. Families are often divided, and mother have
to raise children alone, often living with their employer. The increasing presence
of Italian-born children of immigrants, simultaneously to the ‘building’ of second
and third generations, have hastened the process of cultural and social hybridization, however, without weaken Italian-Capo Verdeans’ ‘Capo-Verdeanity” strong
sense of social and cultural identity.
Keywords
Cape Verdean migration, Women, Cultural integration, Cabo Verde, Labor.

1. Cabo Verdeans in Italy: phases and timing of a mostly
female phenomenon
Women were the real pioneers of migration to Italy, which started
during the mid-sixties when alongside the phenomenon of emigration,
which had involved Italian society since the nineteenth century, there began
the reverse migration that is still in progress (Demetrio, Favaro, Melotti, Ziglio, 1990; Vicarelli, 1994; de Filippo, 2000). The female component, which
now accounts for more than half of the five million regular immigrants in
Italy (IDOS Study and Research Centre, 2014), has been a significant slice
of Italian immigration since the beginning.
In the specific case of Cabo Verdean migration to Italy, the phenomenon
originated as an exclusively female emigration, encouraged by the demand
for domestic workers to be employed in the homes of middle-class families in major Italian cities (Jesus, 1989). What was attracting women was
the need for labour in the context of domestic work and child care, which
emerged in the years of industrialisation that characterised Italy in the decades following the end of the Second World War. This had encouraged
Italian women to abandon domestic work to be employed in factories (Silva,
2002, p. 46). Then the demand for care work involving people increased in
the nineties to meet the increasingly urgent, social need for care of the no
longer self-suﬃcient elderly, whose number is constantly growing because
of increased longevity and aging of the population. Today in the field of care
– where most of the so-called “caregivers” (badanti) are employed: this was
a term introduced by the Italian legislation on immigration of 2002 – women
of diﬀerent countries and continents are involved, mainly from Eastern Europe, but initially concerned mostly Philippine, Eritrean and Cabo Verdean
women (Silva, 2012a).
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The Cabo Verdean immigration to Italy began sporadically as an exclusively female phenomenon between 1957 and 1962, but it soon took on a
continuous nature. At first the goal was Rome; later the other major cities
such as Turin, Milan, Genoa, Florence, Naples and Palermo became places
of welcome and employment for Cabo Verdeans. The first to emigrate were
the women from São Nicolau and acting as go-between were the Capuchin
friars who had been on the island for a long time (Cabral, 2012). As soon
as the Cabo Verdean women arrived in Italy, usually unmarried and with a
basic education, they set about finding work for other fellow compatriots,
both relatives and friends. This sparked a real chain of migration that linked
Cabo Verde to Italy and that reached its highest peak in the late 1970s and
early 1980s. Thus the function of the Capuchin friars gradually decreased
in importance, giving way to a network of organised and legal migration in
which women, also from this point of view, played a role as protagonists.
From the second half of the 1960s the flow of Cabo Verdeans to Italy had in
the meantime also aﬀected all the other islands (Jesus, 1989).
Until 1970 employment contracts were regular, but since the contracts
of domestic workers were not regulated, the rights and duties of such
workers depended only on verbal agreements between them and their
employers. With the collective contract for domestic workers (called “colf”
from the Italian “collaboratrici familiari”) imposed in 1973 by the Ministry of
Labour, labour relations were regulated by law, although in fact the Cabo
Verdeans, like other foreign domestic workers, closed in the home, continued
to work according to schedules that were too long, not to have holidays and
to be underpaid. This situation of regularity might make it appear that the
situation of the immigrants at that time was better than the current “caregivers”. In some ways it was, if you think that the way to emigrate to Italy
is today almost exclusively that of illegality, with all the risks involved, as
evidenced by the frequent shipwrecks oﬀ the Italian coast. However, even
then the situation was not easy if one considers that at that time there was
no check on the situation of domestic workers, whose rights were very
limited and whose social security and trade union contributions were almost
nonexistent.
Between 1970 and 1980 taking the route to Italy were not just very young
unmarried girls, but also women and mothers who had left their children
and often a husband or companion in Cabo Verde. The presence in Italy of
other immigrants coming from various countries of Asia, Africa, Central and
South America (Philippines, Eritrea, Sri Lanka, India, Dominican Republic,
Peru etc.) over the years generated strong competition in working in the domestic sector, which discouraged departures from Cabo Verde. Fortunately,
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at the same time the social, economic and cultural situation of Cabo Verde,
after independence in 1975, was steadily improving (Bossu-Picat, 1985), so
much so that emigration today is seen more as a forced departure, even
though many young people continue to have the desire to emigrate.
In the late 1980s the Cabo Verdean community in Italy was made up, by
more than 90%,of women. The issuing of comprehensive legislation on
immigration, with law no. 39 of 1990, among other things, introduced the
right to family reunification, thus allowing many Cabo Verdean women to
be rejoined by their husbands and any children left at home or who had
migrated to other countries, so as to constitute a family in Italy.
With the formation of families, Cabo Verdean emigration, just as in
general in migration processes, came to lose those traits of provisional and
temporary nature that had marked it early on, taking on instead a stable
connotation (Silva, 2004). For the Cabo Verdeans Italy became no longer a
land of passage in which to look for a certain economic fortune and then return home, but the place where you plan your own future. A new perspective
that was certainly helped by many mixed marriages between Italians and
Cabo Verdean women.
Whereas during the first phase of immigration, women returned to Cabo
Verde after a few years of work (2-5) – often after contracting marriage with
compatriots who had emigrated elsewhere in Europe – ensuring that new
streams of young women would fill the places left free by those leaving –
the stabilisation of Cabo Verdeans in Italy since the early 1990s has severely
limited this turnover.
In 1972 there were between 3,500 and 4,000 Cabo Verdeans in Italy, of
which about 2,500 from the island of São Nicolau. After reaching a peak in
1978, migration decreased sharply from 1981, following the introduction by
the Italian government of more restrictive procedures regarding immigration from non-EU countries in the developing world, such as Cabo Verde.
In the mid-1980s, when legal entries were almost totally blocked, Cabo
Verdean immigrants resident in Italy numbered 7,000, 90% of whom were
women (Altieri, 1992).
Starting from the 1990s we saw the first cases of repatriation or of emigration to other countries by the Cabo Verdeans living in Italy. Returning were
especially those women who, having reached retirement age, preferred to
return to their country of origin, where life is cheaper. At the same time internal mobility on the Italian territory, initially quite small, became much
livelier.
Today the oﬃcial figures indicate a presence, almost constant since
2009, of about 4,600 Cabo Verdeans legally resident in Italy (ISTAT data).

2. Work and social situation of Cabo Verdean immigrants in Italy
It is estimated that 70% of immigrants from Cabo Verde in Italy are still
working in domestic work. Poor labour mobility is due both to the rigidity of
the Italian labour market and to the limited opportunities for immigrants in
general to acquire new professional skills by attending specialised courses.
Nevertheless, since the early 1980s, the Cabo Verdeans have begun to pursue
other interests, especially in services and commercial and tourist structures.
For a large number of them, having a full-time housework job implies
their total availability for their employers, or being available round the clock,
except for one and a half days a week. This prevents them from engaging in
any activity of study, work or relationship, which would allow an improvement in their living conditions.
Given the social stereotype for which a domestic worker must be female
and given the low level of specialisation of male migrants from Cabo Verde,
the latter have more diﬃculty in finding employment and therefore their
rate of unemployment is higher than women’s. However, over time some
men have adapted to the work of care, possibly working in pairs with their
companions. Then the fact that Cabo Verdean adults of first generation migrated to Italy as part of family reunification led in some cases to a certain
disorientation and a sense of inadequacy when the men found themselves
facing situations already overcome by their companions.
The scarcity of leisure time related to domestic work has not prevented
a number of Cabo Verdean immigrants from increasing their level of education. There was, especially with the first to arrive, an important need for
training, which was met by setting up a Portuguese School in Rome in 1971.
The curriculum was based on the oﬃcial programmes in force in Portugal
and that included early primary education and the preparatory cycle and
later extended its classes until the 12th year of schooling. For many years
the students of this school were mostly of Cabo Verdean origin and only in
the middle of the 1990sdid enrolments decrease substantially.
Another important dimension that has always characterised and continues to characterise the social and cultural life of many Cabo Verdeans
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The number of people of Cabo Verdean origin on the Italian territory,
however, is much higher, and hovers between 10 and 12 thousand people,
since many women have gradually acquired Italian citizenship, through
marriage to Italians, but also by naturalisation.
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living in Italy is associative (Jesus, 1996). Currently there are Cabo Verdean
associations in Rome, Milan, Naples, Florence, Genoa and Palermo. In Rome
as early as the mid-1970s there was an association, founded by two Cabo
Verdeans originating from São Vicente, who over more than ten years favoured the maintenance of social ties and mutual support among people
who were likely to lose themselves in society, supporting their desire for
education and training. This association later gave way to a new association, the Organização das Mulheres Caboverdianas em Italia (OMCVI), set up
in 1988 and still active in various fields, including those of promoting Cabo
Verdean culture and maintaining important ties with Cabo Verde. The subsequent emergence of other Cabo Verdean associations in Rome is a sign of
great vitality and organisational ability of the Cabo Verdean community in
Italy (Jesus, 1989).
Belonging to the Catholic religion has certainly encouraged the relationship between immigrants from Cabo Verde and the local community. The
fact that the religion practiced by the Cabo Verdeans is the same as practiced by the autochthonous population facilitated reception of the former,
because the Catholic Church is driven by the concern to keep religion alive
in them (Monteiro, 1997). Especially in the first phase religious bodies made
premises available to the Cabo Verdeans and people responsible for their
hospitality during the time left free from work. In Rome a particularly significant role was played by the centre “Tra Noi” (Among Us), which set up
a meeting place for Cabo Verdean girls. In Naples the Don Orione Institute
welcomed and continues to welcome women with children laid oﬀ by employers who do not accept the presence of the children of workers or who
expect them to send their children to Cabo Verde after their birth.
The gradual integration of women in local society and the lack of free
time, gradually more and more absorbed by emotional commitments and
family life, has however, weakened ties with religious institutions, somewhat unable to meet the new needs of women, less and less connected with
the emergency of the first reception and orientation in the new context of
life, and instead connected with the desire for positive integration into Italian society. Furthermore, making a comparison between the religious life
conducted in Cabo Verde and that conducted in Italy, we are facing a transformation that we have defined elsewhere in terms of a change in the social
and symbolic significance of religious practices. In other words, the social
and symbolic significance of the diﬀerent practices, such as marriage or
christening, changes in the new context. In Cabo Verde the rites, as well as
having an obviously strictly religious value, are also designed to strengthen
the position and the social role of the individual within a network of local

3. Bringing up children of immigration: the case of
Cabo Verdean mothers
Parents today find it increasingly more diﬃcult to be an important guide
for their children in a society marked by a deep crisis of values and models.
Disorientation, fear and anxiety, not only in parents, but in all the subjects
who have the task of accompanying the growth of the younger generation,
are the manifestations of this crisis. Then the multiplication of ways of
forming a family or of living in a family is accompanied by a plurality of
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relationships. In Italy, however, the fragility of the network of relationships
established by the group and especially the marginalisation suﬀered by the
group itself, prevent the establishment of meaningful relationships with
the outside world, so that the same practices are emptied of the symbolic
meaning and social importance that they hold in the country of origin. The
influence of the cultural context of the country of immigration is then manifested clearly in appropriation of traditional customs of European societies,
such as the custom of giving and receiving presents at ceremonies such as a
christening, communion, confirmation etc. (Silva, 2000).
What is more, over the years the composition of the Cabo Verdean community in Italy has been transformed and diversified. César Augusto Monteiro, analysing the communities of immigrants from Cabo Verde in Rome,
outlined three types: that of the “first generation”, formed by women who
arrived in Italy in the 1960s, characterised by a low level of education and
very connected to the traditional habits and customs of Cabo Verde; that
of the “independence generation”, made up of women who came to Italy
in the mid-1970s and mid-1980s, with a relatively higher level of education,
a higher level of expectations and with a more conscious and determined
migration project, emotionally linked to the first group, but able to deal with
Italians on a level of greater equality; and finally the type that consists of the
generations born in Cabo Verde or in Italy between 1980 and 1985.
These young people from immigrant families and who sociologists
generally call second-generation immigrants - but today in Italy we are already in the presence of a third-generation of Cabo Verdeans descending
from the first immigrants - have more self-respect compared to the groups
of the first generation and, in any case, even though financially supported by
their families, they have less planning ability and in many cases leave school
and have conflicting attitudes towards their culture of origin (Monteiro,
1997, pp. 399-403).
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educational styles and ways of relating to the family which in turn determines very diversified behaviour in children. For immigrant families raising
children is a challenge, even more diﬃcult for the reasons explained above
because they live in the most vulnerable conditions due to issues of social
integration and cultural adaptation. In order to succeed in their parenting
tasks, immigrant parents must develop a diﬀerent educational approach
than the one in which they were educated because for their children to develop a secure identity they need to learn to combine the references and
cultural values of their tradition with those of the country where they live.
Psychological and cultural lacerations related to the migration experience
accompanied by low self-reflexive skills do not always allow immigrant
parents to respond appropriately to the educational challenges posed by today’s society. In order to educate in immigration parents should reflect critically on the educational model in order to work out a new idea of education
and their relationship with their children. Doing so can help them build the
capacity to transit between various cultural backgrounds, thereby avoiding
the creation in them of a state of dissonance between the values of the
family culture and those of the society in which they live (Silva, 2012b).
In the case of Cabo Verdeans in Italy, the children, including those born
in the country of immigration of the parents, live the migratory experience
of their families as a reflex. At the end of the 1980s Maria de Lourdes Jesus
already reported some diﬃculties faced by Cabo Verdean women in raising
and keeping their children born in Italy with them, as well as the inability
to transmit the linguistic and cultural elements of their country of origin to
them (cf. Jesus, 1989, p. 88).
It should also be noted that having children is not always a rational
choice, for immigrants, but perhaps not only for them. In the specific case of
the Cabo Verdean women that choice may be motivated by a desire to have
their own emotional life and family.
Having children in the working, economic and housing situation described
above can cause great diﬃculty in rearing and educating them. Especially
when it is only the mother who is taking responsibility, as in the case of many
Cabo Verdeans. Raising children alone, without the material and emotional
support of a companion, not only depends on the separation imposed by the
experience of migration, but in this case also has roots in cultural patterns
and relationships between men and women typical of Cabo Verdean society,
where a significant proportion of men live parenting irresponsibly by refusing
to deal with all or part of the care and education of children (Filho, 1995).
In the case of Cabo Verdean immigrants in Italy, but this also applies to
other immigrant women employed in fixed household collaboration, new
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Abstract
Using exploratory case study methodology and a critical theoretical perspective,
this study examined the impact of parental deportation on three Cape Verdean
youths, in one of the largest Cape Verdean immigrant communities in Southeast
New England. A particularly focus is given to their schooling experiences following
parental deportation as well as their understanding of the event of parental
deportation. Participants expressed feeling isolated and disconnected in school
and from extended family following their parents’ involvement with Immigration services. They questioned or denied their American identity despite being
citizens by birth. They described fears and feelings of uncertainty about their
future. All participants described having negative schooling experiences following
their parents’ incarceration with Immigration Customs Enforcement. They all
understood the deportation to be unfair and unwarranted. The findings of this
study highlight the importance of school districts that serve large immigrant
populations, developing structures responsive to the issues of immigration.
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Introduction
The passage of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Responsibility Act
(IIRIRA) of 1996, the Antiterrorism Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) of 1996 in
response to the Oklahoma City bombing, coupled with the reverberations
of September 11, 2001 events resulted in an increase of deportations of
undocumented as well as legal permanent residents (LPRs) from United
States. From the years of 1997 to 2001, approximately one million people of
a variety of nationalities were deported of which 20% were lawful permanent residents (LPRs) in the U.S., with most having established residency
for ten or more years (Baum, Jones & Barry, 2010). On October 6, 2010, the
United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS) announced record-breaking numbers of deportations which is carefully termed by DHS as removals. Between the years of 2009 to 2010 approximately 800,000 people
were deported from the United States. According to the United States Department of Homeland Security (2011), 393,289 aliens were removed, and
of those removed, 264,944 were removed for non-criminal reasons and less
than half of the total numbers (128,345) were identified as criminal aliens.
Hagan, Eschbach, and Rodriguez (2008) concluded that a significant number of people deported from the United States are poor Latin American immigrants and for the most part they are removed for non-criminal reasons.
Following an in depth study of Immigration Customs Enforcement data,
Human Rights Watch (2009), concluded that 77 percent of LPRs who were
targeted for removals were deported for non-violent oﬀenses and only
23 percent of LPRs were deported for violent oﬀenses. The Department
of Homeland Security (Yearbook of Immigration Statistics, 2013) reports
that from the years of 2004 to 2013 a total of 8,420,687 people were apprehended, 3,465,061 removed and 6,797,268 were returned from the United
States to country of origin. While the number of apprehensions has maintained, the number of removals has increased and the number of returns
has decreased. DHS terms removals, cases which result in a deportation,
that is court ordered. Returns are those cases that the person has returned
to country of origin voluntarily or under an administrative request by DHS.
Removals and returns have the same outcome as deportations, which is
expulsion from United States.
Also relevant to the increased number of people deported is that IIRIRA
of 1996 and the AEDPA of 1996 limited judicial powers, restricted due process, eliminated family hardship as a relief from deportation and added a
retroactivity aspect of the law, which allows for crimes not defined as aggravated felonies, committed prior to 1996 to be punishable by deportation

Recently President Barack Obama took action to protect families from
separation through deportation. However, in his remarks he mainly aimed
at undocumented families with children (Obama, 2014). No protections
were granted to LPRs with U.S. citizen children (Obama, 2014). These actions
came in the form of executive discretion and did not represent changes
in the law. The president’s attempts at decreasing separation of families
through deportation has been met with enormous political resistance.
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(Hagan, Eschbach & Rodriguez, 2008; Kanstroom, 2007). Following the
2001 events, the U.S. Patriot Act of 2001 was signed into law and the United
States Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was created. These laws
are discussed by many U.S. experts as unwarranted, unfair and damaging for
the entire U.S. society (Dow, 2004; Kanstroom, 2007; Welch, 2004, 2002).
Debates, discussions and conversations about deportation seldom
include information about the consequences to citizens, U. S. children or
U. S. spouses of those that are in the process of being deported or have
been deported. In fact, most of those I speak to about this subject matter,
quickly admit that when thinking about deportation, they do not consider
or remember that children, and much less American born children may be
impacted. Along with this oversight, the impact of parental deportation in
community structures such as health, welfare agencies and school districts,
are also seldom considered. The limited information and suppression of
historical memory are an eﬀective mechanism in the domination of immigrants and subordinate groups. The dynamics and full impact of deportation appears to have limited and or strategic exposure.
Beginning in 2011, in response to the growing decade long outcry for
immigration reforms and recognizing the potential impact of parental deportations on citizen children, made a specific requirement that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) keep data regarding the number of
parents of U. S. citizens deported. These data are to be provided in a joint
explanatory statement and submitted semi-annually to the Committee and
the oﬃce of Immigration Statistics. Baum, Jones, and Barry (2010) in an
executive summary addressing the plight of children of Lawful Permanent
Residents, propose that;
a) Judicial discretion be restore for all cases involving LPRs with U.S. Citizen children.
b) Revert to the pre- 1996 definition of “aggravated felony”
c) Data collection on children of LPRs impacted by parental deportation
d) Strict guidelines for deportation of LPRs with U.S. citizen children.
(Baum, Jones, and Barry, 2010, P.I)
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Deportation of Cape Verdeans
The deportation of Cape Verdeans has serious implications for Cape
Verde and the Cape Verdean American communities in the United States. In
the United States, the communities in southeast New England are among
the largest communities of Cape Verdeans for the Cape Verdean diaspora
and as a result these are particularly impacted in cases of deportations.
In the cases of deportation, the Consulate of Republic of Cape Verde in
Boston is notified by the Immigration Customs Enforcement of all Cape
Verdeans who need travel documents emitted in order to comply with an
order of deportation. These notifications do not include Cape Verdeans who
have a valid up-to-date passport or who are deemed inadmissible, upon reentry in the United States. In such cases the deportation is processed within
days, leaving the families with little time to contact attorneys or take any
legal action. Families of those with standing deportation orders may contact the Consulate of the Republic of Cape Verde to obtain assistance Not
all families contact the Consulate. Lack of information, stigma and fear results in many families not contacting the Consulate to request assistance.
Also, Immigration Customs Enforcement does not notify the Consulate of
a deportation or return in cases that the agency is in possession of a passport.
According to the data from Department of Homeland Security (Immigration Yearbook, 2013) many more Cape Verdeans are apprehended and
incarcerated by ICE, in an attempt to deport than are actually deported.
Often those apprehended are not deported due to a stay or
judicial cancellation of deportation. Figure 1. provides a visual representation of those apprehended and those deported between the years of
2004 to 2012.
Figure 1. Cape Verdean Apprehended and Removed by ICE

Figure 2. Age of Arrival in the United States of those provided with a travel document
2007-2010.

Between the years of 2007-2010, the majority of Cape Verdeans provided
with the travel documents for deportations purposes were between the
ages of 19 and 38 ( Consulate of the Republic of Cape Verde).
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Department of Homeland Security data (Immigration yearbook, 2013)
shows that from the years of 2004 to 2012, a total of 355 Cape Verdeans
were deported, averaging approximately 40 people per year. Year 2013
was not reported in an eﬀort to limit data disclosure. An analysis of data
from the Consulate of the Republic of Cape Verde reveals that none of
those deported between the years of 1997 to 2013 have returned to the
United States. From the 355 people deported between the years of 2004 to
2012, it is reported that 267 were deported for criminal reasons and 88 for
non-criminal reasons. From 2004 to 2010 the number of criminal deportations exceeded non-criminal. However in 2011 and 2012 many more Cape
Verdeans were deported for non-criminal reasons than criminal. (Immigration Yearbook, 2013.)
Also, Consulate data shows that the population of people deported with
travel documents emitted by the Consulate arrived in the United States, for
the most part between 6 and 17 years of age. Figure 2 presents the age of
arrival in the United States of those with emitted travel documents for the
purpose of deportation.

Figure 3. Age of those provided with a travel document –2007-2010.
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According to the data oﬀered by the Consulate of the Republic of Cape
Verde, and DHS, Capeverdeans who are deported most often arrived in the
United States at a very young age (6-17). They generally are in the plenitude of adulthood (19-38) at the time of deportation. An overwhelming majority are lawful permanent residents and have resided in the United States
for more that 10 years. They have strong family ties in the United States.
They are mostly English speakers and parents of American born children.
For the most part they have not returned to Cape Verde since arrival in the
United States and according to the interviews provided to the Consulate,
most express having no ties to Cape Verde. Families that remain in the
United States become responsible for financially assisting relatives that are
deported given the unemployment rates and the lack of social supports in
Cape Verde.

Outcomes of Family Deportation
The repercussions of living in a state of deportability, or going through
deportation of a caretaker can have significant implications for the children
involved in the process. One can eﬀectively argue that for children of immigrants, who are born in America the implications are compounded. These
children often feel the burden of having to make a choice between their
country and their parents’ country of origin. During this turmoil and state
of uncertainty, children are expected to attend and perform well in school.
In the case of parental deportation, the family deals with the added stress
of having to choose between permanent separation and relocation. The
family may choose to relocate to countries that the children have never
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been, speak little of the language and have had limited exposure to the
culture. On the other hand, the idea of permanent separation from parents
can be traumatic and inconceivable. These children most often remain in
the United States in a single parent household or are placed with extended
families. It is estimated that between the years of 1997 and 2007 more than
100,000 children were impacted by the deportation of a LPR parent (Baum,
Jones & Barry, 2010).
For immigrant students and students that live in mixedstatus homes, the
lived realities of immigration may be traumatic. According to the Vermont
Department of Health, Division of Health (2005) children may experience
trauma due to a variety of circumstances, including loss and separation
from caregivers and immigration. For some children, immigration may trigger anxiety, depression and an inability to progress developmentally. These
reactions may be further exacerbated if children or other family members
have been the victims of persecution, violence, severe poverty, homelessness, exile, or have witnessed violence, death and destruction (Vermont
Department of Health, Division of Health, 2005, p.160).
The term “trauma” has its origin in medicine (Braga, et al. 2008). Used
first to signify injury to the body, the term trauma has evolved to encompass
experiences of situations or events that are perceived by the individual as
sudden, negative, and uncontrollable (Carlson, 1997). Trauma in infants and
young children is defined as a physical or psychological threat or assault to
a child’s physical integrity, sense of self, safety or survival or to the physical safety of another person significant to the child” (Vermont Department
of Health, Division of Health, 2005, P.170). We know that given protective
factors and personal characteristics the experience and intensity of trauma
diﬀers from person to person (Riggs & Riggs, 2011), and that trauma can be
presented in a variety of situations and results in psychological distress and
psychiatric diagnosis (Shnurr, Friedman & Bernardy, 2002). Furthermore,
trauma and psychological distress results in poor academic achievement
(Porche & Fortuna, 2011; Rothon et al., 2009; Duplehain, Reigner & Packard,
2008). Understanding physical, emotional and psychiatric aspects of trauma leads to an understanding of how and to what extent trauma impacts
educational experiences and academic achievement of youth.
Goodman, Miller and West-Olatunji (2012) examined the impact of psychological trauma in education achievement using data from the nationally representative Early Childhood Longitudinal Study of the kindergarten class of 1998-99. The exploratory study included data from 11,820
fifth-grade students and it spanned the years of 1999-2007. Goodman,
Miller and West-Olatunji (2012) found that the presence of traumatic stress
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significantly increased the likelihood of academic underachievement and
placement in special education program.
In an extensive literature review and clinical observations of a cohort
of children conducted by Streeck-Fisher and Van Der Kolk (2000) found
that exposure to traumatic events results in emotional, psychological
and biological deficits that impact learning ability. In essence, memory,
and cognitive engagements are compromised by the exposure to multiple traumatic intra familial and medical events (Streeck-Fisher, & Van
Der Kolk, 2000).
A series of studies conducted by Saylor, Macias, Wohlfeiler, Morgan and
Awkerman (2009) concluded that children exposed to potentially traumatic
life events scored significantly higher in school diﬃculties and behavior
problems. Despite the event of immigration or deportation of a parent not
being present in the Saylor et. al. study, specific events listed in the study
included parental separation (Saylor et.al., 2009).
Upon examining data from the Collaborative Psychiatric Epidemiology
Surveys of 2,532 young adults, immigrants and U.S. born, Porche and Fortuna (2011) found that there is an increased likelihood of dropping out
among black and immigrant youth. This study was examined through
retrospective data and correlates to high school dropout (Porche and Fortuna, 2011). Survey data was collected from U.S. born adults, ages 21-29,
who were foreign born and migrated to the United States during various
ages specifically age 12 and under, age 13-17, and those that migrated at
the age of 18 or older. Porche and Fortuna (2011) found that immigrant
youth with childhood anxiety disorders and a history of trauma were more
likely to drop out than the non-immigrant student population. The study
included African Americans, Afrocaribbean, Asian, Latino, and non-Latino
white. Goodman and West-Olatunji (2010) argue that members of socially
marginalized groups are under persistent traumatic stress due to systemic
oppression and educational hegemony. Recognizing systemic injustice
and structural subjection as a source of trauma for socially marginalized
groups, Zalaquett, Fuerth, Stein, Ivey, and Ivey (2008) proposed an approach to diagnosis that is inclusive of individual perception and contextual
issues. Researchers in the field of psychology, public health, social work and
counseling (Forman, 2003; Goodman & West-Olatunji, 2009; Harell, Hall &
Taliaferro, 2003; Paradies, 2006) have studied and consistently linked the
eﬀects of trauma caused by discrimination and systemic oppression on the
well-being of culturally and linguistically diverse population.
The deportation of a parent can be a traumatic life event for children.
Androﬀ et al., (2011) positioned the argument specifically for children of

Linguistic diversity and Immigration
There are many challenges to providing services to students who are
culturally, linguistically diverse and immigrant. Limited English proficiency
and language barriers between home and school oﬃcials are some of the
immediate obstacles for this population of students (Lima, 2011). To further
complicate matters there have been limited number of empirical studies
that address the instructional needs of the population of students who
are culturally, linguistically diverse and immigrant (Shyyan, Thurlow & Liu,
2008) and there have been even fewer studies that address the impact of
public policies in the education of these youth. Such studies are important
because culturally and linguistically diverse youth live within the boundaries
of immigration. In The United States there are specific public policies that
address immigration and there is a social climate that responds and instigates these policies. An exploration of such policies and an understanding
of the impact of the climate are long overdue given current predictions of
increased diversity in racial and ethnic composition of American population.
The linguistic condition of Cape Verde is particularly complex given its
diglossic imposition. Diglossia is a condition where two languages are in
use. One language is used in formal and the other for informal encounters.
This condition allows for a linguistic power relationship between the two
languages resulting in the poor and least educate segments of the population being placed in a socially vulnerable position. The oﬃcial language of
Cape Verde is Portuguese; however, the cultural and oral language is Cape
Verdean Krioulo. The development of Krioulo in its written form has only
recently been addressed and its oral form has significant variations depending
on the island it originates from. Service providers attest to the diﬃculties in
serving the Cape Verdean community given its linguistic diversity (Thomas
& Sanchez, 1999) Limited English skills place the Cape Verdean communities in a vulnerable position.
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undocumented aliens suggesting that the stress of immigration, possible
deportation, and economic insecurity results in barriers to education, poor
health outcomes, discrimination, trauma and harm to the children, families
and to entire communities. Studies focused on legal permanent residents
are limited. The purpose of this study was to uncover the impact of parental
deportation on schooling experiences with a focus on Cape Verdean American youth with parents that are lawfully permanent residents.
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Cape Verdean Youth and Development of Bicultural
Identity
Cape Verdean immigrant and first generation Cape Verdean youth develop their identity while living in between cultural spaces. Interaction
between culture of origin and host culture influences identity perception.
Chen, Benet-Martinez and Bond (2008) suggest the development of a bicultural identity from direct and mediated intercultural exchanges between
culture of origin and host culture. A study completed in 2013 (Chen, Benet-Martinez, Wu, Lam, and Bond, 2013) indicated how bicultural identities
can be impacted by individuals perceptions of contradicting elements such
as the experiences of cultural isolation and discrimination. Understanding
biculturalism, cultural identification in the study of Cape Verdean youth of
is important due to multiple factors imbedded within this population.
Schwartz, Zamboanga and Weisskirch (2008) provided measures of personal identity processes, heritage and American cultural practices, values,
and identifications to 2,411 emerging adults at 30 United States Universities and Colleges, who were either born abroad or with parents born outside the United States to determine the extent to which measures would
diﬀer across personal identity statuses. Their findings, for both groups of
participants (those born abroad, or those with parents born abroad) suggests a convergence of personal identity and cultural identity (Schwartz, et.
al., 2008.) This convergence is punctuated by the elements of exploration
and choice. The exchange of ideas and experiences in and between cultures
of origin and host is a determinant in the development of cultural identity.
Scholars have also explored threats to the development of personal and
cultural identity. Petriglieri (2011) suggests that individuals respond in two
diﬀerent ways when presented with threats to their identity. Some may
restructure their identity by re-aligning with dominant or culture of origin
depending on the threat and others respond by protecting their identity
through maintaining and underlining elements of primary culture (Petriglieri, 2011). Furthermore, Petriglieri’s (2011) framework suggests that
individual’s responses to acculturation when presented with a threat may
take three courses; deflating or devaluating those who present a threat,
conceal their identity, or re-structure identity through identity deletion. In
exploring identity and acculturation processes in youth with mixed heritages, Howarth, Wagner and Magnusson (2014) found that acculturation is
“dynamic, situated, and multifaceted” (p.81). Furthermore they found that
acculturation and identities are constructed through oppositional themes
which they list as “cultural maintenance versus cultural contact; identity

Method
This study explored the impact of parental deportation on youth’s
schooling experiences using a critical theoretical perspective. Exploratory
case study methodology conducted within a critical theoretical framework
seeks to produce a sociopolitical critique in an eﬀort to transform and promote change in the communities under study. A critical perspective focuses
on issues of power that are particular to a cultural context and assumes
that oppression is multifaceted and that in every situation privilege exists
(Carspecken, 1996). It is also crucial that this study be undertaken within
the critical framework given that the issue is deportation. The idea of deportation creates a sense of them versus us and as a result lends support to
the hegemonic views present in American society. Hegemony refers to the
social, political, intellectual, economic control of a dominant group over
subordinate groups (Gramsci, 1971). The system of deportation points to
social inequities in the law and a hierarchical system of who has the right to
stay and who must leave.
With this study, I sought to add to the conversation about immigration
policies, in particular deportation policies that lie outside the school walls
but that ultimately may produce academic risks for youth. I understand
that the subject is exploratory in nature because there have not been
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as inclusion versus identity as exclusion; institutionalized ideologies versus
agency” (Howarth, Wagner and Magnusson, 2014, p.81)
Consistently studies in the various facets of identity development and
acculturation point to the importance of experiences and environment as
determinant factors (Badea, Jetten, Iyer, and Er-Rafiy, 2011; Neto, 2006;
Mana, Orr and Mana, 2009; Fisher and Model, 2012). Bowskill, Lyons and
Coyle (2007) point to a tendency for research in acculturation to be integrated in rhetoric, that conceals the (re-)production of a more implicit assimilationism (p.793) andsuggest the need for research in acculturation
that is more environmentally grounded, and attentive to the hegemonic
structures. Howarth, Wagner and Magnusson (2014) concluded their study
by positing that “acculturation strategies are profoundly political and psychological as they are embedded in the politics of intercultural relations,
social histories, family dynamics, and systems of social support” (p. 93).
Studies that targeted immigration policies and the impact of such policies
on immigrant populations can be revealing and provocative to the understanding of identity development and acculturation processes.
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studies focused on the impact on schooling experiences of Cape Verdean
youth subsequent to parents being deported. It made sense that this study
be qualitative given the specificity of the topic studied, the exploratory nature of the study and the potential for hypothesis generation rather than
hypothesis testing.

Research Questions
This study was guided by one broad question and one supporting question.
1. How do youth understand and experience the deportation of their
Cape Verdean parent (s)?
a. In what ways are the schooling experiences of youth impacted when
their parent is ordered deported?

Case Selection
This study included three youth participants between the ages of 13-21.
The participants were purposefully selected through the Consulate of the
Republic of Cape Verde. Families who chose to participate have youth
between the ages of 13-21 and had a parent with a deportation order. Also
the crime that led to the order of deportation occurred ten years prior to
the issuance of order of deportation; therefore, with parental incarceration
occurring prior to the birth of the children. I also targeted cases that had no
other incarcerations that occurred after the birth of the children. These criteria resulted in the youth having a more clear recollection of the incidence
of parental incarceration by Immigration Customs Enforcement and it also
provided greater assurance that the youth had maximum access to the
parent while growing up. Parent(s), who are currently primary caretakers
also participated in the study. Parent(s), and primary caretakers were interviewed once to allow for data triangulation.
A reduction of the number of cases allowed me to make explicit data
that may be extreme, contradictory or unique. I was aware of the exploratory
nature of this multiple case study and as a result I planned for the possibility
of encountering data that seemed contradictory, extreme, or unique by
limiting the number of cases to be selected and allowing more opportunities

Data Collection
Data were collected through interviews, field notes and observations
as this constituted the most important form of data collection in case
methodology (Stake, 2006). Youth participants’ interviews were formatted into three series (Seidman, 2006), with six types of variation questions
(Madison, 2005). I asked behavior or experience questions, opinion or value
questions, feeling questions, knowledge questions, sensory questions, and
background/demographic questions. Given the intricacies and challenges
of the subject matter of this study, all six types of variations questions were
used. Iunderstood that all parts of the interviews were important sources
of information.

Findings
This exploratory case study sought to answer the question, how do
youth understand and experience the deportation of a parent? And in what
ways are the schooling experiences of youth impacted when their parents
are ordered deported?
Youth interviews were analyzed for themes. The results of this study
found that youth participants experienced a deep sense of fear, anxiety,
uncertainty and anger subsequent to the possibility of their parent being
deported. All three youth participants described being impacted by the
experience of having a parent deported or in process of deportation. The
impact seemed to be immediate, negative, long-lasting and extensive to
immediate social context and school settings. All participants have been
given a Pseudonym.

Understanding and Negotiating the Event
As to the question how do youth understand and experience the deportation of a parent, three main themes emerged. Youth spoke of their
experiences with the event of deportation in terms of feeling isolated and
disconnected, fearful and uncertain of the future, guilty and angry. None of

47

“This country does not have my back!”: Youth Experiences With a Parent Threatened by Deportation

for canvassing the data. A large number of cases may have resulted in small
intricacies or minimally invasive data that is contradictory to be lost.
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the youth interviewed knew the exact reasons that led to the deportation
and overall, the reasons did not seem relevant. All participants expressed
not being interested in the reasons that led to the deportation. Youth participants felt the deportation to be unfair and unwarranted based on who
they knew their parents to be as persons. All participant youth focused on
the injustice of deporting their parent given their belief that their parent is
a good person. Upon being confronted with the possibility of deportation,
youth participants sought for a resolution and experienced the event in all
its intensity. They were fearful, felt isolated and disconnected. They felt angry, guilty about the lack of control and were uncertain about the future
Youth participants negotiated their experiences by disconnecting and
isolating from others. The disconnection was also evident in their hesitation in identifying themselves as American citizens, despite being born and
raised in the United States. They felt their identity was compromised by the
event of parental deportation. Sara admitted to still struggling by feeling
ambivalence when identifying herself as an American. Keenan denied his
identity as an American pointing to the lack of protections America oﬀers.
He clearly stated that the United States is not his country despite being
born in the U.S because “this country does not have my back” (Keenan, interview 1). This was in direct relationship with his experiences as an American youth undergoing the event of parental deportation.
None of the youth interviewed demonstrated or had specific knowledge
of the reasons their parents were deported or became involved with immigration. When asked they exhibited confusion and negotiated the reason
for their parents’ involvement with ICE by blaming the agency. One participant stated that the father had missed an interview with the agency,
another stated that the agency did not have accurate information and the
third simply stated not knowing the reason. Guilt due to lack of control and
the inability to resolve their parents’ situation and anger towards federal
agencies involved were also part of the conversation.
All participants expressed changes in living, social context arrangements and understood these changes to be a consequence of the event of
parental deportation. Two participants were forced to change schools, with
one changing from one state to another. Sara chose to change from a private catholic school to a much larger public school, in an eﬀort to lessen the
financial hardship on the mother. Sara’s mother described an event where
Sara broke down. While crying and feeling completely overwhelmed she
demanded answers from the mother. According to the mother it was evident that Sara had reached the breaking point due to lack of answers, uncertainty and fear.

Schooling Experiences
All participants expressed deep levels of stress and anxiety which impacted school work. Sara negotiated her stress and anxiety by focusing on
school work. She admits that this was a mechanical way of keeping busy,
and keeping her mind occupy with something other than what was happening at home. Keenan’s behaviors in school also allowed for an escape.
His suspensions due to fights and the exhibition of inappropriate social behaviors released some of the anxiety and resulted in some attention being
paid to his emotional state. Derrick seemed to have limited coping strategies. His stress and anxiety immediately resulted in a drop in grades, which

49

“This country does not have my back!”: Youth Experiences With a Parent Threatened by Deportation

Keenan was forced to move due to a change in living arrangement.
Given his father’s incarceration, he was forced to go live with his mother.
The change in schools resulted in having to establish a diﬀerent circle of
friends for Sara and Keenan. Keenan went to live with his mother for the
first time. He acknowledges that the friendships he made in the other State
were not always positive. He was often involved in fights and was often
suspended. Kennan perception of self is that “given a chance I can be a
troublemaker” (keenan, interview 3). Sara’s description of the friendships
she made following the change in school, were short and superficial. She
denied connecting to school friends in a significant way and admitted that
due to having to deal with the stress of her father’s deportation she mainly
kept to herself. Sara also made statements as to other people, mainly relatives and school oﬃcials not understanding what she was going through.
Derrick was separated from his younger sisters, who were sent to live
with their father. He understood the change in living arrangments as
necessary but described feeling worried and missing his sisters. Derrick
also states that he became quieter following his mother’s incarceration.
Derrick’s aunt also agreed with Derrick’s description stating that she felt he
was no longer the same kid. Derrick maintained the same group of friends
in school but denied discussing what was happening at home with any of
his friends. Derrick admitted that his homeroom teacher knew about the
situation at home. However he denied ever being supported or asking for
support at school. All three youth exhibit a deep sense of disconnection
with school, family and friends. It was clear that all three negotiated the experience by isolating themselves. For all three youth interviewed, the event
of parental deportation and involvement with immigration impacted their
schooling experiences.

Leila Rosa

50

he explained by his inability to concentrate and focus on the work. Derrick
described himself as a good student prior to his mother‘s incarceration with
ICE and has a “bad” student after his mother’s incarceration.
Keenan discredited his schooling experiences and academic achievement by stating that “about 80% of the knowledge I have right now, I didn’t
learn in school” (Keenan, interview 3). Sara described her sarcastic attitude
(chuckling) about statements she heard in social studies class about America being a country of immigrants. Sara also made statements as to her immediately noticing the contradictions in materials and ideologies presented
in school. Derrick, the only participant still in school, much younger and
with his mother still with a pending order of deportation, describes his disconnection with school as well as his drop in grades but appeared to have
diﬃculties articulating his feelings and experiences in school.
Youth feelings of isolation and disconnection extended to the school
setting. All youth participants spoke of lack of intervention by school
oﬃcials in terms of guidance or support related to counseling or academics.
This lack of support resulted in negative experiences in the school setting.
One youth participant used academic activities to distance herself from the
event of having a parent under order of deportation. She used school work
to escape the stressors of her home situation, but her overall connection
to school and school personnel was superficial. Sara recognized that her
oral participation in classes decreased following her father’s involvement
with Immigration Customs Enforcement. She admitted to not talking to her
teachers or seeking the help of guidance. She stated that school personnel did not know about her situation at home and it was her impression
that they did not care to know. These statements underlined her feelings
of isolation and disconnection. These feelings might also have been in part
the result of her change from private to public school after her father’s incarceration by Immigration Services. The change was necessary due to the
financial stressors at home. She recognized having many friends in the private school, prior to her father’s incarceration. She clarified that her father
was well known in the community of the private school, given his work with
the church. In the public school, her family was not known and as a result
her father’s contribution to the community was not recognized. On the
other hand, Sara stated that she distanced herself from those who knew
her father such as extended family, friends and community acquaintances.
According to her, those who knew her father saw her with pity and often
made questions that made her uncomfortable.
Derrick, a 14 year old, is aware of the negative impact the experience
of parental deportation had in his school standing. He attributed his lower
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grades to not caring and feeling unmotivated. He expressed feelings of sadness over his poor performance in school, following his mother’s incarceration with Immigration Customs Enforcement. He explained that despite
wanting to do well, like he had done before, he had diﬃculties focusing and
concentrating in school work. His schooling experiences were impacted in
that he no longer perceived himself as a good student. Derrick also spoke
of isolation and disconnection. He admitted that school personnel did not
contact him, sought to help by talking to him or provided assistance in any
way despite their knowledge about what was happening at home.
Kennan, while highly aware of his academic abilities and felt that his
behaviors such as not turning in homework, skipping school, engaging in
fights which resulted in suspensions were a direct result of the anger and
uncertainty he felt. From all three youth participants, Kennan was the only
one that became involved with law enforcement and was incarcerated for
a few months after High School completion. According to him his anger is
directed towards the structure that allows for deportation and incarceration. He spoke of his own incarceration and alluded to the fact of being poor
and black as directly related to his father’s deportation and his incarceration. Subsequent to high school graduation, Keenan was incarcerated for
assaulting a law enforcement oﬃcer. He stated that if he had retained a private lawyer he would have beaten his case. He often alluded to the idea that
America only works for those who are white and have money. He reported
that school personnel found out of his father’s incarceration with immigration Customs Enforcement and possible deportation through the newspaper. The day following the media reports school personnel approached him
to ask him if any of his peers had bothered him about his father’s incarceration. He stated that school personnel only did that to make sure there
would be no trouble in school and that in no time school personnel sought
to help him understand or work through the situation that was happening
at home. His conclusions were based on the fact that this was the only time
school personnel ever approached him and questioned about the incident.
His reports provided strong indication of the quality of his schooling experiences. Through this event he gained knowledge of his value or lack there
of, as a student in the school. Subsequent to his father’s incarceration, he
often missed school, became involved in fights, was suspended and spent
time in an alternative school. After completing high school, Keenan was incarcerated for a period of time. Despite being born in the United States he
does not identify himself as an American.
Two youth participants spoke of becoming more aware of the inconsistencies in some curricular content and questioning the presentations made
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at school. One youth participant spoke of her diﬃculties when presented
with the idea of America being a country of immigrants. Alluding to the
idea of how can it be, if immigrants are mistreated? An older male youth
participant spoke of his anger towards the “system” as well as the inconsistencies in the treatment of black and white people.
Throughout the interviews, youth participants were very aware and
connected to the experience of their parents’ deportation. They spoke of
the event intensely and continually returned to their feelings which related
to the overall event rather than specific experiences in school, signaling
their schooling and education as having been placed in the background.
The acknowledgement of impact on schooling experiences followed by a
consistent return to the discussion about the experience of dealing with the
deportation of a parent signaled the intensity and power of the experience
as a whole rather than the sole experiences within the school subsequent to
the parents’ deportation. This was also an indication of their need to focus
and talk about the event in totality.

Discussion and Recommendations
Belief of Permanence versus the Reality of Transience
In the United States, deportation and state of deportability is associated with undocumented immigrants. However deportation and state of
deportability is also a reality for those with Legal Permanent Residence
status (LPR). Deportability is defined as the “specific vulnerability to arrest
and the spatial removal, as well as linked legal penalties, such as the loss
of rights to future ‘legal ‘immigration” (Talavera, Núñez-Mchiri & Heyman,
2010, pp. 166-167). Changes in immigration law in 1996 (IIRRRA, AEDPA)
in response to Oklahoma City bombing, the events of September 11, 2001
and the subsequent creation of Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
resulted in increased legal vulnerabilities for lawful permanent residents.
These laws limited judicial powers, restricted due process, and eliminated
family hardship as a relief from deportation. These laws allow for crimes,
otherwise considered misdemeanors to be defined as aggravated felonies,
punishable by incarceration followed by deportation. Often and in desperation, those I visited while they were incarcerated spoke of the outlook of
deportation as being much worse than being incarcerated. Many stated
that they would prefer to be incarcerated for double the amount of time
than to be forcibly separated from their families through deportation. They
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spoke of the fears of returning to a country that would exclude and ostracize them given their identification as deportees. They begged for their
lives, hoping that in my role with the consulate I would have some control
over their situation.
The retroactivity aspect of the laws result in deportations for crimes that
occurred many years prior to the deportation order. While working at the
Consulate of Cape Verde in 2010 and 2011, I often dealt with cases with an
order of deportation for crimes committed in the 1980’s. As a result, those
in process of deportation were now older, heads of households, and primary income earners for their families. I recall a case of a man in his late 60’s.
He was charged with domestic violence in 1986. Subsequent to the charge,
he went through a divorce. In 2010, married to another person and with six
adult children from the second marriage, he was apprehended and incarcerated for approximately 6 months by immigration customs enforcement
and placed under deportation order. The order of deportation was given
due to the charges of domestic violence incurred in 1986. All six adult children were born in the United States and had no knowledge of their father’s
first marriage history. The first wife wrote a letter requesting ICE to release
him, to no avail. After 180 days of incarceration, and due to inability to obtain travel documents, ICE released him under supervision.
Those who seek and are granted legal permanent residency in the United
States, leave the country of origin with the expectation and accepting the
perduring quality of their actions. The move almost always requires letting
go of employment, personal property and for some, the giving up of social
status in the country of origin. This move is not made without fears. The
idea of physically disconnecting from a known environment and attempting
to reconnect and be successful to an unknown social cultural environment
brings to mind uncertainties and anxieties that for many is traumatic. Also,
linguistic diﬀerences between country of origin and receiving country impacts levels of independence, and ultimately ability to succeed in receiving
country. Given what is left behind, it is important that the move be done
with the guarantee of permanency in the receiving country. The dreams
and hopes of legal permanent residents is often grounded in educational
advancement, better employment, social and financial stability and an access to opportunities that would otherwise not be available in country of
origin. Despite these dreams and hopes, success and the realization of such
dreams is not a guarantee; and it is also challenging given the social and
political limitations of LPR status. The status of LPR limits opportunities for
educational advancement, access to certain property, and or type of employment, and increases political and social vulnerability.
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According to Immigration and Customs enforcement data most of those
deported hold the status of lawful permanent residents. This status is clearly stated on an oﬃcial card, provided by the United States Immigration and
Naturalization Services. Individuals and families must apply and meet all
requirements in order to be granted legal entry in the United States. Meeting requirements is the result of careful background investigation, health
clearances and provision of financial statements of support. Those who
apply for a lawful permanent residency seek to establish permanent residency in the United States. The statement of permanency in the documents
is misleading. In reality an LPR status increases social and legal vulnerability,
in fact placing individuals and families in a state of transiency. This state can
only be alleviated by entering the process of citizenship, which is only possible following 5 years of residence. For some the process of citizenship is
not an option given the requirements. As the parents remain under an LPR
status, their American born children enter into a state of social and political
vulnerability.

The Climate
Constructing a populous rationale that supports deportations requires
narratives of fear. In the United States these narratives rely heavily on
the idea that immigrants may hold ideological stances that are “counter”
American interests and or that immigrants take jobs from U. S citizens.
In the presidential remarks of November 2014 about Immigration, President Obama acknowledged these fears by stating “I know some worry immigration will change the very fabric of who we are, or take our jobs, or
stick it to middle-class families at a time when they already feel they’ve
gotten the raw deal of the decade” (Obama, 2014). He attempts to dissipate these fears by reminding that “our history and the fact shows that immigrants are a net plus for our economy and our society” (Obama, 2014).
President Obama’s executive action of November 20, 2014 was aimed at protecting undocumented families from deportation. Through this executive
action approximately 5 million people who are undocumented, may apply
for temporary residency, work permits, driver licenses, etc. In response to
President’s Obama’s executive action, and demonstrating strong opposition to immigration reform aimed at protecting undocumented individuals
and families, the speaker of the house John Boehner as well as a number
of republican leaders accused the president of “violating the law”, “ignoring
the will of the American people”, and “political grandstanding”. Former
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Governor of Florida threatened political inaction by stating that the president’s action “undermines all eﬀorts to forge a permanent solution to this
crisis” (Bradner & Rosche, 2014). The blogs that followed the president’s
remarks on immigration were also indicative of the negative climate of immigration reforms. Some of these blogs were entitled “Obama’s amnesty
benefits lawbreaking employers” (Freere, 2014), “Amnesty requires immigration cuts” (Krikorian, 2014), “Bluelight Special on Naturalization to help
Fund Obama’s Amnesty” (Vaughan, 2014). Many suggested that Obama’s
approach to immigration justified impeachment procedures. The diﬃculties in putting immigration reform on the table and the historically oppressive anti-immigration climate is a testament as to the ideological complexities existent within the issue of immigration.
This climate is also present at the local community level. The Enterprise, a daily Brockton newspaper, often runs articles on immigrants that
were rounded for deportation. The articles often provides full names and
at times street addresses of immigrants involved with ICE. This information is extremely damaging to the families involved and it places the community in check given the high numbers of immigrant population and the
stigma around deportation within the community. The lack of disclosure
on the characteristics of those deported in terms of the family composition (i.e. parents of American born children, spouses of American citizens,
type of crimes that are deportable) serves a purpose. Populous knowledge
of the characteristics could be a push for change in immigration laws. The
limited information presented by the media also works to generate misconceptions and assumptions around the issue. The media most often
works to manufacture consent around political and social issues (Herman
& Chomsky, 1988).
According to DHS data, between the years of 2004 to 2012 and average
of 39.4 Cape Verdeans obtained orders of deportation, nationwide. The
average number of travel documents requested to the Consulate of the Republic of Cape Verde between the years of 2007 and 2010 was 36.5 annually.
These requests are nationwide and do not only represent the community of
Brockton; however despite this number being considerably small, there is
the perception that there are numerous deportations in the Cape Verdean
community. Media presentation about deportations in the community of
Brockton adds to the perception that there are numerous deportations
within the Cape Verdean community. It is also important to note that given
that the community is close knit, and Cape Verde is a small nation of approximately 500.000 people, one deportation impacts many families thus
adding to the perception that there are many deportations.
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The perception of high numbers of Cape Verdeans being deported adds
to fears, stigmatization, and shame within the community. Reasoning
these numbers requires that community members develop a rationale regarding the reasons why Cape Verdeans are being deported. Community
leaders consistently point to youth and diﬃculties in acculturation as being
the problem. In an analysis of the data from the Consulate of the Republic
of Cape Verde we conclude that most travel documents provided to ICE,
subsequent to an order of deportation were for people between the ages of
24 to 33 with arrivals in the United States between the ages of 6-11. Most
of those deported to Cape Verde began and completed elementary and
secondary education in the United States. Community leaders were aware
of the educational history of most of those deported. One noting the failure
of the American educational system in terms of immigrant youth, stated
“everything that they learned, they learned here, not in Cape Verde. So if
they are in trouble, they learned trouble here”. According to data from the
Consulate General of the Republic of Cape Verde, between the years of 2007
and 2010 more than half of the travel documents provided for the purpose
of deportation were for males between the ages of 25 and 38, who arrived
in the United States between the ages of 6 through 17. Most claimed
English as their primary language.

What is Immediately Felt
Like the participants, it is likely that most children of immigrants are
not fully aware of their parents’ legal status in the country. None of the
three participants were aware of their parents legal vulnerability with Immigration agencies prior to their parents being threaten with deportation.
All participants stated that they assumed that their parents were American citizens or never considered the subject of citizenship. The participants
never considered the possibility of parental deportation. The confusion
generated by their parents’ arrest with immigration resulted in fear and
feelings of uncertainty about the future. One participant described the
feeling of disbelief when confronted with the formation of the possibility
of his mother’s deportation. Menjivar & Abrego (2012) suggest that conditions of vulnerability and fear aﬀect educational experiences.
Participants described impact on their school placement, school work
and relationships. Two participants were forced to move schools due to a
change in living arrangements. All three participants suggested decreased
parental involvement and family involvement in school matters. And all

Moving Beyond Appearances: Recommendations and
Study Implications
At the Federal Level: Exposing Senseless Policies. The deportation
of legal permanent residents impacts American born children, destroys
families, hurts the community, and burdens state services. Giroux (2013)
endorses the understanding of the current hardened social climate by
recognizing the presence of “brutalizing psychology of desensitization”. He
explains that these grow “out of a formative culture in which war, violence,
and the dehumanization of others becomes routine, commonplace, and removed from any sense of ethical accountability” ( Giroux, 2013, P. 71). When
Federal policies fail to recognize the harm to children and youth, placing
the emphasis on homeland security, these same policies violate what it was
intended to protect in the first place, re-reproducing the same dangers it
was meant to counter. Youth disconnect and question their national identity, and lose sense of belonging due to policies that hurt and impact them
directly. In 2012, in a Brockton community meeting held by the Department
of Homeland Security, when I posed the issue to Dorothy E. Herrera Niles,
the director of DHS for New England, of the vulnerability of American born
children, she responded that “ the children are free to leave with the
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three reported to having disconnected from friends and school personnel. All three reported not talking about their situation or asking for help in
school. While two male participants suggested that their feelings impacted
their school work as evidenced by a drop in grades, and subsequent multiple suspensions, the female participant suggested that she used her school
work to escape the climate of tension she experienced at home. As a result
her grades were maintained. The same female participant also stated that
she withdrew from school friendships and felt particularly impacted when
subject matter related to immigration was presented in class. These presentations resulted in feelings of sadness and anger.
Participants’ feelings of stability were jolted by the possibility of parental separation through deportation. The possibility of parental expulsion
from the United States lead the participants to becoming more aware and
to questioning their own citizenship. All of the participants hesitated presenting themselves as Americans but they also hesitated when identifying
themselves as Cape Verdean. This was an indication of their fragmented realities and identification challenges. In this respect their sense of belonging
seemed to be compromised.
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parent.” She dismissed the children’s American citizenship and right to live
in their country and failed to consider the significance of having American
born children, who hold American passports leave under such conditions.
When pressed about the United States increased vulnerability, given that
these children are almost “expelled” and as a result may fail to build any
allegiance to the US, she punctuated by stating “there are plenty of American children that chose to live abroad.” The conditions under which these
children leave the United States were not considered. I recalled leaving
the meeting, in a cold November Fall day feeling hopeless for the children
caught in the process. They are citizens, but they are second class citizens.
Deporting legal permanent residents because a crime was committed,
amounts to the senseless idea of racial and ethnic cleansing the country.
The Immigration Policy Center (2007) stated that “the problem of crime in
the United States is not caused or even aggravated by immigrants, regardless of their legal status” (p.1) Through an analysis of previously conducted
studies, Rumbaut Et. Al. (2006) situated the topic of crimes by immigrant
population by concluding the following:
1. Violent and Property Crime Rates Fell as the Undocumented Population Doubled in Size
2. Immigrants are Five Times Less Likely than the Native-Born to be in
Prison
3. Immigrants from Nations that Account for Most of the Undocumented
Have Lower Incarceration Rates than the Native-Born
4. Focusing on the Immigrant Share of Inmates in Federal Prison Distorts the Real Story
5. The Skinny on the SCAPP (State Criminal Alien Assistance program)
Sound-Bite: SCAPP Data Cannot Be Verified
The numbers of expulsions/deportations are often used by politicians
to explain to their constituency how the country is safer with the policies
of deportation. This presentation also adds to the belief that crimes are
mostly committed by the “others” that reside in the United States. The impact to American born children, American spouses and American extended
families are never discussed. The American political, economic, and social
structures that allow and even support criminal behavior is also never questioned or discussed. As such current immigration policies remain in place.
Giroux (2013), while calling for structural reforms, notes that “governing
through-crime model produces a highly authoritarian and mechanistic
approach to addressing social problems that often focuses on low-income
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and poor minorities, promotes highly repressive politics, and places undue
emphasis on personal security rather than considering the larger complex
of social and structural forces that fuels violence in the first place” (p.73)
It is imperative that current immigration policies be reformed. Such
reforms must be driven by current data and research. A critical portion of
immigration policies requiring changes is the retroactivity aspect of the
law. Given that Immigration Customs and Enforcement has no limitations
on time and crime, the potential for Citizen Children to become involved
may be greater. The need for immigration reform is undisputable. The risks
of posed by current deportation policies outweighs the benefits.
At the Community Level: Developing Responsive Structures. Schools
must design structures that sustain and support students who are undocumented and/or whose parents are immigrants. School District policies must
also respond to issues of immigration in communities that are immigrant
and highly diverse. For undocumented students, these structures should
focus around access to legal information and advocacy. Schools must develop close, trusting relationships with families, youth and community at
large.
Hiring a number of personnel that belong to the cultural groups found
within the community and that can represent the community within the
school seems to have positive results for all involved. Families must be
oﬀered direct access to this type of personnel if a relationship of trust is
to exist between the community and the school. This eﬀort represents a
conscious, deliberate eﬀort by the school to access the families and to be
available to the families. School personnel must be aware of the matter of
immigration policies, deportation and deportability just as much as they
seek to be aware of homelessness. The awareness must serve to develop
structures within the school walls that support students emotionally but
also that allow for students to acquire a voice. Work aimed at assisting students with writing letters to key political figures, researching information
about deportation and immigration, and engaging in political projects that
respond to their experiences are important. Curricular content and instructional methodology must be infused with deliberate information and action aimed at developing students voice and social awareness. All aspect of
the curriculum must be penetrated
Access to guidance counselors to discuss issues of immigration which
without guidance may increase stress and impact performance may be
crucial for some students. Intense work at assisting students at developing
coping strategies around issues of immigration should be a primary concern in schools densely populated with immigrants students and parents. In
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developing such response it is also important for the guidance counselor to
have access to a cohort of professionals for support and information.

Community Mapping
The dynamics of each particular context is diﬀerent and as such, the
issues and opportunities available for service provision for each school
district or school community is also diﬀerent. It is essential that schools
know the community, the neighborhoods, the families well enough to understand what the problems are and to consider what works and does not
work. Any response that aims at being prescriptive is at best limited and
may work counter intent. Understanding the dynamics of each community
requires that schools engage in community mapping. This exercise must
be undertaken in collaboration with the community, thus involving community organizations, agencies, business leaders, and community leaders.
Understanding community dynamics must be a deliberate and explicit
exercise with the purposeful objective of better understanding the community. Engaging the community will allow school administrators to see
and understand aspects of the community that they would otherwise have
no or limited exposure. In doing community mapping it is important to first
identify a critical cohort of school personnel that is interested in researching
community dynamics, understanding the community, disseminating information within the school walls, and finally organizing the possibilities for
solution at the collaborative as well as at the individual case level. The composition of this cohort of scholars should be diverse in terms of background
and function held in school. This diversity will allow for more in depth rich
conversations as well as the potential development of response plans that
will include every aspect of student life. The cohort must meet regularly,
research questions posed by the school staﬀ, and make presentations to
the staﬀ regarding their findings. Regular continuous conversations are
crucial to better understanding the community they serve. Getting to know
the political structure within the community is also crucial in the development of any plan. This work must be informed by a strategic entry into the
community as well as the development of a culture of negotiation between
school personnel, students, families, organizations and community oﬃcials.
Schools that serve communities with high number of immigrants, and with
public oﬃcials that are sensitive to immigrants, will have more opportunities to push the boundaries and harness community support in terms of
response to immigrant issues. One such example is the imposition of secure

Tackling Ideologies
School personnel that serve school districts with large numbers of immigrant families are aware that fear of deportation and being in a state of
deportability can be devastating for families and children of immigrants.
These fears impact the way schools serve undocumented and immigrant
students. A research study by Jeﬀeries (2014) concluded that threat of
deportation prevented administrators from collecting information from
students that could assist with service provision, given fears that law enforcement may access such information and use it against the students.
Administrators were aware of the immigration status and the fears of students because the students included in the study were undocumented. In
the case of American born children living in mixed status homes, administrators most often are unaware of the threat of parental deportability.
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communities by the Department of Homeland Security in Brockton in May
of 2012. This program allows data inputted by local law enforcement to be
digitally transmitted to Department of Homeland security, thus increasing
apprehensions and deportations of undocumented and legal permanent
residents that are in violation of the law. The governor of Massachusetts
was in opposition to such program. The secure communities program has
a direct impact in schools because it increases apprehensions and deportations of parents and ultimately prevents people from requesting assistance
from law enforcement in fear of being apprehended by immigration service.
However lack of knowledge by the school oﬃcials and school district facilitated the imposition of such program with little push back. I have met several
Cape Verdean social workers in the community of Brockton that openly
disclose that they advise mothers not to call law enforcement in case of
domestic violence because of the implication of referrals to immigration
service subsequent to law enforcement involvement. These social workers
have devised creative ways to address the issue of domestic violence in
some immigrant families in an eﬀort not to trigger law enforcement. Immigration services may also be triggered by school oﬃcials in cases that
require a report to the state of a suspected child abuse case, particularly
if police become involved. It may be that in certain cases, involvement of
law enforcement is unavoidable. However knowledge of the possible repercussions by school personnel may result in more effective responses
prior to the event and an appropriate plan subsequent to the event of police
involvement.
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Jeﬀeries (2014) noted that administrators and teachers resisted talking
openly about the issue of undocumented students. School administrators,
participants in the study expressed reservations about addressing this issue
with their personnel. However schools that serve immigrant communities
and highly diverse population must deliberately, and explicitly design services and programs that are aimed at building trusting relationships within
school personnel, between student and school personnel, student and student, and school personnel and families. These eﬀorts must take shape and
be visible from the front door oﬃce of the school to the most distant corner
of the school.
A plan that attempts to develop services for immigrants students and
students that live in a mixed status home can only be productive if dominant ideologies of school personnel are tackled. The provision of professional development around the issue of immigration was also diﬃcult
given the “volatile political atmosphere surrounding undocumented migration and the delicateness of the issue” (Jeﬀeries, 2014, P. 288). Jeﬀeries’s (2014) study suggests that administrators and teachers have great
diﬃculties dealing with issues that may be ideologically grounded. This
requires in-service work for teachers and administrators aimed at analysis
and reflection around dominant ideologies. This work must also be done
at pre-service level in order to grant teachers and administrators with the
opportunity to fully prepare for the work in communities that are highly
diverse. Bartolomé (2008) suggests that teacher preparation programs are
not addressing ideological and political dimensions of educating subordinated students.” as a result “the hegemonic ideologies that inform our perceptions and the treatment of subordinated groups” (p. x) goes unchecked.
Without an analysis and continuous reflective activities about how our actions further subordinates and victimizes those that have diﬀerent experiences from the dominant group, we are unable to develop appropriate
responses with realistic alternatives. Without this we are also unable to understand how certain programs and or policies impact the community and
ultimately impact our work.
Schools must design structures within the school walls that sustain and
support students who are undocumented and/or whose parents are immigrants, potentially live in a mixed home status and or impacted particularly
in communities densely populated by immigrant families. For undocumented
students, these structures should focus around access to legal information
and advocacy. For students that are American born and live in mixed home
status, the support must come after the fact. Schools must develop close
trusting relationships with families. This requires hiring a number of personnel

Academic Work
Much more must be done to improve school and community partnerships. Academic work must be aimed at improving quality of community
life, increasing social awareness, and increasing youth’s opportunity at success, while informing policies. It is crucial that research on the topic of deportation and in particular impact of deportation on children be conducted.
These studies should be community specific. It is undeniable that deportation is impactful regardless of the ethnic group. However the meaning and
dynamics of deportation may diﬀer according to community. For smaller
countries such as Cape Verde, being deported may carry implications for
the family for generations. We must also consider geographically location.
For the Cape Verdean population, a country with no borders with United
States or any other country, being that Cape Verde is an island on the west
coast of Africa, the feeling of isolation and finality may be more pronounce
in case of deportation. Qualitative studies have the potential of informing
future quantitative work.
This study was exploratory in nature and included a small number of participants as such it is limited. Longitudinal studies, and studies with a larger
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that belong to the cultural groups found within the community and that
can represent the community within the school. Families must be oﬀered
direct access to this type of personnel if a relationship of trust is to exist
between the community and the school. This eﬀort represents a conscious,
deliberate effort by the school district to access the families and to be
available to the families. School personnel must be aware of the matter of
deportation just as much as they seek to be aware of homelessness. The
awareness must serve to develop structures within the school walls that
supporting students emotionally but also that allow for students‘ to acquire
a voice. Work aimed at assisting students at writing letters to key political
figures, researching information about deportation and immigration, and
engaging in political projects that respond to their experiences are important. Access to guidance counselors to discuss issues of immigration which
without guidance may increase stress and impact performance may be
crucial for some students. Intense work at assisting students at developing
coping strategies around issues of immigration should be a primary concern in schools densely populated with immigrants students and parents. In
developing such response it is also important for the guidance counselor to
have access to a cohort of professionals for support and information.
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number of participants are crucial in identifying issues and determining
solutions. Nonprofit organizations such as MIRA, and the Policy Center for
Immigrants work to inform and develop social awareness on the topic of
immigrants. However its projection has been limited. This type of work
should also be undertaken by governmental agencies that are independent
from Homeland Security. It is important to uncover the full impact of deportation including the repercussions on the work of social, health agencies
and school districts.

The Researcher and the Research Process
I spent many afternoons on the phone and in my oﬃce meeting with
relatives whose desperation completely filled my oﬃce. Between tears, and
pleas for mercy, they oﬀered everything they had in exchange for clemency
for the relative being deported. Often they went through countless hours
of vignettes attesting to how good their sons, brothers, fathers, mothers
were and how deporting them was the most absolute act of injustice. When
I was completely exhausted, I hid in my oﬃce and told the secretary to ask
them to come the following week. The largest pile of letters always landed
at my desk. Letters with children’s drawings, family pictures of barbecues
and birthday parties, recommendations for mercy from employers, letters
from doctors attesting to the emotional and psychological damage to sons,
daughters, mothers and fathers. Every Tuesday for 3 months without fail I
received the visit of an elderly father. Shaking, sustained by a cane, visibly
frail and continuously apologizing for coming to my oﬃce yet once more, he
would sit in the Consulate’s waiting room and wait for me to call him. I realized
that he came just to make sure I would not forget his son. He came to make
sure that I did not sign the travel document. I never signed the document.
After 180 days of incarceration, his son was released under supervision of
ICE. I received a note from him many months after the son’s release, expressing gratitude for my time and explaining that on Tuesday he counted
on his “fill of hope” simply by seeing me seating at my desk at the Consulate.
I quickly, I learned that in pain and suﬀering, hides fear. I also learned
that the most important function of injustice when coupled with power and
is to silence those that most desire to speak. Many relatives called upon
learning about the study, but most called to apologized for their hesitation
and or inability to participate given their fears.
In research, all plans are conditioned to the dynamics of space, time and
context. Despite speaking to many people, it took many months to be able
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CAPE VERDE AND ITS DIASPORA: ECONOMIC
TRANSNATIONALISM AND HOMELAND
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Resumo:
This study examines the historical role of the diaspora in Cape Verde’s socioeconomic
development. It analyzes the prospects and limitations of its diaspora as a transnational
economic development resource. While it is policy oriented, the study oﬀers a conceptual
framework to analyze its diaspora engagement policies and eﬀorts since 1975. Cape Verde
has emerged as a success story. The diaspora’s contribution was one of the four essential
factors behind this relative success: migration and remittances, overseas development
assistance, large scale public investments, and reasonably sound policies and stewardship
of public finances. Today Cape Verde confronts an adverse set of conditions that hamper
growth and even threaten to undue development gains since 1975. An externally dependent micro state in the world economy, with exceedingly limited internal capacity to generate growth and employment, Cape Verde has few viable options in this new phase of
development. Its biggest and most dynamic sector, tourism, is disconnected from the rest
of the economy. Foreign aid and emigration opportunities are disappearing. This study
argues, however, that Cape Verde’s reliance on its diaspora as an economic resource will
only increase. However, a number of obstacles continue to hamper the country’s ability to
harness the full potential of its diaspora for development.
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Introduction
This study examines the prospects and limitations of the diaspora as an
economic development resource for Cape Verde. The underlying sources of
the country’s post-independence economic development and growth performance can be reduced to four essential factors, or ingredients: migration and remittances, overseas development assistance, large scale public
investments, and reasonably sound policies and stewardship of public
finances. Cape Verde has emerged as a comparatively successful case of development over the last four decades (AfDB 2012a; 2012b).The diaspora’s
contribution was critical. The country’s robust performance across many
social and economic indicators resulted in the 2008 decision by the United
Nations to graduate Cape Verde from the list of Least Developed Country
(LDC). Today Cape Verde confronts an adverse set of conditions that hamper
growth and even threaten to undue development gains since 1975. Foreign aid
and emigration opportunities are disappearing, and the lingering Eurozone
crisis has exposed its over dependence on Europe for all its trade, tourists
and foreign investments. Despite its graduation, the micro state remains
structurally vulnerable and externally dependent. The country must search
for a new development model and sources of growth. It is in this broader
development context, and structural weakness of its economy, that the
economic significance of Cape Verde’s diaspora comes into crisper view.
Ironically, even as emigration prospects and monetary remittances shrink,
the country’s large diaspora will become even more important, not less, to
homeland development in the future. Comprising both permanent and temporary migrants, its diaspora has been a vital economic resource historically.
The diaspora’s structural role in the economy today remains large, with its
direct financial flows accounting for perhaps 50% of GDP. The open question
today is whether Cape Verde will be able to devise an eﬀective strategy to
deepen and extend its role in national development. A number of obstacles,
on both sides, continue to hamper the country’s ability to harness the full
potential of its diaspora in homeland development.
This is a study on the political economy of diaspora-homeland transnational relations. Emigrants, and the diaspora communities that result from
migration, are important but overlooked transnational actors. Their practices and ties involving the homeland can have significant impact, positive
or negative, on the social, cultural, political, and economic development of
their country of origin. The study examines the historical role of the diaspora in Cape Verde’s socioeconomic development, and analyzes the prospects
and limitations of its future contribution. As a policy focused study, it examines
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diaspora engagement policies and actions adopted by the homeland since
1975. At the same time, the study oﬀers a conceptual framework to analyze
and assess these diaspora engagement policies. It argues that eﬀective mobilization of the full economic contribution of the diaspora requires three
categories of eﬀorts: diaspora enabling conditions, diaspora-building, and
diaspora integration. An analysis of the Cape Verdean case will show that,
first, the migrant economic transnationalism can positively contribute to
development and, second, that the diaspora’s potential economic contribution extends far beyond financial and goods remittances. Harnessing this full
potential requires a broad range of eﬀorts that enlarge the scale and modes
of the diaspora’s participation in homeland development. The diaspora’s
economic contribution, however, is conditioned by factors and motivations
on the part of the diaspora itself as well as the homeland. This study focuses
primarily on the policy and institutional strategies adopted by Cape Verde
to harness this economic transnationalism. As such, the study focuses on
only one side of the equation. Sustained research is needed on the factors,
strategies and conditions that determine the diaspora’s own motivations,
capacity, practices, and contribution.
The value of Cape Verde’s large diaspora as a development asset must
be considered in the context of the country’s vulnerabilities and limitations.
First, Cape Verde is a small island development state, with a micro economy,
no exploitable mineral resources, poor natural and climatic endowments,
and thus an exceedingly limited productive base. That is, Cape Verde is a
small state with few viable options to generate growth and long term development. Development constraints and growth bottlenecks abound. Its
micro size, insularity, limited human and natural endowments have meant
that the country is structurally vulnerable and externally dependent for
nearly everything, including 80% or more of its food. Second, historically,
it has relied on donor aid and emigrant remittances. Both sources of free
money are vanishing. The country’s graduation from the LDC list resulted in
losing important sources of non-debt external financing – aid, concessional
loans, and other grants and preferential treatment available to LDCs. In the
past, foreign aid and concessional loans financed a large public sector and
extensive public investments that spurred growth and created jobs. With
the end of aid, and the unsustainability of debt-led growth, the state can
no longer play this role. Third, in its new phase of development, the country
must now rely much more on internal resources and sources of growth and
jobs creation. Cape Verde’s biggest immediate – and structural – challenge is
to create jobs and income generating opportunities for the resident population. Unemployment is structural. The unemployment rate today is over 16%
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but over 30% for among the young and educated (INE 2015). Aid-financed
large public sectors and public investments have disappeared. An industrial
or manufacturing base that can generate the jobs and growth necessary is
impossible, and the private sector as a whole remains weak and limited in
its investment capacity. Tourism has been the fastest growing and dynamic
economic sector, but it is an all-inclusive mass tourism model disconnected
from the rest of the economy. A high leakage rate undercuts its contribution
to national income and growth. Aside from diversifying the tourism product,
the country must diversify the economy by fostering new sectors to spur
growth and create jobs. Fisheries, agribusiness, creative industries, ICT, and
international transportation and logistics services have been receiving
policy attention. Each of these sectors faces severe limitations in terms of
scale, productivity, financing, human capital, quality, and commercialization. Moreover, Cape Verde will never be a producer or competitor in any
of these sectors for global markets. However, it can foster these sectors to
generate jobs by producing for the domestic market and exporting to niche
markets, primary among them the diaspora market. Fourth, the post-graduation exigency to spur growth and diversify the economy will require new
sources external financing. A debt-led growth strategy is neither possible
nor long term sustainable. Total public external debt has been rising rapidly,
reaching an alarming 98% of GDP at the end of 2013 (IMF 2014). Encouraging foreign direct investment (FDI) is necessarily an integral part of
the eﬀort, but the country’s micro scale and limited non-tourism economy
make attracting substantial FDI diﬃcult. In nearly all these areas, such as
foreign investments, tourism development, and economic diversification,
there is potential to widen and deepen the diaspora’s contribution.
The November 2014 eruption of the volcano on the Island of Fogo was
a microcosm of the relationship between Cape Verde and its global diaspora. Diaspora communities were gripped by the unfolding natural disaster, closely following news reports from back home and calling relatives
daily. For a country where few families are unaﬀected by emigration, the
alarm and anxiety over the wellbeing of relatives were palpable. Individuals,
church groups, businesses, students, and civic groups each quickly mobilized
to raise money, food, clothing and other humanitarian supplies to send for
disaster relief. This rapid and extensive outpouring of support was evidence
a relationship between the Cape Verdean diaspora and its homeland that
is intimate, intense, and cemented by strong emotional and material links.
The widespread use today of information and communications technologies, such as social media and low cost telecommunications services, has
only magnified the intensity and closeness of this relationship. On the other

Aims of the Study
This study examines the evolution and future prospects of Cape Verde’s
eﬀorts to incorporate its diaspora in the country’s development. The study is
organized as follows. The first section examines Cape Verde’s development
in the context of economic transnationalism. The section then discusses the
nature of Cape Verde’s diaspora population, and analyzes its past and present
economic roles. The second section develops a typology of the modes and
types of the diaspora’s potential economic contribution. It examines the
nature of the relationship between Cape Verde and its diaspora, the policy
and institutional measures adopted by the homeland and, lastly, assesses
the prospects and limitations for expanding the scope and modes of its participation in the country’s new development strategy.
Since 1975, governmentsin Cape Verde have embraced the diaspora
in national life. Cape Verde is not alone. National governments in the developing world, along with the major international development agencies
and donor countries, have been placing increasing emphasis on mobilizing
diaspora communities as a resource for economic development in their
homeland. Countries like Israel, South Korea, India, Mexico, Ireland, and
China are often cited as successful cases of a diaspora-assisted development, whereby their transnational communities actively participate in
homeland social and economic progress (Patterson, 2006; Landolt, 2001).
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hand, the volcanic eruption also revealed the limitations and weaknesses
in this transnational relationship. Lack of organization, poor coordination,
the absence of any eﬀective means of communication and collaboration
between the diaspora and the homeland, meant that individuals and groups
were scrambling on their own and working in isolation. Policy and government oﬃcials were invisible. Hometown associations do not exist, nor umbrella diaspora organizations, both of which could pool and coordinate efforts. Other types of transnational networks, associations, and collaborative
arrangements between the diaspora and homeland civil society are nonexistent. Neither the diaspora, the government, nor homeland civil society
has established a credible framework or mechanism to mobilize emergency
relief supplies or charitable contributions, let alone promote homeland development. These weaknesses are exacerbated by policy and institutional
failures in the homeland, such as ineﬃcient customs procedures, poor transportation, and administrative fragility that frustrate diaspora contributions
in the form of donations, investments or tourism.
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Many African governments and regional agencies, such asthe African Union
(AU) have been keen to replicate this success (Kamei, 2011). Many advanced
industrial countries have also been rediscovering their nationals abroad
(Gamlen, 2005). The relationship between migration and development has
attracted much scholarly attention. A paradigm shift has occurred such that
migration is no longer viewed as always harmful to development, but major
debates rage over its significance and net impact. The surge of interest in migration and development, especially among donor countries and agencies,
may certainly reflect a neoliberal agenda that exaggerates the development
benefits of migration while ignoring global power inequalities, restrictive
immigration policies, declining aid, and the precarious socioeconomic and
legal situation of migrant populations (Glick Schiller, 2012; de Haas, 2012;
Skeldon, 2008). The premise of this study, however, is that Cape Verde’s
emigrant population has always been, and can continue to be, a development resource. That is, this form of economic transnationalism – harnessing
the economic practices, resources, ties and transactions between the diaspora and the homeland – can be utilized as a development tool for the homeland. With a diaspora estimated to be twice the size of the resident population, for Cape Verde, the migration-development nexus is not a novelty or
neoliberal policy fad. Migration has been the central reality of the country’s
historical formation and, in good and bad ways, has intimately shaped its
economic development across the centuries. Cases like Cape Verde, while
perhaps sui generis or outliers, demonstrate the central role of migration in
a country’s development, if not its national viability. For a country without
the domestic productive base and natural resources to feed its own people
and ensure their welfare, migration has been both as a vital relief valve for
its people to escape poverty, famine, unemployment, and lack of economic
opportunities as well as a source remittances in the form of money, goods,
medicine, food, clothing, and even ideas. However, this economic role of the
diaspora has been limited largely to financial and goods remittances. The
diaspora has never been a consumer market for its merchandise exports, a
source of tourism demand, knowledge and skills transfer, or a political lobby
advocating support for homeland development.
Given its analytical and explanatory objectives, this study focuses on the
political economy dimension of homeland-diaspora relations. This is not the
only, or even most important, dimension. Migrant transnationalism encompasses all areas of social life and not just ties and transactions that are purely
economic. Transnational economic relations and flows of people, money,
goods, and ideas are themselves embedded in larger social practices, relations and identities. While this study is solely preoccupied with the

1. This definition of diaspora departs from the classic definition of diaspora as exiled populations forcibly expelled from a homeland, and sharing a common identity and attachment to the homeland. The definition also departs from others that exclude temporary
migrants.
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diaspora’s economic role, diaspora-homeland relations are multifaceted and
span a broad range of social-cultural, political, religious, economic, and psychological interactions, transactions, and connections. They comprise both
material and immaterial dimensions and relationships. Even if we narrowly
focus on the material and economic dimension, we expect immaterial, or
social and ideational, dimension can also impact development. Social remittances of ideas, knowledge, attitudes, identities, norms and values, or other
forms of transnational ideational and social interactions, indirectly impact
development in positive or negative ways. Important as these dimensions of
diaspora-homeland relations are, even for economic development, they lie
beyond the immediate purview of this study. In similar vein, there is no suggestion here that Cape Verde’s economic development can be reduced to
migration and diaspora contribution. Such reductionism would also obscure
the fact that economic development of small developing countries like
Cape Verde is embedded in a broader global political economy of power
relations, hierarchy, inequality, and vestiges of colonialism and neocolonialism. Finally, despite its focus is on political economy, the study brackets
from direct consideration the politics of diaspora-homeland relations and
the politics of diaspora mobilization. That is, diaspora mobilization is not a
politically neutral or partisan free process. The Cape Verdean diaspora is
also an electoral constituency. This is a source of promise as well as peril,
and it merits a separate study.
Despite its historical and economic significance, there are only few
works in English on the Cape Verdean diaspora – loosely defined as all Cape
Verdeans and their descendants living abroad permanently or temporarily, sharing a common identity and ties to the homeland.1 Most research
on the Cape Verdean diaspora has focused on issues of transnational identity and citizenship, social formation, migration patterns, immigrant incorporation and other cultural and ethnographic questions (Halter, 1993; Challinor, 2008; Batalha and Carling, 2008; Carling and Akensson, 2009; Marques,
Santos, and Araújo, 2001). A rare few explicitly examine the dimension of
political economy (Cardoso, 2009; Bourdet and Falck, 2006; Rocha, Tolentino and Tolentino, 2008). Studies on the Cape Verdean diaspora, therefore,
face daunting challenges in terms of the scarcity of research and data. Its
geographical dispersion and historical depth present additional research
challenges. As discussed below, we do not know the true size of this diaspora,
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its socioeconomic composition, the depth of sentimental and material connections, the scale of return and circular migration, or the scale and composition of diﬀerent kinds of transnational transactions that take place. The
problem is especially acute for studies on political economy. We have good,
albeit incomplete, data on monetary remittances and emigrant deposits
in homeland banks, but data is either limited or nonexistent for goods remittances, diaspora return visits, diaspora foreign investment, skills and
knowledge transfer, consumption of homeland products, and other types of
transnational economic transactions.

The Cape Verdean Diaspora, Transnationalism and
Development
Broadly defined for the purposes of this study, economic transnationalism
consists of all economically relevant practices, flows, and transactions between
diaspora communities and the homeland. Its most visible and recognizable
manifestation is the sending of financial remittances. For Cape Verdeans,
bidons (drums) filled with goods sent to family members has become emblematic. No other social group or sub-state actor embodies transnationalism
better than diaspora communities. Since they retain emotional and material
ties to the homeland, and engage in practices that span or cut across multiple
borders, migrants and diaspora communities are among the most tangible
and weighty transnational actors (Portes, 2001). For good or ill, therefore,
migration has been an intimate aspect of Cape Verde’s social formation and
development process, and remains one of the few viable options available as
it transitions into its new phase of development. However, to capitalize fully
on this potential, the country and its diaspora must move away from the traditional methodology of relations; new strategies and instruments are needed
to expand the scope and modes of the diaspora’s participation. Indeed, in light
of ever restrictive immigration policies in host countries and the long term
decline of remittances, the new framework must move diaspora-homeland
relations beyond monetary remittances and bidons. More still, since the diaspora’s economic role remains large – and its withdrawal catastrophic – a policy
priority must be to nurture, expand and manage this role.
Harnessing the diaspora for development compels us to rethink and
reconceptualize our traditional notions and theories of economic development. In the case of a small developing country like Cape Verde, the building
blocs of economic development have tended to focus on governments,
international intergovernmental agencies, state-to-state relations, trade
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regimes and global markets, and other state-centric actors and interactions. Transnational actors, such as diasporas, are rarely considered as a
potentially weighty factor – good or bad – in a country’s social, political, and
economic development. For countries like Cape Verde, economic transnationalism has been central. As this paper argues, it is not possible to understand Cape Verde’s social and economic formation, before and after independence, in the absence of economic transnationalism.
A vast literature on transnationalism and migration exists (Levitt,
DeWind, and Vertovec, 2003; Vertovec, 2003, 2004; Portes, 2001; Faist,
2009). As such, conceptual and theoretical debates need not detract our
analytical objectives in this study. Migrant transnationalism is just one of
several forms of the phenomena of sub-national, non-state, non-institutional actors interacting and transacting across or above multiple national
borders (Portes, 2001). Transnationalism, and diaspora communities as
distinct agents and actors in global aﬀairs, shifts our methodological and
conceptual focus from the nation-state as the unit of analysis to non-state
actors and forces transcending sovereign borders. Globalization intensifies
these flows and practices that cross, span, and transcend borders. Migrants
occupy a distinct transnational space that encompasses material and immaterial facets and transactions. Of great policy and theoretical significance
of transnationalism is that it can lie, fully or partially, beyond the purview,
control, regulation or preferences of formal governing structures or agents
of the state. In the case of the diaspora, some facets of its transnational activities may be partially or fully controlled by the state, such as migration,
remittances, investment, return visits, but other facets lie beyond the state’s
reach and capacity. A significant portion of monetary remittances, for
example, flow through informal channels. New communications and information technologies further strengthen the ability of transnational actors
and flows to escape the purview of states. Transnationalism, moreover, is
not always a positive force. Not all forms of migrant transnational practices
benefit homeland development (Faist, 2009). Transnationalism, including
migrant transnationalism, can involve illicit traﬃcking, international organized criminal networks, cybercrime, pandemics, terrorism, and so on. Migrant transnationalism can often entail activities and transactions – such as
protest, organized opposition, and other anti-system behavior – that threaten
both the security and prosperity of the homeland state. Viewing it as a
threat, not all countries wish to involve their diaspora in national life. These
are not major concerns in the case of Cape Verde. Nonetheless, many people
express concerns over perceived negative cultural and social influences from
the diaspora or the troubled integration of deported youth.
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Thus, transnationalism in the context of migration encompasses multiple and interacting dimensions and spaces (Levitt, DeWind, and Vertovec,
2003). This study focuses exclusively on migration and the political economy
of homeland-diaspora relations. However, the transnational lives and practices of migrants cannot be reduced solely or even primarily to economic
interactions with the homeland. A vast literature examines the cultural, social, and ideational dimensions of transnationalism and its impact. Given its
analytical and explanatory objectives, this study isolates the economic aspects of transnational migration, specifically diaspora-homeland economic
relations, but no suggestion is made here that this facet is insulated from
or impervious to the other dimensions. These facets interact and transform
one another. Indeed, the social, cultural and ideational dimensions of transnational interaction between diaspora and homeland, especially as they impact identity formation, may have a determining role in shaping diasporahomeland economic relations.
Economic transnationalism has its limits. The diaspora has not been,
and will not be, the only critical factor is Cape Verde’s development. Migration has been, and might continue to be, a central reality for Cape Verde,
but its socioeconomic development cannot be reduced to migration and
diaspora. Mobilizing the diaspora’s full contribution must necessarily be
only one component in a much broader national development strategy and
post-graduation growth model. For any country, especially small developing
countries, development is conditioned, positively or negatively, by a number
of factors internal and external to the country. Vital as migration and the diaspora’s contribution may be, the development of a small, highly open and
vulnerable, and externally dependent country like Cape Verde will always be
conditioned by global forces over which it has no control, including a global
asymmetries of power, wealth resources, and economic exchange. As such,
the prospects and limitations of the diaspora’s contribution must be placed
in this larger context of global relations and local capacity. Notwithstanding
these larger global constraints and development handicaps, homeland policies, institutions and conditions remain critical. The Cape Verdean diaspora,
as discussed below, is an economic diaspora – in that emigration over the
centuries involved individuals and families driven by poverty at home and
searching of better economic opportunities abroad. Put diﬀerently, caution
is necessary in analyzing the positive links between migration and development for Cape Verde, since migration has been a product of the country’s
poverty and underdevelopment. In good and bad ways, migration and development in Cape Verde are inseparable. The country’s high rate of out migration since the beginning reflected its limited internal capacity to gener-
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ate growth and development. In a land of poverty, drought and scant natural
resources, migration constituted a vital safety valve. The export of people
reduced the pressures at home for food, jobs, education, and resources. On
the other hand, migration was also a positive economic resource in terms of
the monetary and goods remittances that resulted. The small island country, with a long history of emigration, implicitly has always relied on diaspora-based economic transnationalism as a major resource.
It is not the purpose of this study to engage in debates about the migration and development nexus. Others review this debate (Skeldon, 2008;
Ratha, Mohapratha, and Scheja, 2011; de Haas, 2012; Schiller, 2012; Faist,
2009; Bourdet and Falck, 2006; Ratha, 2003; Durand, Parrado, and Massey,
1996). The relationship between migration and development is neither linear, simple, or unidirectional. As de Haas (2012) notes, it is context dependent. There are limits and challenges to migration’s potential contribution to
development, many of which are beyond the control of either the homeland
or its emigrants. Unavoidably, migration has negative and positive impacts
on the homeland, especially for a country like Cape Verde with a high proportion of emigration consisting of skilled labor. We can assume a high degree of brain drain in the Cape Verde case, but data and empirical research
are scarce as is data on brain gain and circulation (Cabral, 2009). Migration
deprives a country of social and human capital essential to productivity,
creativity and entrepreneurship; it can result in negative social and cultural
impacts, such as family separation, breakdown, and negative cultural influences. There is a widespread view in Cape Verde that emigration results in
reduced work ethic and entrepreneurship by relatives in the homeland who
simply rely on remittances from family members abroad. That the diaspora
retains strong material connections to the homeland may mean more remittances and circular migration, but it also means diaspora-owned houses,
farmland, and other productive assets frequently remain frozen, unused,
and an obstacle to local and national development planning.
Given Cape Verde’s structural characteristics and severe development
limitations, it is safe to conclude that emigration has resulted in a net positive impact and that the diaspora’s direct contribution has been vital. Compared to other countries, Cape Verde may be an outlier in that migration
looms so large in its development, today as in the past. The reason is not
solely based on the disproportionately large size of its diaspora and high
rate of out migration, but also based on the sizeable financial role of the diaspora in the economy. As discussed below, 40% of Cape Verde’s GDP today
is accounted for by the direct financial transfers (remittances and emigrant bank deposits) from its diaspora. As such, the role of the diaspora and
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migration in the country’s development is not merely a theoretical exercise.
Understanding the prospects and limitations of this economic transnationalism,
and devising an eﬀective framework to manage and nurture it, becomes a
practical, timely and urgent policy necessity.
The paucity of empirical research on the economic impact of migration
in Cape Verde tempers any firm conclusions and net assessments (Bourdet and Falck, 2006; Rocha, Tolentino and Tolentino, 2008). Migration has
contributed positively to Cape Verde’s development at both the macroeconomic and micro, or individual and household, levels. Migration becomes
a development resource for countries with Cape Verde’s characteristics. To
put it crudely, Cape Verde has always been a country unable to feed itself,
let alone possess the scale or productive endowments for large scale economic activities to employ everyone. Cape Verde’s historical vocation has
been the export of people, including skilled labor. As noted above, this has
not only been an important social and economic pressure relief valve but
also a source of economic value. Migration results in an inflow of financial
resources that can stimulate consumption, production, improve balance
of payments and the current accounts, increase hard currency reserves,
and boost private investments. Financial remittances became one of the
two biggest sources of external financing for the economy during the
first three decades after independence. The macroeconomic impact of remittances and emigrant deposits extended even further. Such financial inflows by migrants are non-debt. Combined with the fact that remittances
are also a stable, non-volatile source of financing, they were pivotal to Cape
Verde’s macroeconomic stability and long term sustainability. Finally, the experience of countries like India, China and others, demonstrate how a wellarticulated and managed diaspora engagement framework can transform
skilled emigration into an important source of growth and innovation for
the homeland economy. At the micro level, the positive impact of migration is visible, both in terms of remittances as well as circular migration
and social remittances of skills, ideas, knowledge, entrepreneurship. Remittances have been critical sustaining household consumption, reducing
poverty and even stimulating entrepreneurial activities. Since those early
years, the remittance by emigrants to relatives of money, food, clothing,
medicine, home goods, tools, farm equipment, vehicles, machinery, and
other goods made the diﬀerence between famine and survival, abject
poverty and prospects for improved living standards by family members
back home.

The Cape Verdean diaspora is unique. On both theoretical and policy
grounds, Cape Verde oﬀers a novel and fertile case study on migration and
homeland development. Cape Verde is notable among countries with large
emigrant populations because of the relative size of the diaspora, the historical depth of its formation, and the unusually strong bond the diaspora
maintains with the homeland. Cape Verde has the largest diaspora population in Africa, relative to the resident population, and ranks among the
largest in the world (Ratha, et. al., 2011). Cape Verde and emigration
are synonymous. Transnationalism thus defines Cape Verde and the Cape
Verdean experience in the modern world. Indeed, as a vulnerable micro
state in the world economy with near total dependency on the outside, Cape
Verde’s development and national survival have been determined by the
external dimension – trade, migration, remittances, donor aid.
Migration is thus at the heart of Cape Verde’s historical formation as a
society and economy (Batalha and Carling, 2008; Halters, 1993). The history
of Cape Verde is a history of migration. Its formation as a society has roots
in migration – from the brutality of colonial “discovery” and the violence of
the trans-Atlantic slave trade, to centuries of voluntary out migration driven
by famine and poverty. Cape Verde is unique among countries of the global
South because its transnational and transatlantic migration, both coercive
and voluntary, began so early (Halters, 1993). This economic transnationalism, in
eﬀect, started with the country’s social formation and origins as an entrepôt
during the Atlantic slave trade. In its non-coercive manifestation it has been
reproduced across centuries of out migration driven by poverty, famine,
colonial repression, and lack of economic opportunities. The indelible traces of
transnationalism are visible as early as the nineteenth century when the socalled packet boats and whaling ships transported people, goods, money
and ideas back and forth between the Islands and the Americas. The Cape
Verdean diaspora is also unique because, despite its long history, it retains
strong sentimental and material ties to the homeland even after becoming
permanently settled in host countries. With a large diaspora relative to its
tiny resident population, few families in Cape Verde are unaffected by migration. Cape Verde continues to have one of the highest rates of emigration
in the world (Ratha, et. al., 2011).
Cape Verde, perhaps more than any other country, can be considered
a nation, a culture and society whose history and identity are intimately
shaped by and through its diaspora and history of emigration (Challinor,
2008; Batalha and Carling, 2008). Cape Verdeans are among the first free
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Blacks in the United States. Ship manifests and other oﬃcial records show
Cape Verdean emigrants in the United States by the mid-1700s (Halters,
1993). In general, prior to independence in 1975, there were three great
waves of outmigration (OIM, 2010a, p.26). The first big wave of outmigration from the Portuguese colony, approximately 1900-1926, was destined
primarily toward the United States (although arrivals had begun over a century earlier). The second wave, 1927-1945, was oriented primarily toward
Latin America and Africa, while the third wave during 1945-1973 went to
Europe. In general, the Cape Verdean diaspora communities in Europe are
more recent and comprise a much higher percentage of temporary migrants
(Batalha and Carling, 2008). Most oﬃcial figures indicate that the majority
of emigrants from Cape Verde in the last two decades went to Europe. Thus,
Cape Verde’s diaspora does not consist only or primarily of temporary migrants, but also long established, permanent communities with a high level
of social and economic integration in their host countries. Its diaspora is
quite varied in terms of history, geography, genealogy, and socioeconomic
composition. That is, while it is a large global diaspora, Cape Verdean communities abroad are heterogeneous in terms of socioeconomic conditions,
legal status, host country incorporation, wealth resources, and overall levels
of human development. On the other hand, it is a culturally, linguistically,
and ethnically homogeneous diaspora, and reinforces the transnational
identity of the people as one nation.
No one knows the true size of Cape Verde’s diaspora. Census data in
the US or Europe are nonexistent. Is is likely that Cape Verde has the largest
Diaspora in the world relative to the resident population. A widely shared
assumption is that the Cape Verdean diaspora is ‘twice the size’ of the
resident population of roughly 500,000. The largest diaspora communities are in the United States and Europe, primarily Portugal, France,
the Netherlands (Holland), Italy, Luxembourg, Switzerland and more
recently Spain. Scatterings of Cape Verdean emigrants can be found in
nearly every part of the world, from nearby Senegal and São Tome e Príncipe, to Argentina and Brazil to China. The United Nations database on
international migration estimates a total stock of 171,737 Cape Verdean
emigrants in 2013 (UN-DESA, 2014), or 35% of the resident population.
The Global Migrant Origin Database of the Development Research Center (DRC) places the estimate at 199,644 in 2007 (DRC, 2014). The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) estimates
116,248 Cape Verdeans living and working in OECD countries in 2011
(OECD, 2011). The World Bank’s Global Bilateral Migration databank calculates a size of 152,411 (World Bank, 2014), roughly 31% of the resident

Evolution of the Diaspora’s Economic Role
There is strong empirical and historical reason to assert that Cape Verde’s
economic viability and social progress since 1975 would have been improbable without its diaspora’s contribution. This study argues that in order for the
diaspora to remain a valuable economic resource in the next phase of Cape
Verde’s development, a new framework must be devised that expands the
modes of its contribution. The diaspora’s historical contribution has been
largely limited to goods and monetary remittances, as this section discusses
below. Today, the economic value of Cape Verde’s diaspora is neither limited
to, nor primarily, in the form of financial remittances. Yet Cape Verde and its
diaspora have yet to develop a framework to mobilize the full extent and
modes of the diaspora’s contribution. However, this does not imply absence
of substantial contribution today and in the past. Financial remittances remain important today. Since 1975, the diaspora’s primary contribution has
been channeled through monetary remittances, but today it is also emerging
as an important source of investments.

2. Note that the methodology and definition used by many international agencies tend to rely
on oﬃcial census data as well as define migrants as only foreign born, non-citizen individuals residing in a diﬀerent country. As such, this methodology would severely undercount
the Cape Verdean diaspora, especially older and rooted communities in the United States.
3. Author’s calculations based on UN migration data and World Bank population data.
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population.2 A now extinct government agency responsible for emigrant
support services had estimated a diaspora population size of 518,180 in
1998 (OIM, 2009, p.18). An early World Bank report in 1985 estimated a high
range of 454,00 compared to 296,000 residents (World Bank, 1985a). A recent study by the International Organization for Migration (IOM, 2010b, p.9)
puts the size of Cape Verde’s emigrant population at 450,000, or 90% of the
resident population. Even if we use a low conservative estimate, it still would
represent a significant stock relative to the tiny resident population. Based
on the UN migration data, Cape Verde’s diaspora size relative to national
population is much higher than comparative figures for Senegal (4%), Liberia (8%), Ghana (3%), and Côte d’Ivoire (4%).3 Cape Verde’s relative diaspora
size is more comparable to high emigration countries like El Salvador, whose
total emigrant stock is roughly 24% of the resident population.
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Figure 1. Cape Verde Migrant Remittances

Universally, remittances are the most visible and direct manifestation of
the diaspora’s contribution to homeland development. Oﬃcially recorded
remittance inflows from Cape Verde’s diaspora in 2013 totaled $13.7 billion
escudos, or roughly $172 million dollars (BCV, 2014b). Remittances were
three times the size of foreign aid, and bigger than donor aid and FDI combined. Remittances are two to three times bigger than merchandise export
earnings. In fact, it is safe to say that the export of workers (emigration) is
Cape Verde’s single biggest export. As percentage of GDP and in per capita
terms, Cape Verde is among the highest recipient countries in the world.
Cape Verde was the 6th largest remittances recipient in Sub-Saharan Africa
in 2013, as percentage of GDP, and 29th in the world, according to World
Bank data (World Bank, 2014). In per capita terms, Cape Verde remittance
inflows in 2013 infused an additional $352 dollars into the personal income
of every resident, more than double the minimum monthly salary. This per
capita contribution of remittances ranks Cape Verde among the highest recipient countries in the world such as El Salvador ($664), Guatemala ($349),
the Philippines ($258) and Nepal ($187).5 Cape Verde’s remittanceper capita
is the highest in the West Africa subregion, with Senegal ($116) trailing a
distant second. Historically until the mid-1990s, remittances and foreign
aid have been the dominant inflows, accounting for as high as 80% of the
4. World Bank, World Development Indicators (WDI), 2014.
5. Author’s calculations based on World Bank remittances and population data for 2013.

6. Author’s calculations based on BCV normalized balance of payments data.
7. Banco de Cabo Verde (BCV), Relatório de Política Monetária, (Praia: BCV, May 2012).
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country’s GDP (World Bank, 1985b, 6). For most the decade and half after
independence, remittances ranged between 40% and 25% of GDP. The
World Bank estimates that remittances accounted for over 40% of GDP
during 1978-82 (World Bank, 1985a, p.29).As is commonly observed, oﬃcial statistics on monetary remittances underreport their actual size. An unknown but presumably significant portion, as high as 50% of oﬃcial figures,
is transferred through informal channels (Rocha, Tolentino and Tolentino,
2008). Likewise, oﬃcial data do not capture non-monetary remittances, or
goods remittances. Goods remittances have been just as equally important
as monetary remittances, especially in terms of their role in household consumption and poverty alleviation.
Today, oﬃcially recorded remittances account for roughly 9% of Cape
Verde’s GDP, which is much lower than in the past (BCV, 2014a). However,
this figure is far above the regional average of 2.6 percent for Sub-Saharan Africa (Ratha, Mohapratha and Scheja, 2011). Remittances have been
steadily rising in absolute terms for more than two decades. Despite its declining share in GDP, remittances remain one of the four main sources of
financial inflows into Cape Verde today, along with ODA, FDI, and tourism
travel receipts. During the 2005-2011 period, remittances averaged 10.3%
share of GDP. Tourism receipts have averaged 18.7 percent of GDP during
2005-2011, ranging between 12-21 percent.6 For its part, FDI averaged 10
percent of GDP during this period, oscillating between 6.3 to 14.2 percent
of GDP. In the last few years since the 2008 crisis, remittances have been
a bigger source of external financing than FDI – indeed the largest source
not including tourism receipts. Remittances inflows in 2009 experienced an
expected but almost negligible dip, 1.6%, in contrast to the -36.5 decline
in FDI. Inflows of approved FDI resumed in 2010, but took another steep
drop, 21.6%, in 2011.7 Remittance inflows rebounded, to a peak of 28% in
2011. Importantly, unlike FDI and ODA, remittances are not only stable but
also non-seasonal. In terms of the economic geography of remittances,
Cape Verde enjoys significant remittance inflows from eleven countries, the
majority of them in the European Union. Over the last three decades or so,
the top source countries for roughly 80% of Cape Verde’s remittances have
been Portugal, France, Netherlands, and the United States. Italy has been
a distant fifth for most years, followed by Switzerland, Luxembourg, and
increasingly Spain and the United Kingdom. Portugal, traditionally home
to the largest Cape Verdean migrant worker community, has remained the
largest single source country (Rocha, Tolentino and Tolentino, 2008).That
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the European based diaspora, comprising a higher proportion of temporary
migrants, remits more than the historically older US diaspora is not surprising. Research has shown that temporary migrants tend to remit much
more and more frequently.
TrendsinMainSourcesofExternalFinancing
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Figure 2. Trends in Main Sources of External Financing, GDP Shares
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In summary, monetary remittances continue to be a crucial source of
development financing and poverty alleviation for Cape Verde. They have
proven resilient and stable, confirming research findings that remittances
are more stable and counter-cyclical. The overall relative decline of remittances in GDP may primarily reflect the fast growth of the homeland economy
in the past two decades, rather than restrictive immigration policies or generational turnover. Undoubtedly, however, the latter two phenomena are
occurring.
Even as remittances decline, Cape Verde has been making good progress in
expanding the modes of diaspora contribution. The most important change
in the diaspora’s role has been its rise as a source of foreign investments.
Cape Verde’s diaspora is depositing its savings in specially designated “emigrant accounts” in homeland banks. The origins of these emigrant deposits
date to a 1984 law, revised and amended in late 1995. The accounts can
be in local or foreign currency time deposits. They are tax-free and carry high
interest rates. In addition, emigrants may borrow up to twice their value. Emigrant deposits are conceptually and qualitatively diﬀerent from remittances.
8. Author’s calculations compiled from various oﬃcial reports by the Banco de Cabo Verde,
including Boletim de Estatísticas 20 Anos (Praia: BCV 2012).
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Figure 3. Financing Cape Verde’s Economy - Main Sources 2013
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Emigrant deposits are by far the largest single category of deposits in
the national banking system. Fruit of a policy innovation in the mid-1990s,
emigrant deposits now constitute a substantial portion of assets in national
banks. Representing nearly 30% of GDP, emigrant deposits also account for
over 32.4% of M2, or monetary mass. Like remittances, emigrant deposits
have proven very stable, even during the crisis years following 2008. Indeed,
this stable and steady growth, without any reversals, is characteristic of emigrant deposits since 1991 (BCV, 2012). Emigrant deposits also represent46%
of the outstanding commercial credit to the economy during the fourth
quarter of 2013 (BCV, 2014b). This external financing has helped fuelled the
country’s growth by supporting domestic investment and business development. As such, emigrant deposits have been a significant source of liquidity

9. Banco de Cabo Verde (BCV), Boletim de Estatísticas. (Praia: BCV, November 2014).

87

Cape Verde and Its Diaspora: Economic Transnationalism and Homeland Development

They are investments, as emigrants pursue higher rates of return on their
money. More than three times the size of annual remittance inflows, by the
end of calendar year 2013, Cape Verde’s emigrants had deposited over $545
million dollars in Cape Verde’s commercial banks (BCV, 2014b). As alluded to
previously, emigrant deposits and oﬃcially reported financial remittances
combined account for about 40% of Cape Verde’s GDP. This share is likely
much higher since some portion of remittances is informal and emigrant
investments are included in FDI figures.
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for the banking system, which has converted these assets into investment
credit. Diaspora savings, in other words, have been supporting the credit
expansion that has benefitted business and consumers alike. The substantial
amount of emigrant deposits is not risk free, since sudden withdrawal can
cripple the banking system and trigger economic ruin. Growth and stability
in the deposits have been the norm, even after the 2008 global and Eurozone crises. For now, emigrant deposits constitute a diaspora vote of confidence in the homeland. The country’s stable and predictable exchange rate,
based on a fixed peg with the euro, provides added confidence.
Finally, observational evidence suggests two other notable trends. The
first is a growing trend of ‘transnational entrepreneurship’, as emigrants
start or finance businesses in the homeland or launch new ventures that cater to this transnationalism (Portes, Guarnizo and Haller, 2002). The second
trend, often intertwined with the first, is that emigrants themselves are
using their savings to finance their own housing construction, other
property investments, and entrepreneurial ventures. The last two decades
have witnessed a veritable boom in emigrant home construction and real estate purchases by emigrants. Aside from depositing their savings in homeland banks, emigrants are also investing in real estate, farmland, transportation, hotels, and new business ventures. Reliable statistics on emigrant
foreign direct investment are lacking. Reports of the Central Bank of Cape
Verde (BCV) over the last few years have inserted a new rubric labeled “emigrant investments,” but there is no consistency in reporting, explanation, or
systematic treatment.10 In one of its random reporting, BCV data indicates
that emigrant investments accounted for 42% and 28% of total FDI in 2012
and 2013 respectively (BCV 2014b, 25).
Lastly, observational evidence suggests that potential exists to extend
the diaspora’s contribution in other modes. Based on current trends and
market signals, two areas of biggest potential are tourism demand and socalled “nostalgic” trade. Not only is there already a detectable amount of
informal transnational trade taking place between Cape Verde and its diaspora, but circular migration is also substantial. Significant deepening of diaspora participation in either or both of these areas, trade and tourism, can
have significant multiplier and secondary eﬀects on homeland economic
growth, diversification of the economy, business development, rural poverty alleviation and jobs creation. The strong emotional and material bonds

10. Care is necessary in treating statistical data from all sources. It should be noted that there is
frequent discrepancy and inconsistency across diﬀerent statistical reports from the Banco
de Cabo Verde (BCV) or in diﬀerent editions of the same reports. Some data is always
reported as preliminary.

Harnessing the Diaspora for Development
Cape Verde today is in a development crossroads. Having graduated into
the middle income country category, it must readapt development strategy
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between the homeland and its diaspora mean that Cape Verdeans are returning and visiting in substantial numbers. A growing trend is emigrants
returning to retire. Most return to vacation and participate in annual cultural
festivals. The diaspora is consuming the few ‘made in Cape Verde’ products
available on store shelves in community supermarkets and shops in the US
and Europe. In other words, a ready-made consumer market exists for Cape
Verdean exporters. The biggest consumption item has always been cultural
products, music especially, but there is high demand for other goods, especially agro-foods and traditional alcoholic beverages.
Notwithstanding these many positive developments, Cape Verde and its
diaspora have failed to extend the scale and modes of diaspora contribution
beyond the areas above. Progress in transforming the diaspora into a source
of foreign investment has been notable, but the diaspora is still not a source
of tourism demand or consumer market for national products. Nor is the diaspora a meaningful source of knowledge and skills transfer. As noted above,
emigrant direct investment and transnational entrepreneurship appear to
be substantial and gaining momentum, but there is neither reliable statistical monitoring of it or a policy framework to guide it. Philanthropy and charity
are widespread but ad hoc. Despite a good deal of enthusiasm and eﬀorts
among diaspora individuals and groups to send donations and other charitable contributions, no credible framework exists to marshal, coordinate,
manage and catalyze such eﬀorts. The inability to harness the full potential
contribution of the diaspora is puzzling because of the unusually strong and
positive ties between the diaspora and the homeland. Diaspora-homeland
and diaspora-state relations have always been positive, rather than hostile,
historically. What explains this incomplete success in harnessing the diaspora as a development resource? As noted previously, there are numerous
facets to this questions, and a complete explanation would have to examine
the many social, political, economic, cultural and ideational factors inside
the diaspora itself. The importance of these other factors notwithstanding,
diaspora engagement policies of the homeland are also determining in the
success and failure of diaspora mobilization. The section below develops a
typology of diaspora engagement policies and mechanisms, and assesses
Cape Verde’s policy performance in each of the categories.
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to find new sources of growth and innovation. Given the size and historical
significance of its diaspora, and limited in its options, Cape Verde is rethinking
ways to leverage its diaspora as a resource. Since independence, Cape Verde
has sought to incorporate its diaspora in all facets of national life. Only recently has this goal taken a more focused and comprehensive form, but it
builds on years of individual policies and laws aimed at encouraging greater
diaspora participation in all aspects of national life. The 2014 National Strategy
on Emigration and Development (ENED) outlines a general framework and
goals. The document is aware of the need to mobilize the diaspora along
multiple forms, or modes, of participation. It identifies four broad areas: promoting dialogue and information sharing; increasing remittances, including
charitable contributions and philanthropy; skills remittances; and investment and trade promotion. The importance of the diaspora is also cited in
other key development documents like the Growth and Poverty Reduction
Strategy Paper (GPRS) and the Plan of Government. As noted below,
however, these documents remain largely aspirational, having generic goals
and lacking an operational or implementation plan for diaspora mobilization. Nonetheless, there is a durable political will and broad partisan support
in the homeland to embrace the diaspora.
Largely implicitly, and without a comprehensive strategy, migration has
always been an integral part of Cape Verde’s development strategy since
1975. Strong emotional and material bonds retained by emigrants materialized as monetary and goods remittances, requiring little eﬀort in policy
or institutional innovation on the part of the homeland. Today, for all the
reasons discussed in this study, the laissez-faire approach of the past is no
longer relevant. Migration must be translated into positive economic contributions through deliberate and sustained eﬀorts by the homeland and
its diaspora. Diaspora engagement policies are one crucial component of
this process of translating migration into a development resource. In both
policy and the academic literature, the focus has concentrated on financial
remittances, skills transfer, remittance capture and immigration policies
(Bhagwati, 2003). This is a narrow conception of the possible economic roles
of the diaspora, since today its role as tourists, investors or consumers of
nostalgic goods will have far greater growth-inducing impact. To leverage
fully its diaspora, Cape Verde must go beyond monetary remittances to
harness the diaspora as a source of growth, jobs creation, innovation and
global economic integration. Although a number of policy and institutional
deficits stand in the way, as discussed below, Cape Verde has good reasons
to believe its diaspora can continue its historically significant economic role
into the future. Harnessing this full potential will require eﬀective policy and
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institutional supports on multiple fronts. These policy and institutional supports fall into three distinct but mutually reinforcing analytical categories:
diaspora enabling, diaspora-building, and diaspora integration.
The section below oﬀers a typology of diaspora engagement policies.
It is important to re-emphasize that, while this study focuses primarily on
the eﬀorts of the homeland state, constructing an eﬀective and sustainable
framework is a two-way street, and it must involve both governmental, non-government, civil society and private sector actors on both sides. Moreover, as De Haas (2012) and others have observed, the laws and policies of
diaspora host countries – on immigration, banking and money transfers, social security, taxation, mobility and guest workers, circular migration – have
considerable impact on the scale and modes of the diaspora’s contribution
to the homeland. Even with a fully developed diaspora engagement framework, the homeland may not be able to derive migration’s full contribution if
the policies of host countries areincompatible. Nevertheless, homeland policyis crucially important. The experience of other countries, and the practical
necessities of development planning, suggest that the homeland state can
play a pivotal role: devising appropriate policy and institutional mechanisms,
creating an enabling environment, but also an equally important role as facilitator and promoter of bottom-up transnational initiatives by the diaspora
and homeland civil society. Lastly, as Portes (2001) has observed, harnessing the full potential contribution of a diaspora does not require the active
participation of every member of the diaspora, only a portion. It does not
require substantial circular movement or even conscious eﬀort by diaspora
individuals or groups to structure or direct their activities as contributions
to development. Activists, grassroots groups, transnational entrepreneurs
and other similar groups and individuals are important, but passive and occasional consumers of homeland exports can be equally significant from the
standpoint of development. As noted previously, the socioeconomic profile
of the Cape Verdean diaspora is heterogeneous, comprising established
middle and professional classes as well as low skilled temporary migrants
and marginal communities. Moreover, not everyone has to contribute in the
exact same extent or frequency. Considerable variation is to be expected in
the intensity, scope, frequency and modes of participation. The bulk of the
diaspora’s contribution occurs through individual actions and decisions – remittances are a great example – but incrementally and cumulatively they
can have major economic impact and the micro and macroeconomic levels
(Vertovec, 2004; Levitt, 2001).This is all the more reason that it is critical to
devise a diaspora engagement framework that fosters diﬀerent levels and
modes of individual and collective contribution. That is, the importance of a
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strategic framework lies precisely in its capacity to mobilize and facilitate diaspora participation across a broad range of modes: as investors, knowledge
remitters, consumers of homeland exports, tourists, and so on.

Typology of Diaspora Engagement Policies
In terms of its direct economic participation in homeland development,
the diaspora’s potential contribution spans a broad range of activities,
modes, and roles. It can be direct and visible as well as indirect and not easily
quantifiable. Contribution is used here in a wider meaning rather than narrowly to mean direct giving, as in remittances, donations, or voluntarism.
Important as monetary remittances are, it is more appropriate to view the
diaspora’s potential contribution in terms of the multiple modes of participation. As such, a framework constructed to harness the diaspora as an economic resource must be able to do so across all the possible modes of contribution. The experience of countries like Israel, South Korea and, recently,
Ireland, China and India, illustrate that the diaspora’s contribution can extend across multiple modes. This experience has drawn much scholarly attention to what Patterson (2006) has called “diaspora-homeland collaborative
development.” The scope and number of these modes will diﬀer from country to country and will depend, in part, on the three categories of diaspora
engagement eﬀorts. Not all modes may be possible at once, nor materialize
in the same depth. For Cape Verde’s political economy profile, we can identify several possible modes.
The possible economic roles of Cape Verde’s diaspora can be divided into
five or six distinct categories, or modes: a source of monetary remittances;
a source of direct investment; a consumer market for homeland or nostalgic
exports; a tourist demand market; and as a source of brain gain. The sixth
mode, while not strictly economic in character, can be consequential for development – namely, the diaspora as a transnational political lobby. A politically well-organized diaspora can be an eﬀective advocate and promoter
of homeland development by lobbying and pressuring host governments
and international donor agencies. The case of Israel may be sui generis. No
suggestion is made that Cape Verde’s diaspora is similar in size, wealth or
organizational capacity. A major handicap Cape Verde and its diaspora confront is the low levels of organization and political mobilization inside diaspora communities. The diaspora is poorly organized. It can neither defend
nor advocate for its own community interests and welfare, let alone advocate for the homeland. More importantly, it cannot mobilize, coordinate,

Diaspora Enabling Conditions
Diaspora enabling conditions comprise all macro level social, economic,
political, and historical conditions and factors that either obstruct or
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and manage its own contribution to homeland development, as the recent
volcanic eruption illustrated. This internal weakness obstructs the diaspora’s
full potential irrespective of the eﬀorts of the homeland. Finally, the list of
modes above is not exhaustive. There are several other potential modes not
mentioned. Diaspora transnational entrepreneurship, a variant of direct investment, can be a transformative force in the both the homeland and host
countries (Portes, Guarnizo and Haller, 2002). As diaspora reaction to the
volcanic eruption illustrates, for example, the diaspora can be an important
source of charity and humanitarian relief. Similarly, another potential is philanthropy oriented toward community development, youth empowerment,
education and training, and entrepreneurship, including microfinancing,
scholarships, and project grants. The eﬀectiveness of diaspora hometown
associations in the cases of El Salvador and Mexico illustrates not just the
potential impact of diasporas on community development but also the
importance of diaspora organization (Durand, Parrado and Massey, 1996;
Landolt, 2001; Portes, Escobar and Radford, 2007). New information and
communication technologies open up a range of unexplored opportunities
for virtual diaspora engagement, especially in knowledge and skills transfer.
This study examines the types of diaspora engagement policies necessary to harness these various modes and expand the scale of each type of
contribution. Like the diaspora’s modes of participation, diaspora engagement policies and mechanisms vary widely. A universal formula or set of
policies does not exist. Gamen (2006) suggests we can classify diaspora
engagement policies into general types of policies homeland governments
pursue, namely, policies oriented toward diaspora capacity building, extending rights, and extracting obligations. Brinkerhoﬀ (2012) and others argue that eﬀorts to harness the diaspora for development are eﬀective only
if broader conditions in the homeland are conducive. For analytical convenience, and borrowing from Brinkerhoﬀ (2012) and Gamlen (2010), we can
organize these policies and conditions into three distinct categories, or typologies: diaspora enablers, diaspora-building, and diaspora integration.
The three categories are interrelated and mutually supporting. Success in
harnessing the diaspora’s full potential requires substantive progress in all
three categories of diaspora engagement policies.
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facilitate the participation of diaspora members in national life of the home
country. These conditions include among them: the nature of diasporahomeland relations, especially the character of the diaspora exit; social and
political stability; macroeconomic conditions; and governancequality in the
homeland. In other words, enabling conditions and policies are not directly
related to, or aimed, at the diaspora, but encompass the general socioeconomic and political conditions in the homeland. These conditions impact the
lives, behavior and economic activities of everyone – residents, diaspora,
foreign investors, tourists, donors. By shaping the wider structure of incentives, risk, and productivity, enabling conditions spur growth by facilitating
economic activity, entrepreneurship, trade, investment, and business development.11 While gaps and challenges remain, Cape Verde enjoys a number of
enabling conditions that favor diaspora engagement.
Of the three categories, Cape Verde has made most progress in the area
of enabling conditions. First, diaspora-homeland relations have always been
positive historically. It is not a relationship characterized by mutual hostility,
fear, or rejection. The diaspora is not an exiled population forcibly removed
or fled persecution. Migration has been free of exit trauma. Poverty and
famine have been the main drivers, not civil wars, ethnic cleansing, persecution, or expulsion. Aside from the exuberance and competitiveness of partisan politics, the Cape Verde case is free of anti-system behavior, deep social,
ethnic or political cleavages, political exclusion or trauma. Government-diaspora relations are equally positive. Partisan squabbles and criticisms of
government policies are routine but normal.
Second, political stability, social peace and durable institutions have
been crucial enablers of the country’s underlying economic and political success since independence. Problems remain. Comparatively, however, the
country has performed well. It ranks high in Africa and the world in terms
of democracy, governance, transparency, and human development (AfDB,
2012a).Aside from a competitive multiparty democracy, there is rule of law,
secure property rights, and investor protection.
Third, good governance and sound macroeconomic management have
been the country’s trademark, and ensured its credibility with donors, foreign
investors, and diaspora alike. Over the last two decades, Cape Verde has
pursued economic and trade liberalization as well as reforms to improve
11. For a comprehensive analysis of economic conditions and the business climate in Cape
Verde, see: Government of Cabo Verde, Ministry of Finance and Planning, Cape Verde:
Constraints to Growth, Transformation and Poverty Alleviation (Praia: MFP, 2010); and
Government of Cabo Verde, Ministry of Tourism, Industry and Energy (MTIE), Cape Verde:
Diagnostic Trade Integration Study 2013 (Praia: MTIE 2013). See also the AfDB (2012a;
2012b) studies.

Diaspora Building Policies
Diaspora building, in essence, entails constructing a shared identity and
common purpose that can be harnessed for homeland development. There
is nothing automatic in collective identity formation, and translating identify into collective action. This is especially true of the Cape Verdean diaspora,
which is dispersed geographically and spans generations. Diaspora building
policies are measures and initiatives aimed at constructing solidarity, shared
identity, common purpose, patriotism, and strengthening emotional bonds
with the homeland and inside the diaspora. They involve the construction
of a transnational imagined community. They also include activities that
constitute and recognize diaspora communities (Gamlen, 2010). In social science jargon, diaspora building entails symbolic as well as concrete
actions involving transnational nation-building. Although this study focuses
only on homeland initiatives to support and promote it, diaspora building
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the business and investment climate, including reforms to improve the eﬃciency of public administration to deliver services to citizens and businesses.
The reforms, still incomplete, have been improving the business and investment climate for all investors – nationals, foreigners as well as diaspora. For
example, one important reform has been in electronic government, and the
creation of a one-stop-shop platform, the Casa do Cidadão (House of the
Citizen) which allows nationals and emigrants to access common services
virtually or in person at any consulate. Progress is uneven and big challenges
remain, especially in the areas of public administration eﬃciency, customs
procedures, business and investment regulations, and regulatory environment. Even though institutions generally work, favoritism, judicial delays,
and bureaucratic ineﬃciencies are common. The two biggest areas of diaspora complaints in Cape Verde are transportation and customs administration. Diaspora visitors and returning emigrants overlook the inadequacies
of health care, water, electricity and other services, but the low quality and
ineﬃciencies of international and inter-island transportation as well as customs administration generate a level of frustration that dampens diaspora
enthusiasm for the homeland. Today, growing external debt is threatening macroeconomic stability. Social inequality, crime and public insecurity,
weak accountability of elected oﬃcials, policy dysfunctions, and other ills
still exist, and may threaten long term stability and democratic governance.
Despite these challenges, Cape Verde possesses a still durable and favorable
enabling environment for eﬀective diaspora engagement.
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necessarily depends much more on the diaspora’s own internal eﬀorts, conditions and dynamics. As noted, the diaspora’s motivations, incentives, and
mobilizational capacity are critical determining factors (Vertovec, 2003).
Diaspora building eﬀorts can be subdivided into five subcategories,
namely, cultural aﬃrmation, community support and consular services, diaspora organization, circular migration, and diaspora focused administrative
structures. Cultural aﬃrmation eﬀorts by the diaspora and the homeland
are oriented toward fostering collective identity, cultural pride, solidarity,
and transnationalism nationalism. Commonly used diaspora building initiatives by homelands include promoting cultural festivals, sponsoring and
facilitating national day celebrations, community outreach, diaspora return
festivals, among others. The Cape Verdean diaspora is also unusual in the
strength and vitality of its collective identity and cultural aﬃrmation. Diaspora communities retain cultural practices and customs, turning their local
communities into little ‘Cape Verdes’ in host countries. Cultural, ethnic, religious, and linguistic homogeneity further strengthens this transnational
collective identity and sense of nationhood. The use of the native language,
creolu, is a powerful cement and dimension of collective identity that unifies diaspora Cape Verdeans irrespective of their geographic residency. The
homeland government has typically not focused on cultural aﬃrmation activities. Some of its policies, such as refusal to recognize creolu as an oﬃcial
language, undermine cultural aﬃrmation. Community outreach is also an
important element. Frequent oﬃcial visit to diaspora communities by government leaders is a common practice, even though they are social orpartisan
events rather than development promotion.
Homeland governments have been attentive to providing consular services to diaspora communities, including a focus on providing social and
financial assistance to distressed communities. Cape Verde’s principal
diplomatic representations are precisely in the countries with substantial
Cape Verdean immigrants. The advent of electronic government, specifically the one-stop-shop Casa do Cidadão, oﬀers greater reach and eﬃciency in
providing consular services. In a pattern established since the 1980s, much
homeland policy attention continues to be on social work, focused on providing social services and integration assistance to diaspora communities.
The recently endorsed III GPRSP (2012-2016) allocates financial resources
under the “Global Nation” category, but these are destined for “improving
the quality of life of emigrants” and reinforcing consular and diplomatic
representation in the main diaspora host countries.
Diaspora organization and circular migration are two areas in which
neither the diaspora nor the homeland have performed well. Indeed, both
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are practically non-existing. First, the Cape Verdean diaspora in the United
States and in Europe is poorly organized, as noted above. Notwithstanding
a proliferation of small neighborhood and church based groups and social
clubs, intermediary organizations and umbrella associations do not exist. A
separate study is necessary to untangle the myriad of social, economic, political, cultural, and even psychological factors that shape and condition the
diaspora’s weak organization (Vertovec, 2003). Island groupings and hometown associations are few; if they function at all, activities are primarily social
and rarely inclusive. The Cape Verdean Associations in many urban centers
in the Boston-Providence corridor function as a community resource center,
oﬀering language classes, translation services, and meeting point. However,
a peak organization, umbrella association or network of organization does
not exist in neither the US or in Europe. Diaspora professional networks and
associations do not exist. Despite its long history in the United States, the
Cape Verdean diaspora does not have a national umbrella organization –
not even at the state or municipal levels – that can lobby, represent, defend
and advocate for its interests. Organizational fragmentation and low levels
of political participation are the norm. The diaspora in the US is characterized by low levels of voter registration and electoral participation despite its
large size in certain urban centers.
Various governments have made ad hoc and limited eﬀorts to encourage circular migration and return visits. However, a comprehensive
policy does not exist, especially policies that either focus on promoting
diaspora building through return visits and ‘rediscovering ancestral roots’
or that focus on promoting diaspora investment and brain gain. Circular
migration is valuable both in strengthening or renewing diaspora bonds,
especially with younger generations, and in encouraging economic investments. Ad hoc and limited eﬀorts have been tried, including attempts to
encourage brain gain. With financial support from various European Union
countries, the government initiated a “Diaspora Contribution” and “Diaspora Cape Verde” programs to support short term visits by diaspora professionals based in Europe to oﬀer training programs in public and private
sector organizations. Currently, Cape Verde participates in the Temporary
Return of Qualified Nationals program, financed by the International Organization for Migration (IOM). The substantive impact of these one-time,
two to three weeks training programs is uncertain. Sporadic, individual
eﬀorts by businesses, ministries, universities and other agencies to attract
temporary or permanent return by skilled diaspora professionals are common. Nevertheless, a specific policy to encourage, organize and support
return and circular migration does not exist.
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Cape Verde has performed much better in terms of creating dedicated
bureaucratic structures to manage diaspora-homeland relations. First, since
the early years, the government has experimented with an assortment of
institutional arrangements, although none had the specific mandate to mobilizing the diaspora for development. An early mechanism was the creation
of a directorate general for emigration and consular services in the foreign
ministry, followed a few years later in 1984 with the creation of the Institute
for Emigrant Support (IAPE – Instituto de Apoio ao Emigrante). This institute was renamed the Institute of Communities (Instituto das Comunidades)
in 2001, also inside in the foreign ministry. These early structures, however,
were not focused on diaspora economic mobilization. Rather, much of their
mandate focused on social and consular services. A more recent institutional
innovation is the creation of “focal points” for migration in all 22 municipalities. In 2008, a separate ministry, the Ministry of Communities, was created.
In practice, three separate government bodies – the Ministry of Communities, the Ministry of Foreign Aﬀairs, and the Institute of Communities – are
responsible for diaspora aﬀairs. As such, conflicting and imprecise mandates, together with institutional fragmentation, is the norm. A national diaspora council exists, under the aegis of the Ministry of Communities, but
it is not clear how operational it is and it functions as a consultative rather
than policy making body. Notwithstanding the elevation of the diaspora as a
policy priority, the strategic objective of diaspora mobilization for homeland
development is neither at the core of policy nor institutional mandate.
There is one final aspect of diaspora building that merits attention. As
noted, Cape Verde has not performed well in encouraging circular migration, but it has made limited progress in enhancing emigration opportunities
for its people. Namely, it has been active on the diplomatic front in an eﬀort
to widen emigration opportunities through special mobility and temporary
workers’ accords with European Union countries. It signed a mobility agreement with the EU in 2008, involving the Netherlands, Portugal, France,
Spain, and Luxembourg. Finally, Cape Verde enjoys preferential access to
the world’s two biggest economic blocs, the United States and the European Union. While this preferential access is underutilized by Cape Verde
and other African countries, they give Cape Verde easy access to its diaspora
communities as well as the wider market in these countries.

Diaspora Integration Policies
Diaspora integration involves efforts to strengthen emotional and

12. A useful reference on Cape Verde’s diaspora policies and institutions is the International
Organization for Migration (IOM), Linking Emigrant Communities for More Development:
Inventory of Institutional Capacities and Practices (Geneva: IOM, 2010).
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material connections to the homeland, including cultivating direct diaspora
participation in all spheres of national life.12 Two important subcategories
of diaspora integration measures include the extension of constitutional
rights, such as dual citizenship, and specific policies aimed at attracting diaspora participation in development. Cape Verde has been an innovator in
both areas, although institutional and policy deficits continue to hamper its
ability to harness fully its diaspora.
Asa matter of constitutional principle, the country has embraced the
principle of political and legal equality for all Cape Verdeans irrespective of
their residence or place of birth. Granting automatic dual citizenship and the
right to vote to its diaspora sets Cape Verde apart from most other countries
with large diaspora populations. This constitutional principle has a practical
consequence beyond the importance of patriotism and emotional bonds – it
facilitates circular migration. Second, and related to this constitutional principle, universal suﬀrage was extended to the diaspora in national elections.
Cape Verde’s diaspora is one of the few in the world able to vote in national
elections. Suﬀrage is limited to parliamentary elections, rather than municipal elections. The diaspora is represented in parliament by deputies directly
chosen by the diaspora constituency. There is uncertainty in terms of taxation and social rights, such as pensions and social security, although Cape
Verde has attempted agreements with some European countries.
However, diaspora integration, such as extending suﬀrage rights, can be
a dual edge sword. It too is not risk free. There is an ever present risk that
diaspora-homeland relations will become politicized and infused with partisan divisions. As an electoral constituency, the diaspora becomes a domestic political actor. It can influence political and electoral outcomes – as it did
in the controversial 2006 presidential elections – or become embroiled in
domestic squabbles. Harnessing and mobilizing the diaspora for its development contributions in an intimately political endeavor, not a technical
or bureaucratic process. The process can easily become partisan or engender acrimony and suspicions between the diaspora and the homeland
government, thus undermining the overall national objective.
In terms of standalone policies, Cape Verde has made a lot of progress.
As discussed above, Cape Verde has been one of the largest recipients of
financial remittances in the world. Remittances are driven by personal and
familial motivations rather than primarily by policy. However, policy matters
directly and indirectly to the extent that remittance inflows are aﬀected by
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monetary and exchange rate policies, macroeconomic governance, and
general enabling conditions in the homeland. Moving beyond monetary
remittances, Cape Verdehas embraced policy innovations that have proven
quite successful. The most outstanding policy success has been the 1984 law
creating the emigrant deposit bank accounts. That policy alone has been
responsible for infusing half a billion dollars into the economy. In addition,
a number of fiscal and other incentives are in place aimed at fostering diaspora investment and circular migration. To encourage emigrants to return,
the country has a number of customs exemptions. As noted, a noticeable
trend is retired permanent emigrants returning, with their pensions. Returning
emigrants can ship their belongings, including vehicles and household durable goods, duty free. To encourage emigrants to invest in real estate, for
example, fiscal and administration fees are waived or reduced. In addition,
emigrants are also eligible for any of the investment incentives in place that
benefit foreign investors, including sector specific investments in tourism
and renewable energy.
Progress and partial success notwithstanding, Cape Verde still lacks a
coherent diaspora policy, or strategy. Its diaspora ‘policies’ are disjointed. As
Gamlen (2006) observed, for most countries, diaspora engagement policies
tend to emerge in ad hoc fashion, unplanned, driven by disparate interests
and motivations, for diﬀerent reasons at diﬀerent times. Cape Verde is no
exception. In order to harness the diaspora in the post-graduation phase of
development, a qualitative leap in policy formulation, policy coordination and
implementation capacity will be necessary. Serious policy and institutional
deficits must be addressed. There are three distinct aspects to this policy
deficit – policy mainstreaming, bureaucratic capacity, and policy coordination and implementation. Streamlining and integrating diaspora policy in all
areas and phases of development planning has never been practiced in Cape
Verde. Rather than mainstream diaspora mobilization across all policy making
and institutions, diaspora policy has been scattered and pigeonholed in bureaucratic silos. As a policy issue area, the diaspora is cross-cutting and multidisciplinary. Diaspora mobilization implicates active involvement of multiple agencies. It entails active roles from a mix of public and private sector
agencies covering finance, investment and trade promotion, customs, marketing, economic diplomacy, banking services, tourism, transportation, and
so on. Put diﬀerently, diaspora mobilization policies must be mainstreamed
in overall development planning and project implementation.
For the diaspora to participate across all modes of potential contribution,
all policy and institutional supports must be aligned. For example, observational evidence suggests the diaspora can be an important demand
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market for the country’s merchandise and tourism products. However,
tourism and trade policies have simply ignored the diaspora market despite
having a diaspora potentially twice the size of the resident population. The
2010 Tourism Strategic Plan, the first of its kind and subsequently shelved,
does not even mention the word diaspora. Despite the fact that the diaspora is doing tourism in the homeland in large numbers, there is no eﬀort to
court them, cater to them, or treat them as tourists. No eﬀort has ever been
made to market and sell the country’s tourism to its diaspora. In both policy practice and the theoretical literature, diaspora visitors are not counted
as tourists, thus Cape Verde not unusual is disregarding this market. It is a
missed opportunity. Diaspora visitors go in large numbers, especially for the
big national festivals and cultural celebrations. Even if they choose to stay
in family homes rather than the all-inclusive hotels, diaspora visitors spend
more money, stay longer and leave more in local communities through their
general vacation spending and gift giving to relatives and friends. For good
or ill, tourism is a critical sector. In the short term, Cape Verde faces a dual
challenge of increasing the national income eﬀects of tourism by diversifying the product, and increasing its linkages to the rest of the economy. The
diaspora as a tourism demand market can be a significant component of the
wider diversification strategy.
Similarly, in trade and investment policies the diaspora is missing. A major development bottleneck in Cape Verde is its small and geographically
fragmented domestic market. Incorporating the diaspora population would
potentially double the size of the ‘domestic’ market, and thus alleviate the
bottleneck of economies of scale. Despite the apparent avidity with which
diaspora consumers seek out nostalgicproducts, trade policy has never targeted this export market. Absence of a diaspora trade policy is glaring in light
of the fact the country enjoys preferential access to the world’s two richest
markets and home to its largest diaspora communities. It has a Special Partnership Agreement with the European for its exports, and duty free access
to the US market under the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). As
in tourism, there is urgent need to diversify the primary sectors in order to
address unemployment and rural poverty. Duty free access and high diaspora demand can serve as the base for transforming certain agribusiness
product chains where the country has demonstrated some potential, such
as wine and traditional alcoholic beverages, goat cheese, fresh, canned and
frozen fish, dried and processed fruits, traditional spices and sauces, and
coﬀee. To be sure, a diaspora export strategy will not be easy. Cape Verdean
producers face daunting supply side constraints, such as production limitations, financing, high cost of inputs, high transportation costs, poor quality
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management and nonexistent national certification. That is, a diaspora export strategy will require interventions along the entire product chain, from
production, to commercialization to market entry requirements. Finally, as
noted previously, a diaspora trade policy can also engender a number of
secondary eﬀects that boost growth and business development.
Despite increasing reliance on FDI, investment promotion policy does
not include any explicit diaspora investor targeting, or creative schemes
such as diaspora public-private partnerships. Several decades of heavy
public investments in economic infrastructure, in addition to government
procurement policy and privatization, never attempted to incorporate participation of diaspora investors and businesses. Cape Verde sustained nearly
four decades of heavy public investments in infrastructure. Yet no eﬀort was
ever made to target diaspora investors and diaspora-owned businesses (or
even domestic firms) to participate or bid on projects, nearly all of which
went to foreign companies. Four decades of missed opportunities in diaspora-homeland economic relations. The recently launched “Technology Park,”
data center and other ICT initiatives do not have any explicit plan to incorporate or mobilize the knowledge diaspora. Diaspora investment promotion does not require special or preferential treatment, although some countries adopt such measures. However, it does require investor targeting, with
dedicated public and private sector agencies that promote, inform, market,
and encourage a specific kind of investment or type of investor. In general,
investment promotion has been a deficient component in overall development planning.
Finally, policy coordination and implementation capacity, and the overall
human and technical deficits of public institutions, are perennial challenges
in Cape Verde in nearly all policy areas. As noted, given the absence of policy
mainstreaming, coordination among the various agencies and ministries
is nonexistent. Given the multidisciplinary, crosscutting nature of diaspora
mobilization, policy coordination and implementation capacity are critical.
Bureaucratic weakness and conflicting mandates aggravate the problem.
Municipal governments – the point of closest contact with diaspora – are
limited in resources and capacity. Diaspora focused national bureaucracies
have their own organizational and human resources limitations. The result is
they are small, understaﬀed, and under-resourced. Project implementation
and monitoring are perennial diﬃculties in Cape Verde’s public administration. For example, the ENED contains useful ideas and recommendations,
but implementation capacity is absent.

Cape Verde today is in a development crossroads. Having graduated
from the category of LDC, it must now devise a new model of growth and
development that relies primarily on internal resources. As in the past, the
country’s diaspora, as a transnational economic resource, can continue to be
one of the vital components of the new model. Notwithstanding declining
emigration opportunities and generational turnover, the diaspora remains
a viable policy option. As noted, the country’s structural characteristics
leave it with few other realistic options to spur growth and development in
the present world economy. Yet it is the positive reasons – a large diaspora
intensely devoted to the homeland, a declining but still significant role of
remittances, numerous policy and institutional innovations in the areas of
diaspora enablers, diaspora building, and diaspora integration – that make
the diaspora both a viable and significant option. Harnessing the diaspora’s
participation across all possible modes of contribution to homeland development has been one of the biggest policy challenges for homeland governments everywhere. A number of countries, such as China, India, Israel, South
Korea, and Mexico, have made progress expanding the scale and modes
of diaspora contribution. Cape Verde too has made some progress, as the
phenomenon of emigrant deposits illustrates. Other policies, such as
extending voting rights and dual citizenship, have proven eﬀective instruments to deepen the diaspora’s integration. A qualitative leap is required,
however. A more eﬀective policy and institutional framework is necessary
as is a better organized diaspora.
While this study argued that the diaspora will only increase in importance
as a development resource, it is necessarily only one component in the wider
national development strategy that must find new sources of growth and
human development. The diaspora can only be one part of a broader development strategy. The diaspora is not, and cannot be, the answer to all
foreign investment needs of the country. Nor can it ever be the sole or even
primary demand market for the country’s tourism and merchandise exports.
The diaspora is not panacea. Diaspora mobilization is not risk free, as noted
previously. As alluded, some of the diaspora integration and diaspora building
policies – emigrant deposits, extending suﬀrage – also engender certain
risks, such as exposureof the financial system and divisive partisanship.
Harnessing the full potential contribution of the diaspora is not easy, even
under the best of conditions. The diaspora’s potential as a development resource
must not be exaggerated or oversimplified. This study identified a number of
limitations and obstacles in three categories of diaspora engagement eﬀorts
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– diaspora enabling, diaspora building and diaspora integration. Multiple
policy and institutional obstacles in the homeland hamper the diaspora’s
full contribution. As a structurally vulnerable micro state in the world
economy, policy has always a pivotal ingredient underlying Cape Verde’s socioeconomic performance since 1975. The country’s enabling environment
has been critical for development as well as the diaspora’s engagement.
These enabling conditions are increasingly under strain today. Aside from
these policy and institutional weaknesses, there are also practical reasons
that will limit the diaspora’s full contribution to national development. These
limits, by and large, reflect the diaspora’s own internal fragilities. Significant
portions of Cape Verde’s diaspora in the United States and Europe are on
the social, political and economic margins of those societies, and struggle
with unemployment, legal status, inadequate housing, crime and youth delinquency, family breakdown, inadequate health care and social insurance,
and many other challenges typical in immigrant communities everywhere.
As this study argued, one of the biggest obstacle will be the diaspora’s own
lack of internal organization.
A fully articulated strategy, requiring sustained eﬀorts by both the homeland and the diaspora, will not emerge overnight. A universal formula, or
recipe, does not exist. However, Cape Verde is not starting from scratch. It
can build on a number of policy and institutional innovations and an
enabling environment. Two essential first steps, however, are necessary.
The first is the need to build up institutional capacity and commit to diaspora policy mainstreaming. The second involves actions, symbolic and concrete, to promote better internal organization of diaspora communities. As
noted, diaspora mobilization is a two-way street. The diaspora’s full contribution is crucially dependent on its own ability to mobilize and respond. This
requires eﬀective internal organization. As evidenced in the analysis above,
Cape Verde has made substantial progress mobilizing its diaspora as a vital
economic development resource. Economic transnationalism, in the form
of its diaspora communities, has always been a vital economic resource.
However, Cape Verde and its diaspora today must reconfigure their relationship to enlarge the scope and modes of diaspora contribution to homeland
development.
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ENDING SLAVERY IN CABO VERDE: BETWEEN
MANUMISSION AND EMANCIPATION, 1856-1876

Lumumba H. Shabaka*
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Abstract:
This article explores the ending of slavery in Cabo Verde by using the Committee of
Protection of Slaves and Freed-person. Rather than just following the directives from
Lisbon, it shows that local leaders were reluctant to establish the institution and
cautiously approached the abolition of slavery in the colony. Nevertheless, enslaved
Africans and their descendants fully exploited the new laws to gain nominal freedom.
Like other parts of the Atlantic world, being freed was a state between manumission
and emancipation, because there were struggles over payments, ‘rights’ for the manumitted individuals and mandatory seven years services were required by law.
Key Words:
Slavery, West Africa, Cabo Verde, Emancipation, Manumission.

Although manumission in Cape Verde started as early as the late fifth
century, the Junta Protectora dos Escravos e Libertos (Committee for the
Protection of Slaves and Freed Peoples), a legal apparatus to end slavery
in Cape Verde, was established only in 1856.1 It was a legalistic, gradual
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process in which local abolitionists seemed almost absent, and the process focused on the remuneration of slaveholders.2 Apparently, the Junta
was presided over by powerful men, perhaps mostly brankus (whites) and
mestiço (mixed), who possessed slaves, rendering them far from impartial
in deciding the fate of slaves and freed persons.3 On September 4, 1857,
the Praia City County Administration listed the population of the town of
Praia as the follows: 221 Europeans; 1,302 ‘indigenous’; and 472 slaves out
of 1,995 inhabitants.4 Cape Verde was the first racialized Atlantic slave society.
Europeans tended to assume the highest echelons of power in Cape
Verde, including being slaveholders. Thus, the Junta’s descriptions of the
stories and complaints must be read with skepticism without dismissing
all the stories, such as the sketches of the plight of slaves, otherwise these
marginalized people would remain nameless and voiceless in the annals of
Cape Verdean history.5 The baptismal records, book of slave registry, and
the Boletim Official Governor Geral de Provincia de Cabo Verde (Official
Bulletin of the Province of Cape Verde), and the Junta’s deliberations
allows some micro-history and biographical outlines that enable a better understanding of macro-structural developments, which is new to the
study of slavery in Cape Verde.
In this article, the focus is on the creation of the Junta and the social
consequences for slaves, freed people, and slaveholders. First, an introduction of the establishment of the Junta is provided. Second, then the
article explores the issues of the manumission of minors promulgated by
a new law, which required baptismal and godparents to purchase their
godchildren’s freedom. Third, the social effects of the Junta is interrogated, particularly the issues of manumission, inheritance, and complaints. Fourth, the article examines the issues of crime, punishment, and

2. For the perspective of Portuguese Empire about abolition see, João Pedro Marques, Sá
da Bandeira e of im da escravidão: Vitória da moral, desforra do interesse. (Imprensa de
Ciências Sociais Series. (Lisbon, Portugal: Instituto Ciencias Sociais, 2008); Marques, The
Sounds of Silence, Nineteenth-century Portugal and the Abolition of the slave, trans. Richard Wall (New York: Berghahn Books, 2006); Seymour Drescher and Pieter C. Emmer,
Who Abolished Slavery? Slave Revolts and Abolitionism. A Debate with João Pedro Marques
(New York: Berghahn Books, 2010); João Filho Lopes, Abolição da escravatura: subsídios
para o estudo (Praia, Cape Verde: Spleen, 2006).
3. This is not to imply that only whites and mestiços were slavesowners;
4. Boletim Oﬃcial do Governo Geral a Provincia de Cabo Verde (BOCV), Numero 18, 1857, 91,
Praia, Instituto de Arquivo Histórico Nacional de Cabo Verde (IAHNCV). The reference to
Praia would refer to only the Plateau, which is the main business district area of Praia
today.
5. Cláudio Alves Furtado, ‘Raça, Classe e Etnia Nos Estudos e Em Cabo Verde: As Marcas do
Silêncio’, Afro-Ásia 45 (2012): 143-71.

Creation of the Junta
On 1 March 1856, António Maria Barreiros Arrobas, general governor
of Cape Verde, noted that the Ministry of Trade of Marine and Overseas
enacted the Decree of 14 December 1854, which was to promote the
freeing and protection of slaves and freed persons in the overseas
provinces.7 In order to verify the manumission of slaves, the Decree stipulated that slaveholders must register a title for their slaves.8 This would
create the only substantial slave census for Cape Verde.
On 12 November 1856, in Praia, Barreiros Arrobas, governor general of
Cape Verde, demanded that ‘all the authorities’ of his government cooperate with the ‘solicitations’ made by the interim president of the Junta
to comply with the Decree.9 As the architect of the Decree, Bernardo de Sá
Nogueira de Figueiredo (but commonly referred to as Sá de Bandeira), in
December 1856, reaﬃrmed that the Junta was created:
6. Filho, Cabo Verde Abolição da Escravatura, 35-43; Philip J. Havik, ‘“A Commanding Commercial Position”: The African Settlement of Bolama Island and Anglo-Portuguese Rivalry
(1830-1870)’ in Brokers of Change, Atlantic Commerce and Cultures in Precolonial Western
Africa, ed. Toby Green (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 333-77.
7. BOCV, numero 185, 1856, 793-4.
8. BOCV, numero 187, 1856, 815.
9. BOCV, numero 200, 1856, 919.
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exile as they related to slaves and freed people (liberto), although it also
included freeborn individuals. Within the abolition strategy of the Portuguese Empire, Cape Verde’s strategy for ending slavery was similar to the
gradual and legalistic abolition of slavery in Angola, São Tomé, and other
Portuguese possession, particularly with the omnipresent specter of the
British Empire exerting pressure on the Portuguese Empire to end the slave
trade. Initially, Portugal reluctantly accepted the abolitionist pressure of
Britain, because of their debt to the latter’s support, when France invaded
Portugal, causing the monarchy to flee to Brazil in 1807. Suspicious that
the British, colluding with the French, invoked the abolition of the slave
trade, at least in the Upper Guinea Coast, to gain another foothold in West
Africa, such as with the case of Bolama, Portugal was cautiously hesitant
to loose any colonial territory.6 Economically, Portuguese was too weak
to quickly abolish slavery, but British encroachments further exacerbated
and threatened its feeble colonial grip. Moreover, the exiling of ‘criminals’
to Upper Guinea followed patterns to that of other Portuguese possessions, such as Brazil, São Tomé, and Angola, as well as Portugal itself.
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with special coﬀers, to apply manumission for infants age 5 (or younger) along
with baptism and payment of 5,000 réis to the slave owner in compliance with
Article 30 of the Decree; help slaves; promote freedom of slaves; calculate
each semester a disposable amount for next the semester to apply for manumission; they should make semiannual reports in compliance with Article 44
by providing detailed accounts of cases of manumission.10

The state imposed a tax of 200 réis on each freed slave, regardless of
age or sex, although individuals age 50 and older were exempted.
Another focus of the law was to control the movement of slaves and
end internal slavery in the archipelago. There were a series of decrees
*10 December 1836, 25 July 1842, 21 February 1851, and finally, 17 March
1852), which basically stated that families that owned slaves could travel
intra-island, but only with two slaves per family, and only with the consent
of the slave owner. Entering and departing the diﬀerent islands, the slaveholder’s family had to provide title of the slaves. In March 1857, Arrobas
notified the local authorities that the ordinance of the Ministry of Marine
and Overseas, no. 44 (10 March 1857), ‘prohibited the entry of slaves to the
island of São Vicente,’ whether from other islands from Cape Verde or the
pontas [estates] of Portuguese Guinea.11 Although slavery and the entry
of slaves were prohibited there, manumission records reveal that slaves
were liberated in São Vicente, which meant that some slaves did enter the
island. São Vicente was the last of the inhabited islands to be settled, beginning in the late 1700s. The justification for barring slavery and entry of
slaves was that São Vicente had been selected to become the new capital
and form a new economy based on supplying coal (and functioning as a
telegram center) to passing European ships, particularly the British.
Enacting these laws, however, would prove diﬃcult, especially in the
initial phase, because making the Junta functional was a gradual process,
and the appointments and nominations of oﬃcials became bureaucratic
problems. On 14 September 1858 and 3 July 1860, Pedro Marciano de Freitas Abreu, acting deputy crown attorney and agriculture, was nominated
to be secretary of the Junta.12 On 19 December 1861, Carlos Augusto Franco, general governor of Cape Verde, said that Abreu’s first position was
‘incompatible’ with the other two nominations. In the meantime, Abreu’s
replacement was Carlos Augusto.13

10.
11.
12.
13.

BOCV, numero 11, 1857, 50-1.
BOCV, numero.177, 1855, 746.
BOCV, numero 50, 1861, 229.
He should not be confused with the governor of Cape Verde, Carlos Augusto Franco.

The Administration of Municipality of Maio noted that the Ministry of Marine
and Overseas stipulated that freed slaves under Article 29 and the only paragraph of the decree of 14 December 1854 that slaves who obtained their freedom by the general law charter must serve mandatory seven years of service
in conformity with the regulation of 25 October 1853.15

There was a clarification of the law and Decree, which stated, ‘Besides
slaves belonging to the state, and in the provinces, slaves under the custody of the local chambers/municipalities and charity organizations (Misericordias), upon obtaining freedom, they must also serve the state or
corporations.’16 The corporations were private entities not controlled by
the state, such as properties of slave owners, which included slaves.
Perhaps, these seven years of service or apprenticeship for freed slaves
to their former owners created a dependency and paternalistic relation
between the two sides. In Post-emancipation period, some slaves adopted
their master’s surname and remained very close to the family, maybe, due
to survival strategies.17
During the nineteenth century, the laws became clearer on slave treatment. The Decree of 16 January 1837 stipulated that sub-delegates of ordinary judges did not have jurisdiction to rule on matters pertaining to
slaves fleeing their master to abstain from performing their obligations,

14. BOCV, numero 1, 1864, 1.
15. Secretaria Geral do Governo (SGG) Cx. N.º 576, P-04, avulso. Correspondência Recebida
do Junta Protectora dos Escravos e Libertos, Fevereiro-Dezembro 1857, 7 peças (avulso):
originais e cópias manuscritos; Praia, Instituto de Arquivo Histórico Nacional de Cabo
Verde (IAHNCV).
16. BOCV, numero 199, 1856, 910.
17. For lingering relationship between former slaves/their family and master’s family see,
Américo C. Araújo, Little Known, The European Side of Cape Verde Islands: A Contribution
to the Knowledge of a People (New Bedford, MA: DAC, 2000), 175;177–8.
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Even after appointing a presiding oﬃcer for the Junta, on 3 December
1863, Governor Franco proclaimed that the establishment of the Junta was
not functional, despite the Decree of 1856.14 Franco said that this was a
great “public failure” and that the local administration did not fulfill the
mandate of the Royal Decree. Franco said that the Junta should be operational within two months. In part, the diﬃculty in implementing the Decree was due to reluctant oﬃcers and noncompliant subjects.
On 25 February 1859, for instance, the administration of the island of
Maio noted that freed slaves resisted providing the mandatory seven years
of service.
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but issues related to farming was the responsibility of the court judge.18
However, with the creation of the Junta, these issues would eventually be
resolved though with slow-pace and favoured the slave-owners.

Freeing Slaves via the Womb and Baptism
The Law of 25 and 25 July 1855 declared that children of slave women
born in Portuguese overseas possessions were free.19 The Ministry of Marine and Oversea notified the Junta to comply with the law of 30 June 1856,
which concerned the manumission of slaves and children of slave women,
by September 1857.20 Sá de Bandeira emphasized that it was via baptism
and payment that the children of slaves would be manumitted. The Decree
of 14 December 1854, Article 6, title 2 stated that slaves that ‘belonged’ to
churches were also free.
Although Church records show that children of slave mothers were being baptized before this law was enacted, the incentive was now linked to
the mother’s womb, i.e., slave child must be age 5 or younger, were eligible for manumission via baptism but with compensation due to the slave
owner. Hence, baptism alone did not mean a slave child would be released
from bondage or repatriated to his or her kin group. The law of manumission was based on remunerating the slaveholder. The local Church and the
State continued to collaborate, just like when both sanctioned slavery,
and now they were working together to gradually abolish slavery, which
Marques coins tolerationism.21 At the beginning of colonization of the Cape
Verde with Catholicism as the oﬃcial state religion, baptism meant becoming part of a new community with a new identity (i.e., African slaves
were christened with a Christian name).22 Now, it was being used as moral
rhetoric to end their enslavement and create a new bourgeois colonial order.
The important people in the baptismal records were the godparents,
who usually provided payment for the manumission. The notion of kinship
as relates to godparents in these baptismal acts is not straightforward, but
the godparents’ significance becomes apparent as some names reappear
18. BOCV, numero 204, 1856, 945.
19. BOCV, numero 203, 1856, 939.
20. SGG, Caixa (Cx.) N.º 576, P-04, avulso.
21. Marques, The Sounds of Silence, 1-3; 22-7.
22. António Correia e Silva, ‘A sociedade Agrária, Gentes das Àguas: Senhores, Escravos e
Forros’, in História Geral de Cabo Verde, 2nd ed., vol. II. Coordenação, Luís de Albuqerque and Maria Emília Madeira Santos (Lisbon, Portugal: Cenro de Estudos de História e
Cartografia Antiga, Instituto de Investigação Científica Tropical; Praia: Direcção Geral do
Património Cultural de Cabo Verde, 1991), 313.

23. Philip Havik, Silences and Soundbytes: The Gendered Dynamics of Trade and Brokerage
in the Pre-Colonial Guinea Bissau Region (Munster, Germany: Lit Verlag, 2004), 86.
24. SGG, Cx. Nº.1, Peça N.º2, Conservatória dos Registos Centrais, folha (f.) 3.
25. SGG, Cx. Nº.1, Peça N.º2, Conservatória dos Registos Centrais, 37.
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in baptismal manumission cases. Although there is a clear Catholic dimension, godparents should not be seen exclusively from a Catholic perspective, but rather in terms of fostership and kinship groups that were common in Upper Guinea.23 In the secular realm, godparents served as part of
a social network, and cemented social bonding and mutual aid. Thus, the
following stories of slave children’s baptism represent the new initiative of
abolition of slavery in Cape Verde with godparents playing a decisive role.
The Church was an important institution in ending slavery in Cape Verde
and propagating the ideal identity of the masses. In January 1853, in the
Nossa Senhora da Graça (Our Lady of Grace) Church in Praia, M. Carmo,
a female slave of Gregorio Xavier, had a baby boy named Joaquim.24 On
3 April 1853, Joaquim was baptized and his godparents, Francisco João
Pereira and Antonia Gonçalvez Pereira, paid 10,000 réis for his ‘freedom
[liberdade] and manumission [alforio].’ The sum was twice the amount for
the prescribed manumission of children; however, this was before the
creation of the Junta. Perhaps liberdade was to remove the mandatory
apprenticeship and alforio included mandatory service.
Some cases demonstrate baptism of a slave child linked to manumission without providing any details about compensation, but clearly identified the godparents as an indication of compensation. In the Lady of Our
Grace Church in Praia, on 16 April 1856, Olimpia, slave of Gilberto da Silva, baptized her daughter Bernandina, who was born in 1855.25 With the
agreement of the slave owner, the godparents, Bernando Jozé da Silva
and Theresa Cacilda Medina ‘freed’ Bernandina, but it does not state the
amount paid. For instance, on 14 February 1856, Domingas de Aﬀonseca,
slave of Marcelino Antonio do Affonceca, gave birth to a boy named
Valentin. In February 1856, his godparents, Valentin Tavares Correia and
Maria Jozé Ferreira, baptized him, enabling his manumission. Perhaps the
mother named her son after the godfather. In a similar case in March 1856,
Jusana, slave of Antoni Francisco Costa, gave birth to Luisa. In June 1856,
his godparents, João Cabral Franco and Guiomas Leopodina Abreu, baptized Luisa, resulting in his manumission. However, the Junta also made
payment: the law stipulated that if the godparents could not remunerate
the slaveholders, the Junta would. Although some slave owners did grant
freedom without payment, baptismal records indicate that compensation
was the most common path towards ‘freedom.’
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Other cases were implicit about payment by either godparents or the
Junta by noting that slave children were manumitted in ‘accordance to
the law,’ i.e., baptism and remuneration. On 19 January 1857, in the same
church in Praia, Isabel, slave of Henrique José d’ Oliveira, baptized her
daughter Mariana.26 The baptismal record stated that the child was freed
in accordance with the law, which meant that her godparents, Antonio
Diogo and Maria das Dores Nascimento d’Oliveira, both natives of Portugal, paid the required amount.27 In addition, in 1857, Lourenço Antonio de
Lima and Henriqueta Pereira da Fonseca freed their goddaughter, Elena, a
daughter of Arcangela who was a slave of Valentim Tavares Corrêa, in the
same manner via baptism. Another example is from May 15, 1857: Maria
Fonseca, who was a slave, gave birth to Amelia and with baptism on July
26, 1857, her baby was ‘freed in accordance with the law’ by her godparents Jozé Joaquim and Rita Gomes.
Other cases illustrate that godparents paid for manumission because
local authorities received a receipt for the transaction. For instance, in January 1859, Domingas, a slave of Luis Antonio Fortes, gave birth to Paulo,
whom she baptized in May 1859 at the church in Praia.28 That the ‘receipt’ of
payment presented to Luis Antonio Fortes by Luis Mendes Lopes in accordance with the law testified to Paulo’s manumission. His godparents, Pilinio
Mendes and Maria Mendes Lopes, who were both from Praia, paid 5,000
réis, the amount stipulated by law. In addition, in July 1861, Maria de Conceição, a slave of Pedro Luiz Cordeiro, had a baby girl named Henriqueta,
and her godparents, Antonio João Menezes and Maria Purgueira de Jezus,
paid Cordeiro 5,000 réis with baptism to manumit her in January 1862.29
In September 1862, Maria Felicidade, a slave of Major Crato, gave birth
to Carolina, who was baptized. Crato received 5,000 réis, and Carolina was
freed in October 1862.30 Major Jozé Xavier Crato was a prominent member
of the military and a slaveholder. In May 1869, Major Crato freed some of
his other slaves, but the document does not indicate who paid the remuneration, if any, for Francisco, Francisco dos Santos, Marçallo, Policarpo,
Luiz Antonio, Joaquim Pedro, Theodoro, Caetano, Felicidade, Antonia,
Joanna, Violante, Lucio, and Eugenia.31
Other acts of manumission did not indicate that any godparents, compensation, or reference to ‘the law,’ which suggests that slave owners
26. SGG, Cx. N.1, Peça N. 2, Livro de 1855, f.46.
27. SGG, Cx. N.1, Peça N. 2, Livro de 1855, f.46.
28. SGG, Cx. N. 1, Peça N. 2, Livro de 1855, f.76.
29. SGG, Cx. Nº. 1, Peça N.º 2, Livro de 1855, f.130.
30. SGG, Cx. Nº. 1, Peça N.º 2, Livro de 1855, f.145.
31. BOCV, numero 38, 1869, 226.

Table 1. Manumitted Child Slaves Recorded in City of Praia of Santiago, 1-30
March 1863.
Number
Of Slave
Holders
70

Number of
Registered
Freed Persons
126

Male
65

Female Amount of
Observations
Emolument
for each slave
61
500 réis
Amount
Retained by
the Junta:
31,500 réis

Source: Boletim Oﬃcial do Governo Geral da Provincia de Cabo-Verde, N. º 14, 1863, 76.

Manumission and Ambivalent Freedom
‘Freedom’ was an ambivalent notion, because manumission did not
mean the end of service to the owner or the state. In the Atlantic world,
it was usually an apprenticeship of seven years, which was to inculcate
the bourgeois notion of work and citizenry, because freed slaves tended
to work for self-sustenance. The meaning of citizenship and freedom was
still tied to religion, race, class, and social origin. In January 1863, the Junta
stated that it should use the money in its coﬀers to free slaves, because
slaves were petitioning for assistance on a daily basis, but the Junta also
was cognizant of its budgetary limitation in order to have money for
other expenses.34 Privately owned slaves could purchase their freedom,
but state-owned slave were automatically manumitted. Freed slaves

32. SGG, Cx. Nº. 1, Peça N.º2, Livro de 1855, f.66.
33. SGG, Cx. Nº. 1, Peça N.º2, Livro de 1855, f.66.
34. SGG, Cx. N.º 576, P-09.
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granted manumission on their own volition, but this was the most unlikely
path towards ‘freedom.’ In May 1858, Banlha/Ganlla, a slave of Manoel Saches Freire, gave birth to a boy, Christened José.32 In June 1858, José was
‘freed in the act of baptism with the consent of his owner.’33 Likewise, in
May 1862, Maria da Graça, slave of Luis João Pinto, gave birth to Eugenia.
By receiving a baptism in August 1862, her slave owner manumitted Eugenia. Neither case acknowledged any godparents or reference to ‘the law.’
Unless the Junta recompensed the slaveholders, the latter gratuitously
freed their slaves. Below, in table 1, is a sample of slave children manumitted in 1863.
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carried a carta de liberdade (freedom letter) to prove their new status. Conflict and tension ensued due to price dispute for manumission and when libertos, freed slaves, had to perform the mandatory seven years of service.
Slaves also filed petitions about harsh treatment and refused to do work,
and slaves attempted to benefit from the new legislations by interpreting
the new laws to their advantage. Finally, the government also emancipated
some slaves when the Junta and individual eﬀorts were not enough, particularly regarding special cases.
In March 1859, the Junta demonstrated the diﬃculty in complying
with the Ordinance of the Ministry of Marine and Oversea (Ministerio da
Marinha e Ultramar). The case involved ten freed slaves that were to serve as
sailors (marinheiroz d’ Armada) under the commander of the Sado War Brig
(Commandante do Brigue de Guerra Sado).35 In accordance with Article 29
of the Decree of 14 December 1854, the local administrator of the island
of Maio (Concelho de Maio) stipulated that the freed slaves should follow
this order. In Maio, Manoel Loﬀ, a liberto, pulled out a knife and demanded
his freedom rather than becoming a sailor. The local authorities of Maio
deemed Manoel Loﬀ ’s reaction as menace to the social harmony of the
island and submitted a petition to the Junta. Libertos contested this type of
freedom, which was an apprenticeship. The local authorities of Maio sent
Manoel to Praia, the capital, on the schooner Abelha for deliberation by
the Junta, claiming that his act disturbed ‘public tranquility.’
In May 1858, the reverend bishop of Cape Verde presided over a complaint by Pedro Semedo Cardozo that his liberto, Antonio, ‘refused to
work.’36 The Junta stated that libertos may be reluctant to work, but that
the law obligated them for continued service. Once manumitted, libertos
were sometimes sent to another island to complete their service. For
instance, in 1868, the Junta mentioned that some freed slaves were sent to
Sal, which included Cecilio, a liberto of Pedro Semedo Cardozo.37
The colonial government implemented ‘public works’ by conscripting
members of the lower classes. In July 1864, on Maio Island, the colonial
state used slaves for ‘public works’ because their owners could not sustain them during the ‘crisis,’ i.e., the chronic drought and famine in the archipelago.38 However, 156 slaves were ‘excluded’ from this work, because
former slaves ‘complained’ that their slave owners abandoned them anticipating the rainy season (as aguas). The Junta emphasized the potential

35. SGG Cx. N.º 576, P-04, avulso.
36. SGG, Cx. N.º576, P-05.
37. SGG, Cx.576, P-12, avulso.
38. SGG, Cx. N.º 576, P-08.

Prominent Woman Slaveholder: Dona Maria de Santa Frederica
In São Nicolau Tolentino Parish, part of Praia County in Santiago, Dona
Maria de Santa Frederico was a prominent woman. In the Lusophone
Atlantic world, people used the title dona to indicate respect for women
of high status. Dona Frederico had at least twenty-one slaves. A baptismal
record of São Nicolau Tolentino notes that she was ‘the fourth in filiations
of all the parish.’41 Perhaps Dona Frederico was a Church enthusiast, but
she was also very concerned with the material goods of life.
In December 1868, the Junta had a hearing concerning a petition made
by Paulo, a slave of Dona Maria de Santa Frederico, in a dispute regarding
the price for manumission.42 Eduardo José Rodrigues Fernandes, secretary of the Junta, who owned at least two slaves, had written to the judge
of São Nicolau Tolentino Parish (Maria de Santa Frederico’s residency at
Agoa de Gato fell under that jurisdiction) to uphold or dismiss the amount
of 40,000 réis, which the Junta deemed fair.43 In 1868, in São Nicolau Tolentino Parish, Joaquim Pereira de Carvalho was the justice of the peace

39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

SGG, Cx. N.º 576, P-09.
SGG, Cx.576, P-12.
SGG, Cx. n.23, peça 2, Registo Civil da Praia,156.
SGG, Cx. N.º 576, P-04, f.9.
BOCV, Numero 38, 1869, 226; SGG, Cx. N.º 576, P-04, f.11.
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for ‘robbery’ by and of depraved slaves. Given the owner’s negligence for
food provisions during famine, slaves rebelled by using violence to survive.
The Junta’s greatest complaints concerned disputes over the price of
manumission, because slaves were anxious to take advantage of the law to
quickly secure their freedom. Lucas Augusto, a slave of Libania Amarante
Augusto, exemplifies the struggle for adequate compensation. In December 1864, the Junta considered Lucas Augusto’s petition regarding the
price of his manumission. Libania requested 20,000 réis for freeing Lucas,
who apparently found this too expensive.39 The Junta resolved the quarrel, but as a liberto he still had to agree to the seven years of mandatory
service to his former owner. From Praia, the Junta sent Lucas Augusto to
Sal.40 Perhaps the Junta paid for the remaining amount, and Lucas worked
in Sal collecting salt, which was one of the main exports of that island.
There were several prominent slaveholders and disputes over price, and
I will provide details about these cases. For instance, a prominent woman
slaveholder was Dona Maria de Santa Frederico.
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(juiz de paz) and José Antonio Frederico and Francisco de Barros Souza
were the substitutes.44 The judge that Fernandes wrote to was probably
Carvalho. At any rate, Paulo had paid 30,060 réis for his freedom, but the
slave curator explained that his owner demanded 80,000 réis. In December
1868, the Junta said that the price was ‘excessive’; the local judge of São
Nicolau Tolentino and Junta finally agreed to a ‘maximum’ price of 40,000.
Dona Maria de Santa Frederico consented to the new price, prompting the
Junta to demand that Paulo gives the remaining balance of 9,940 réis. At
the end of the deliberations, the Junta recommended that the governor
uphold the decision rather than ‘nullify’ it, and they extolled the slave
owners because Dona Federico acquiesced to the ruling.45
Dona Frederico’s female slaves, Marcella, Carlota Frederico, and Cecilia
Frere, had children.46 Despite the fact that the children had been baptized,
there are no indications that Dona Frederico emancipated them. In October 1854, Marcella gave birth to twins, Luis and Maria.47 In January 1855,
Marcella baptized her twins. Their godfather was Luis João de Carvalho,
a resident of Penda, and the twins had two godmothers, Maria Claudio
Semedo, a resident of Tamosisra, and Luduvina Lopes, a resident of Pinha.
The document does not explain the reason behind the selection of two
godmothers but only one godfather. The baptism of the twins in 1855
occurred before the Law of the Womb of 1856.
Even with the enactment of the Law of the Womb, the children of Dona
Frederico’s female slaves remained in slavery. In May 1864, her slave, Carlota Frederico, had a baby girl, Maria. In May 1864, Carlota baptized her
daughter with the assistance of her godfather, Ijedoro Rodrigues, and her
godmother, Maria Rosa Gomes; both were from São Nicolau Tolentino and
native to the island of Santiago. Again, there was no manumission. In February 1868, Cecilia Frere gave birth to a boy, Nicolau. In April 1868, Cecilia
Frere baptized Nicolau; again, the child remained in bondage. However, in
May 1869, Dona Frederico liberated the following slaves: Felicianno, Adrianno, Agostinho, Guilherme, Serafim, Cezar, Augusto, Anastacia, Jezuina,
Julia, Maria Guilhermina, Luiza, Joanna Ribeiro, José, Virginia, Catharina,
Gloria, and Marcella.48 It is most likely that Marcella was the mother of Luis
and Maria. Besides Dona Frederico, another major slave-owner was Pedro
Semedo Cardozo.

44. BOCV, Numero 48, 1868, 202.
45. SGG, Cx. N.º 576, P-04, f.10.
46. SGG, Cx. N.º 23, peça 2, vulso.
47. SGG, Cx. N.º 23, peça 1, Registo Civil da Praia, 98.
48. BOCV, Numero 38, 1869, 227. The document is silent about restitution.

Pedro Semedo Cardozo was a resident of Colegio in São Nicolau Tolentino Parish.49 There was a João Jose Semedo Cardozo, resident of Colegio,
who was most likely his relative.50 The slave census of 1856 indicated that
Pedro Semedo Cardozo owned twenty-seven slaves. With the addition
of Felizberta, he owned twenty-eight, which was quite high for the Cape
Verdean context.
Table 2. Slaves’ Background for Pedro Semedo Cardozo
Name
Mathias
Dionizio
Pedro
Francisco
Noberto
Candido
Cezilo
Jozé
Thomas
Ambrozio
Claudino
Nicolau

Born
Guiné
Guiné
São Tiago
São Tiago
São Tiago
Guiné
São Tiago
Guiné
Guiné
São Tiago
São Tiago
São Tiago

Felipa
Violante
Jezufina
Luiza
Camila
Theodora
Maria da Conceição
Constança
Gregoria
Thereza
Joaquina
Francisca Nº 1
Francisca Nº 2
Marcelina
Roza

São Tiago
São Tiago
São Tiago
Guiné
São Tiago
São Tiago
Guiné
São Tiago
São Tiago
São Tiago
Guiné
Guiné
Guiné
Guiné
Guiné

Age
40
40
41
21
46
24
20
74
3
2
Five
months
47
31
21
24
18
15
47
26
28
22
34
34
32
10
36

Skin Color
preto51
fula
fula
fula
fula
fula
fula
fula

Occupation
farmer
farmer
farmer
carpenter
farmer
pastoralist
farmer

preto
preto
mulata
preta
preta
preta
preta
preta
fula
preta
preta
preta
preta
preta
preta
preta

49. SGG, Cx. N.º 23, peça 02.
50. SGG, Cx. N.º 23, peça 02, Registo Civil da Praia, f.117.
51. In general, there was a three-color code system in the slave census,: preta (black), mulata (light-skin), and fula (brown). The Portuguese believed that some ethnic Fula were
not “jet black,” whereas slaves, whether born in Cape Verde or from Upper Guinea, were
sometimes described as cor fula (fula color).
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The census indicated that Roza paid 30,000 réis for her manumission on
July 4, 1867.52 However, the road to manumission for Roza was a decadelong legal battle. In 1857, when Metheuz Severino de Avellar was curator
of slaves and libertos, he noted that Roza, a slave owned by Pedro Semedo
Cardozo, went to Avellar’s house and gave him 20,000 réis in the presence
of Thomas da Costa Ribeiro and Evaristo António Ramos de Figueiredo to
buy her freedom.53 Avellar wrote to Cardozo inquiring about the price that
Cardozo required for Roza’s freedom.
About ten years later, in July 1867, the Junta was considering the circumstances of this case, because the amount given to the former curator
of slaves was a matter of contention. Avellar testified that he delivered
20,000 réis to Cardozo; Roza stated that she had given 90,000 réis to Avellar. Evaristo António Ramos de Figueiredo allegedly received ‘a certain
amount’ from Roza. Cardozo claimed to have kept 20,000 réis for manumission. Roza paid more to Evaristo, who transferred the money to her
slave owner, but Cardozo said that 5,006 réis remained for Roza’s emancipation. It is diﬃcult to discern the truth, but after ten years, Roza insisted
on her position, despite facing very powerful men. If she was fabricating
the story, she was quite courageous.
Pedro Semedo Cardozo’s female slaves had children. The mothers baptized their children, yet Cardozo did not manumit them, which implies
that he demanded indemnification. For example, Cardozo’s female slave
Francisca Semedo had a baby boy, Anibal.54 In October 1858, Anibal’s
godparents, Thomas da Costa Ribeiro and Henriqueta Leopoldin de Mendonça, both from Colegio and natives of Santiago, baptized her at the São
Nicolau Tolentino Church, yet without obtaining freedom.55
In a baptismal record, Maria Joaquina was listed as a native of Guiné
and a ‘servant of Pedro Cardoso.’56 In January 1868, Maria gave birth to a
baby boy, Sebastino, described as being born a slave.57 In June 1868, in the
São Nicolau Tolentino Church, Father Pedro Rodrigues Tavares baptized
Sebastino. ‘The godparents were José Bernardo Rodrigues, a farmer, resident of Fegueira Branca and Roza Maria Tavares,’ a slave of Father Tavares,
a resident of Colegio, both natives of Guinea.58 In July 1870, Maria Joaquina

52.
53.
54.
55.

SGG\F2.2\Lv0863, f. 11 frente (f)-f.14v.
SGG, Cx.576, P-011; These two men must have been of high social standing in Praia.
SGG, Cx. N.º 23, peça 2.
This must be the same Thomas da Costa Ribeiro who was present when Roza, a slave of
Pedro Semedo Cardozo, paid Avellar for her freedom.
56. SGG, Cx N.º 23, peça 2, Registo Civil da Praia, 161verso (v).
57. SGG, Cx. N.º 23, peça 2, Registo Civil da Praia, 161v.
58. SGG, Cx. N.º 23, peça 2, Registo Civil da Praia, 161v.

The slaves are indolent by nature, and the laws are incomprehensible to them;
they understand that they have legal protection, and they assume they should
not work for their owners and that slave owner cannot obligate them to work,
because they will not obey the owners, which results in disobedience. The
owners punishes them, but slaves argued that the laws prohibit them being
physically punished.61

The Junta emphasized that slaves should be protected in conformity
with the new law, but they should also be punished when they commit a
crime. According to the Junta, ‘in Angola, S. Thome and other Portuguese
possessions, where there is still slavery, they are corporally punished, in
accordance to the crime they committed.’62 The Junta articulated religious
and moral parameters to restrict any severe physical punishment in according with with Decree of 16 December 1854. But some slaves did not
just rely on the will of the master, but used the Junta for fight for their
manumission.

59.
60.
61.
62.

SGG, Cx. N.º, peça 2, Livro No.3, Registo Civil da Praia, 77.
SGG, Cx, N.º 23, peça 2, Registo Civil da Praia, 178v.
SGG, Cx. N.º 576, P-09.
SGG, Cx. N.º 576, P-09.
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gave birth to a baby girl.59 Joaquina, however, was listed as resident of São
Felippe and liberto of Pedro Semedo Cardozo. With her ‘freedom,’ she no
longer lived in Colegio with her master. Presumably she still worked for
him, but preferred to live in a diﬀerent place. In July 1870, in Our Lady of
Grace Church in Praia, Father Simeão Gomes Correa, baptized and christened the baby girl as Maria. The godfather was João Tavares and the godmother was Joanna Maria; both were single and farmers.
Finally, in December 1868, Felizberta, a female slave of Semedo Cardozo, had a baby boy.60 In February 1869, the boy was christened Januario.
His godparents were Lucio Lopes and Archangela Lopes, both single and
residents of Colegio. Once again, Cardozo did not grant manumission. As
one can see, for most slaveholders compensation was essential for manumission.
Slaves also tried to manipulate the new laws in their interest. For
instance, the Junta wrote that:
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Accusations and Counter-Accusations: The Case of the Female
Slave Thereza
Besides issues of money, the Junta received complaints from slaves and
other entities. In Praia, on 19 April 1859, Thereza, a slave owned by Maria
da Conceição, filed a complaint with the governor general counsel (Conselheiro Governador Geral) that Maria ‘maltreated’ her by inflicting injuries.
Subsequently, the case was sent to the Junta. Maria claimed that Thereza
“slowly” inflicted injuries to her hands and feet with the sole purpose of
not doing work.63 Maria da Conçeião allegedly claimed that her neighbor Maria Ignocencia witnessed this and notified another neighbor, José
Sanches. Apparently, a person named Barbara also ‘testified’ that Thereza
‘was not touched and not even threaten[ed].’ Maria Ignocencia confirmed
Maria da Conçeião’s statement. When the Junta interrogated Thereza, she
confessed to the falseness of her complaint.
The Junta said that this black woman ‘was so perverse’ that she stole
600,000 réis from her owner’s money hidden in a tin can on top of a table a few days later. She fled to the backyard of the house with the tin
can, cracked it open, and stole and hid the money. Apparently, Maria da
Conçeião confronted her, but Thereza did not confess. Her owner found
most of the money buried but Thereza adamantly denied any guilt. The
rest of the money was found with a third person. The Junta recommended
an ‘appropriate’ punishment. The punishment might have been corporeal
or some jail time, which was common for individuals convicted of crimes.
The Junta also heard cases about the legality of the enslavement of
some slaves. On 3 May 1862, in Praia, the Junta began deliberating the
legal status of Domingos, a slave of Agostinho José Rodriguez, resident
of Santiago.64 They made their decision on 8 May 1862. The Junta noted
that the secretary of the general governor had not registered Domingos.
He was a native of Bissau, but was not counted by customs when he entered Cape Verde with Lieutenant Colonel Aloves da [Piola Deziasasky].65
Domingos came from Bissau in 1845 on the Portuguese war grig, Vouga.66
The Junta argued that it did not have the documents to determine his freedom. If the documentation of his registration existed, it was ‘inadvertently’
given to the curator of slaves. In other words, the bureaucracy could
not locate his documents, which made determining his status difficult.
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Eventually, the Junta noted that a certain certificate demonstrated that
José was ‘imported by contraband.’ The Decree of 1836 banned the importation and exportation of slaves in Portuguese possessions. Because of
this, the Junta decided that Domingos technically arrived as a free person.
Moreover, Agostinho José Rodriguez did not have the right to register Domingos with the Slave Registry. On 23 May 1862, Junta said that Agostinho
should properly register Domingos and ‘obtain clarification in the documents.’
Even slaveholders petitioned the Junta for assistance. On 14 January
1862, Antonio da Costa Ferreira Borges petitioned the Junta to have José,
a liberated slave who was a native of Bissau, to be sent to his homeland.67
Jose was hospitalized, but Borges complained that this was a financial burden for him. Hence, Borges argued that his former slave was ‘deranged’
and he pleaded with the Junta to assist José’s return to his homeland where
he could best convalesce. Borges might have been more concerned about
what this freed slave was costing him than José’s heath. The document
does not provide José’s ethnic group or his exact homeland in the Guinea-Bissau region. Moreover, the document is silent about his age or if he had
another name. José had been in Cape Verde for about seventeen years.
The Junta also paid for the manumission of adults. Gregorio was a native of Santiago, age 26, black, and owned by João Cabral Franco.68 On 26
April 1863, in the praça across the street from Our Lady of Grace Church
in Praia, Franco auctioned Gregorio to Francisco Cardozo de Mello. With
Mello’s death, his son, Francisco, inherited Gregorio. On 3 December 1867,
Gregorio paid 50,000 réis, with the Junta providing 15,000 réis, for his manumission. In another case, the Junta manumitted Luiz, who was the slave
of Jozé Monteiro d’ Almeida, a resident of São Thiago Corado Parish on 14
July 1866.69 Luiz was a mason, a native of Guiné, and age 26 with ‘facial
markings.’
Although issue of inheritance, such as the case of Gregorio, could be
straightforward, other cases were complicated and people sought
assistance from the Junta. On 30 August 1869, the Junta considered an
application by Dionizia Sanches Lopes and Maria dos Reis da Fonseca that
demanded ‘manifesto’ (pronouncement) concerning three freed slaves,
Athanasio, Antonio, and Lucas, who were owned by Antonio Lopes da
Costa.70 The three slaves submitted documents requesting their freedom.
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The Junta noted that due to the ‘instructions of 28 May 1868 [they] denied
the solicited registration because there was a lack of endorsement of past
manifestos by the requesters.’71 This referred to Article 6 of Decree of 28
October 1857, which stipulated that a new ‘possessor’ must register the
slave as evidence before manumission. Because Antonio Lopes da Costa
died after the proclamation of the Decree of 25 February 1868, the documents were deemed ‘insuﬃcient.’ The Junta noted that Antonio Lopes da
Costa had died ‘more than four years ago,’ which meant Dionizia and
Maria’s petition for these slaves was legally diﬃcult to succeed. The resolution was that ‘legitimate heirs to the couple’s assets’ prevailed rather than
the unlawfully submitted manifesto.
On 2 October 1865, the Junta said that a plethora of slaves lodged
grievances daily about lack of sustenance as well as maltreatment.72 The
Junta emphasized that when both sides of the stories (from slaveholders
and slaves) were heard that the majority of the complaints were false. The
Junta adjudication was quite prejudicial because those deliberating were
well established and some were slaveholders.
In addition to manumissions being issued by the Junta, the governorgeneral also provided freedom letters for slaves. In 1856, Francisco Alberto
Azevedo, a resident of Praia, had six slaves. Four of them were from Guiné
and the other two, Viriginia and Julia, were born on São Tiago Island. Both
under age 5, which suggests that their parents were one of his Guinean
female slaves, Constança and/or Jozepha.
Table 3. Francisco Alberto Azevedo’s Slaves73
Name
Jozé de Azevedo
Pedro
Constança
Jozepha
Virginia
Julia

Born
Guiné
Guiné
Guiné
Guiné
São Tiago
São Tiago

Age
20
20
30
30
4
1

Color
fula
preto
fula
preto
preto
preto

The governor-general issued a freedom letter for Pedro.74 In May 1863,
the local authorities altered this information in the slave census of 1856,
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which means that Pedro was freed between 1856 and 1863. In January
1857, Francisco Alberto Azevedo freed his female slave, Constança, but
the local authorities only added this information in the slave census in May
1867.75 This was when the push to end slavery in Cape Verde was well underway and keeping updated records became crucial.
Others, nevertheless, were only freed when their owners perished, such
as in November 1859, when the death of Maria da Penha Franco, a resident
of Praia, freed Rufino in her will.76 The latter was a male, from Guiné, age
35, and described as black. On November 1859, Maria da Penha Franco Jaz,
who was a slaveholder, passed away in Praia.77 (This is not to be confused
with Maria da Penha Franco who passed away on the same date.) In her
will, Jaz emancipated Forentina, a woman, age 45, from Guine, and also labeled black. Dona Anna de Mendonça, a resident of Colegio, divided some
of her slaves among her relatives in her will.78 According to the slave census of 1856, Dona Mendonça had eleven slaves: Paulo Semedo, Manoel,
Maria, Jozepha, Maria da Boa Esperança, Izabel, Aniceta, Felisberta, Ignes,
Bernardina, and Sabina. Ignes was 20 years of age, born on São Tiago
Island and described as fula. In May 1855, Ignes had a baby named Bernardina, who was baptized in June 1855.79 The godparents were Paulo Nunes
and Maria Luanta, both residents of São Nicolau Colegio. Neither the baptismal record nor the slave census mentions her being manumitted. When
Dona Mendonça died, in February 1866, her daughter, Dona Maria Semedo
Ferreira, inherited Izabel, who was from Guiné, age 50, and Ignes, a native of São Thiago, age 20, and described as fula. In February 1866, Pedro
Semedo Cardozo inherited Felizberta, a female slave from Guiné, age 21,
and black.80 Therefore, manumission came gradually: despite the founding
of the Junta in 1856, in Cape Verde, slavery was not completely abolished
until 1876.
Although obtaining freedom could be a legal nightmare, libertos,
former owners, and the state had diﬀerent notions of ‘freedom.’ Thus,
‘freedom’ created tensions and conflicts. The state and the elites used free
labor for their personal interests, and legal institutions, such as the Junta,
usually provided control mechanisms. The colonial state inculcated that
an exemplary ‘free’ people were good citizens who perform work for the
polity and those who freed them, whether state, private owners, or charity
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organizations. The Catholic Church was instrumental in developing the ‘free’
citizenry by serving as the institution via which manumission was conducted
via baptism, but along with the state, it upheld the compensation to the
slave-owners. It was, perhaps, a Portuguese Catholic bourgeois notion of
citizenry, which is diﬀerent from the Weberian notion of a Protestant work
ethic. In the history of the Portuguese Empire, the discourse about the
criminal exiles (degredados) was usually laced with religious overtones of
impurities that required spiritual purification. James Sweet believes, that
‘The logic of banishment mirrored that of purgatory: Once cleansed of
one’s sins after a period of strict penance, a convict could reenter society and
live an upright godly life.’81 Thus, slaves as heathens (gentios) once freed
(liberto), needed tutelage to become true citizens, i.e., civilized, which the
mandatory service for freed persons entailed to accomplish.

Exile to Upper Guinea
The Junta meted out punishment not only to libertos who were ‘lazy’
but also to those who committed ‘crimes.’ There is a direct link between
slaves and prisoners, because the curator of slaves was also the curator
of poor prisoners (curador de escravo e presos pobres). Rebellious people
and those deemed criminals in Cape Verde were a reservoir of foot soldiers. Exile in the Portuguese Empire was used extensively and later colonial powers, such as the British and the French, used it in Africa and other
regions. Just like in Brazil and Portugal, degredados were sent to Africa;
Cape Verde sent them to mainly Portuguese Guinea. In Brazil, there were
loose vagrancy laws that restricted movements and gathering of people to acquire people to serve in Angola.82 The number of convicts sent to
West Africa shows that the colonial government desperately needed foot
soldiers in the praças, especially those who were resistant to malaria, i.e.,
Africans.
In Cape Verde, sending exiles to the mainland started with the colonization of the archipelago during the late fifteenth century. Exile was an
important factor for commercial activities (i.e., slave trade and ‘legitimate’
trade) and to wage a war of terror to that eventually would consolidate
Portuguese Guinea. In October 1861, in Praia, Carlos Augusto Franco,
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82. Roquinaldo Ferreira, Cross-Cultural Exchange in the Atlantic World: Angola and Brazil during the Era of the Slave Trade (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012) 192–3.
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governor of Cape Verde, emphasized the need to establish with ‘urgency’
a regular means of communication between the fledgling Portuguese
Guinea and Cape Verde. Finally, the governor suggested that regular communication would be good not only for the two colonies, but for commerce, which had declined in recent times.
In Portuguese Guinea, elite Cape Verdeans, including slave-owners,
commanded the fighting forces of degredados that consisted of free poor
individuals, slaves, and libertos. In 1861, for instance, Major José Xavier
Crato, a major slaveholder and graduated major of battalion of artillery of
Cape Verde (Mayor Graduado do Batalhão d’Artilheria de Cabo Verde) was
nominated to be auditor for the War Councils.83 In February 1863, Major
Crato, acting as interim governor of Portuguese Guinea, ratified an old
treaty of 1843 with the Felupe of Matta de Putama.84 From at least 1862
to 1865, Major Jozé Xavier Crato led numerous military expeditions and
signed treaties with African rulers. During this period, the Portuguese
were at war with several African groups for which they desperately required foot soldiers. For instance, in the military fort (presidio) of Geba,
they were in conflict with the nearby Beafadas of Badora.85 Major Crato
was selected to head a delegation to Geba. From the Portuguese perspective, this antagonism by Beafadas attacking the fort stifled trade, particularly because Cape Verdean/Portuguese merchants on the estates (pontas)
had established themselves in the slave trade and were making the transition to ‘legitimate trade.’
A prominent case handled by the Junta concerned libertos from São
Nicolau Island. In December 1857, João Antonio Leite, an administrator
for the Saint Nicholas County (Concelho de São Nicolau), lodged a petition
about libertos who had ‘abandoned’ their masters and were ‘robbing in
the streets’ and ‘turned vagabonds.’86 Leite requested that the Junta to
deal with this ‘scandal’ to bring ‘calm to the inhabitants of that island.’
In December 1857, Reverend Robert Fernandes Pinto, president of the
Junta, wrote that it was beyond his authority to determine the ‘necessary
punishment’ for the libertos. Therefore, Pinto submitted the case to the
governor general counsel (Conselheiro de Governador Geral) in December
1857.87 In January 1858, Arroba, the governor of Cape Verde, wrote to the
Portuguese government seeking ‘authorization’ for the Junta to send the
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libertos to a ‘military colony’ in the Rio Grande. The document is silent
about the authorization, but given that there were cases from the Junta of
Justice about exiled convicts sent to West Africa, and that a major slaveholder, Major Crato, led a military expeditionary force from Cape Verde to
Portuguese Guinea, it is highly unlikely that this request was denied.
In summary, the Junta of Protection of Slaves and Libertos ushered in
the end of slavery in Cape Verde, even though it was gradual, legalistic,
and elitist driven. The Catholic Church and the state collaborated to end
slavery in Cape Verde, but with financial recompense for the slaveholders.
Furthermore, libertos had to serve seven years of service to the state or
private entities, probably to instill notions of wageworker, rather than free
peasant. A popular form of punishment was ‘public works,’ which the state
used to implement major projects or control the libertos, slaves, and the
poor majority. Thus, ending of slavery in Cape Verde was caught between
manumission and emancipation. While they were manumitted, libertos,
had to perform mandatory services, against their wills and full citizenship
or emancipation was still lacking. Besides mere passive agents in history,
slaves and libertos used the new law and institution to gain greater freedom and more rights for themselves or just to improve their lot in life.
Godparents were vital in manumitting their godchildren, which underlined
the sense of kinship and social bond between them.
Like other parts of the Black Atlantic, libertos, ‘liberated Africans’ had to
undergo the mandatory apprenticeship tutelage to become true citizens,
i.e., civilized. Thus, they were in a limbo between freedom and enslavement, which occurred with liberated Africans in Brazil, Cuba, Sierra Leone,
Luanda, and so on. For the Portuguese Empire, particularly for Cape Verde,
the Catholic Church played a vital role in instilling a Catholic outlook that
deemed a civilized and full-citizen, ipso facto, was also an upright Catholic.
The historiography of abolition of the black Atlantic have centered on
three arguments: Clarksonian (Thomas Clarkson, Reginald Coupland, Leslie
Griggs, Seymour Drescher, W.E.H. Lecky, Crane Brinton, Howard Temperley, and João Pedro Marques, etc); the decline school (Eric Williams, David
Ryder, Selwyn Carrington, etc); and the revolt school (Michael Craton, Hilary
Beckles, Richard Hart, Elikia M’Bokolo, Herbert Aptheker, etc.). With the
exception of João Pedro Marques, these schools of thought focus primarily
on the British Empire, thus superimposing a British imperial outlook on
these processes. Moreover, the imperial framework overlooks that perspective of the colonies or colonial possessions. In the Portuguese Empire, indeed, there has been a tendency to downplay the African colonies, such
as Cape Verde, São Tomé e Princípe, Angola, Portuguese East Africa, and
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‘Portuguese Guinea’ as a determining factor in how the ending of slavery
unfolded. In the Portuguese Empire, João Pedro Marques promotes the idea
of tolerationism, as a passive stance about the eventual natural demise of
slavery, but neglects in depth focus on Lusophone Africa as it concerns the
ending of slavery.88 With the case of Cape Verde, abolishing slavery was
intricately linked to the colonizing enterprise on what became Portuguese
Guinea. Libertos, degredados, criminals, etc, were used as foot soldiers and
functionaries to spearhead the colonizing eﬀorts and protect territories
against British and French incursion into what would become ‘Portuguese
Guinea’.
João Lopes Filho persuasively suggests that rural property holders,
usually slave-holders, were not aﬀected by the British pressure, despite
in 1836, Sá de Bandeira outlawed re-exporting of slaves from Portuguese
possessions and the 1842, Luso-British Comission of 1842 in Boavista to
end slave traﬃcking, but Filho underscored the social tension.89 Indeed,
António Carreira highlighted how social conflicts, including slave revolts,
degredados’ rebellions, and famines played a part in the decline of slavery.
Rudolphe Paul Widmer challenges Carreira’s theory of demise of plantation slavery model in Cape Verde during the eighteenth century or before; by illustrating with detail examples that this only occurred in the mid
nineteenth century with the oﬃcial push toward abolition.90 Nevertheless, James Duﬀy underscored that for the third Portuguese Empire that
slavery and slave trade was crucial for Angola.91 In the same vein, Augusto
Nascimento notes the persistency of slavery and slave-like labor in São
Tome from the nineteenth century to the twentieth centuries, with contract laborers, contratados, from Cape Verde to São Tomé.92 Other studies
by Frederick Cooper, Rebecca Scott and Thomas C. Holt underscore that
post-emancipated societies that freed-people had to negotiate
the meaning of freedom, which was constrained by issues of race, labor

Lumumba H. Shabaka

132

and citizenship.93 Even before this post-emancipation reality, enslaved
individuals were in a liminal state of existence between manumission and
emancipation, in which issues of labor, citizenship, race, and religion determined their new status.

93. Frederick Cooper et al., Beyond Slavery: Explorations of Race, Labor, and Citizenship in
Postemancipation Societies (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000).
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